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ABSTRACT
NOTHING PERSONAL: A DEFENSE OF NON-LIBERTARIAN INCOMPATIBILISM
SEPTEMBER 1999
BRUCE C. GALBREATH, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
A.M., SMITH COLLEGE
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Vere C. Chappell
Using a belief-desire causal account of doing, I develop the idea that we are not
agents, not unmoved movers, but rather doers, passively moved movers. I criticize certain
compatibilist accounts of self-control (primarily that of Alfred Mele), and then go on to
explore the (lack of) moral status of certain sorts of robots that Daniel Dennett has
described. Then I argue that we are not different in kind from such robots and share with
them in an immunity from literal moral accountability due to a lack of the sort of ultimate
control that I argue such accountability requires.
Next I examine, and criticize, Harry Frankfurt’s influential example of the
counterfactual intervener. I argue that, while it does succeed in overthrowing the
principle that our being morally responsible requires that we face alternative possibilities,
that it does not provide as much support for the compatibilist view as many have
supposed. I then go on to criticize certain claims due to P.F. Strawson and Susan Wolf
that conceiving of ourselves as morally responsible agents is either psychologically
inescapable or a necessary part of having a life worth living.
Finally, I turn to a brief exposition of what I conceive of as a substitute for moral
evaluation: the assessment of role responsibility.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In what follows I present an exploration and defense of a particular philosophical
view, which I call non-libeitanan incompatibilism. As I see it, this view springs from a
theory about a concept central to prevailing common sense evaluative practices, the
concept of ‘moral responsibility’. In these introductory remarks I will try to sketch out
the territory that we shall be covering.
A. What is the Status of the Concept of ‘Moral Responsibility’?
In my view, there are such things as our common sense practices based on moral
responsibility. However, I do not believe that these practices rest on a well-formed,
unitary concept of ‘moral responsibility’. Instead, it seems to me that common sense
moral evaluations rest on an ambiguous set of concepts. A concept of moral
responsibility is compatibilist if being responsible in that sense is compatible with one’s
will being externally or extrinsically causally determined. If a concept of moral
responsibility is not compatible with such determination, it is incompatibilist. I think that,
in our common sense moral evaluative practices, we use both incompatibilist and
compatibilist accounts of what makes for moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness,
and often do not notice that these different construals are inconsistent with each other. As
a philosophical matter, I think we are simply faced with inconsistent concepts. However,
if we are careful in distinguishing which ones we are using, I think we need encounter no
difficulties. We might label the differing concepts with subscripts (morally responsible,,
morally responsible2, etc.) or link them to the names ol prominent proponents (‘morally
responsible’ in Hobbes' sense or in Roderick Chisholm’s sense as of 1976 in Person and
Object 1 ).
B. A Necessary Condition of Moral Responsibility
A condition is necessary to one of our concepts if, that condition not being met,
we would withhold from applying the concept. If some condition is necessary to common
sense moral responsibility, then, if people found out that some putatively morally
responsible people did not meet that condition, they would either refrain from holding
those people morally responsible or at least recognize a conceptual oddity in continuing
to do so.
For example, I take it to be one of the necessary conditions for the literal
application of the concepts of ‘morally responsible’ and ‘punish’ that a personal agent,
who has control, performs some action. Suppose that Jones is very troubled by a rising
river that is encroaching on his property. Suppose that he takes up a whip and begins to
flail at the water with it. Suppose further that he explains to us that he is punishing the
river because it is doing moral wrong by going outside its bounds and endangering his
property. Suppose that we ask Jones if he was speaking metaphorically and that he says
he is being literal. Since I take control to be necessary, I would assume that Jones was
taking the river to be a personal agent with control over where it directed its water. That
is, I would suppose that Jones was taking the river to be an agent, someone that could be
dissuaded by Jones’ flailing, which he thinks of as punishing the river. If Jones told us
that he was not making any assumption that the river’s behavior is under any agent's
control, then that would reveal that his concepts of ‘punish' and ‘moral wrong’ (unlike
mine) do not have as a necessary condition that a personal agent control some action. As
I understand the concept of ‘moral responsibility' that is common sense in my current
society, it has ‘control by an agent’ as a necessary condition.
1
Roderick M. Chisholm, Person and Object . (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1976).
2
Jones concepts may be tine ones, and it may do him good to understand what the
river (and he) are doing in their terms, but, if I am right about that control condition, they
diverge from the common sense concepts we share. To the extent that people hold control
necessary for moral accountability, they would not describe what Jones was doing as
punishing someone or something.
C. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
As I have said, I think common sense moral evaluation is a mixture of
incompatibilist and compatibilist elements. Incompatibilism, briefly put, I take to be the
view that being caused to do what I do is incompatible with my being morally
accountable for doing it. Compatibilism is the view that my being caused to do something
does not rule out my being morally responsible for doing it. It appears to me that
common sense practitioners of moral evaluation resist compatibilism. If they feel inclined
to negatively morally evaluate someone, they do not say, “So what?” when it is suggested
that the person’s doing was caused. Instead they deny the claim. Compatibilists, as I have
described them, would be nonplussed by such a suggestion. Typically, common sense
moral evaluators say something such as, “No one made you do it” to one they would
blame. Common sense moral evaluators accept that, if people who do things are caused to
do them by extrinsic causes ultimately beyond their controls, then they cannot help doing
them, and are consequently not morally responsible for the trouble their doings cause.
However, when the cause of the doing is an internal mental factor, such as a desire,
common sense moral evaluators are quite disinclined to consider that sort of causation as
morally excusing. This is the compatibilist pole of common sense, the view that people
are responsible for doing things if they want to do them, that is, if their doings are caused
by their desires. This is where my view, non-libertarian incompatibilism, diverges from
common sense. I hold that if our motives, our desires, are caused by factors ultimately
beyond our controls, then, despite being internal to us, they are not things we control. If
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we do not control them, I do not see our having the desires we do as proper bases for our
being properly held morally responsible.
There are (at least) two types of incompatibilists, the libertarian and the non-
libertarian. Libertarian incompatibilists hold that moral accountability requires that we
perform actions without being caused to do so, and that we sometime do perform such
actions. Non-libertarian incompatibilists, such as myself, also hold that moral
accountability would require that we perform actions without being caused to do so, but
doubt that we ever perform such actions. Libertarian incompatibilists typically claim that
persons, as agents, sometimes make things happen through their actions, and non-
libertarian incompatibilists do not. As an incompatibilist, I think there is an important
conceptual distinction between something happening due to naturalistic causes (or by
chance) and an agent making something happen by his or her action. For compatibilists, I
suppose, an action is merely a sort of naturalistic cause, a link in a chain of causes, itself
caused and causing in its turn. However, I accept the incompatibilist analysis of the
concept 'action' given by libertarian incompatibilists such as Carl Ginet and Robert
Kane. For Professor Ginet, actions are events that are (at least in part) causally simple
mental events that are themselves uncaused 2 . For Professor Kane, responsible agents
must be the sole authors of what they do, must have a power of “underived origination” 3 .
However, unlike Professors Ginet and Kane (who I take to be libertarian
incompatibilists), I question whether these concepts of ‘agency’, ‘action’, ‘authorship’,
and ‘origination’ have any real-world instances. That is, I question whether anyone ever
acts. I believe that human beings do things, and these doings cause effects, outcomes that
the doings make happen. However, I suspect that every case in which we make things
happen are doings (events that are the effects of sufficient prior causes or happen by
2
Carl Ginet, On Action , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 15-20.
3
Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.79ff.
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chance) rather than actions. As a non-libertarian incompatibilist, I believe that our doings
are, at most, intermediate factors, proximate causes standing between earlier causes and
some later effects.
D. Motivations for Non-libertarian Incompatibilism
Accounts in terms of agents seem to intuitively make attributions of personal
responsibility plausible. However, upon reflection, it does not seem to me that agent-
based accounts are particularly satisfying as explanations of things that happen. If
something happens and I want to know how it came about, being told that Jim just did it
does not seem to me very helpful. It may helpfully direct my inquiry, leading me to try to
find out more about Jim and his dispositions to be moved to do things. However, by
itself, to say that Jim did it is no more an explanation than to say that God made it happen
as it did. In both sorts of explanation, we identify the agent who allegedly brought about
the event that interests us, but are then immediately faced with questions about how and
why the agent produced an event with these particular, detailed properties. As parts of
attempts at scientific explanations, agentic accounts strike me as of little or no value.
Incompatibilist agents are uncaused causers. If they existed, they would originate
new causal chains. This is what would make them morally responsible for doing as they
do. However, I do not see how beings with wholly naturalistic powers could be agents of
this sort, especially if we allow for a comprehensively deterministic natural causal order
(as compatibilists must). Many compatibilists doubt that comprehensive causal
determinism is true, but their position requires that they not rely on any assumption that
implies the falsity of comprehensive causal determinism. I recognize that the fact that I
do not see how something (such as an incompatibilist agent) could come to be is not an
argument against its existing. However, that puzzlement is part of my motivation for not
accepting libertarian incompatibilism. As uncaused causers or ultimate originators, it
seems to me that libertarian agents would have literally supernatural powers.
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I think that part of the common sense conception of the nature of human beings is
that they are different in kind from the rest of nature. In a sense, rolling stones choose
their paths down a hillside. In a sense, a lion chooses which individual antelope from
among a herd to pursue. Most of us hold that the choices that human persons make are
different in kind from these other sorts of choice. It is part of my divergence from
common sense that I doubt that what we do is different in kind from what a lion, or even
an insentient stone does. While what we do is much more complicated and sophisticated,
I see all these choices as moved movings. The naturalism I find myself favoring has at
least the advantage of healing what had seemed to be a breach between us and the rest of
nature. However, I recognize that what seems to me an advantage is to many others an
intolerable flaw.
Given that I have motives for not being a libertarian incompatibilist, why not join
the majority of reflective thinkers in the contemporary philosophical community and be a
compatibilist? If there are no libertarian incompatibilist agents and actions, then isn’t the
proper response to find a different account of what makes for morally responsible action?
Maybe it would be, if we could find a satisfactory account. However, I have not found
any of the compatibilist treatments of moral responsibility I have examined to be
satisfactory. It does not seem to me that any of them leave the putative agents with the
right sort of control over the things they do that would be necessary for their being
morally responsible for doing them.
E. Some Proposed Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility
Even though I have written above about the common sense concept of 'moral
responsibility’, I do not believe that there is a fact of the matter as to what are, or are not,
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a human being’s qualifying for proper moral
accountability. Instead, I think that various people have different opinions about what it
takes to qualify for moral blame or praise, and I see no principled, non-question begging
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way to adjudicate between these contrary opinions. For some, merely causing harm is
sufficient for being an evil person, even if I cause the harm unknowingly or
involuntarily4
. For Thomas Hobbes and Jonathan Edwards, what it takes is my wanting to
do something harmful (and doing it). For Harry Frankfurt, as I understand his views,
what it takes is doing something that I want to do and my endorsing my being moved by
that desire. There are many other accounts. In fact, it strikes me that, of all the accounts
that I have examined in detail, I have yet to encounter perfect agreement between any two
individual thinkers on these matters. While it is no proof, such marked variability among
the accounts suggests to me that there may be no fact of the matter at all. Given my
suspicion that there is no fact of the matter about the proper analysis of the concept
‘morally responsible’, how can I argue in favor of one account: non-libertarian
incompatibilism? 1 do not argue that it is true and that the other accounts are false, but
instead contend that 1 ) our common sense moral evaluative practices rest (in part) on
incompatibilist presuppositions and 2) that we do not have the incompatibilist powers that
common sense moral attributions presuppose we have.
One putative necessary condition of proper moral accountability is some sort of
knowledge. Jesus held that ignorance exculpates (“Forgive them, for they know not what
they do.” 5 ), but others, such as R.M. Adams, disagree. I think that there is a special kind
of badness that comes with ignorant or oblivious harm-causing, but that it is not moral
badness. I would rather face a person who agreed with me on the description of what he
was doing (harming me) and who had ill-will toward me than someone who denied I was
being harmed. I could appeal to the first by offering reasons in ways that I could not
appeal to the second.
4
Robert Merrihew Adams, "Involuntary Sins", Philosophical Review , (Vol. 94), no. 1 January
1985.
5 Luke 23:34
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Foi the purposes of this discussion, I take it as a given that we have a set of social
piactices that include our making moral evaluations about ourselves and each other, and
that our engaging in these practices is part of what counts as common sense in our
culture. It a set ot social practices rests on metaphysical or empirical claims that are
conti oveisial, then it seems to me that any reason to doubt the underlying claims casts a
corresponding doubt on those practices. The moral evaluations that we make provide a
rationale for sanctions, socially contrived consequences added to the uncontrived natural
consequences that follow on what we do. To the extent that the evaluations that justify
these social practices of positive and negative treatment of each other are dubious, then
our confidence in engaging in these practices is weakened (at least to the extent that we
reason consistently about these matters).
I claim that our current common sense moral evaluative social practices rest on
faith in a metaphysical thesis, that human beings are free agents in an incompatibilist
sense. 1 hold that, at bottom, the conception of agency that best makes sense of our moral
evaluative practices is a libertarian incompatibilist one. Despite holding that view, I do
not claim that libertarian incompatibilism amounts to the whole of the common sense
view and that compatibilism is contrary to common sense. Instead, I believe, common
sense moral reactive attitudes and moral evaluative practices rest on both libertarian
incompatibilist and compatibilist beliefs or presuppositions. However, the view I defend,
non-libertarian incompatibilism, is contrary to common sense, or at least to what has been
our common sense up until now. Perhaps that will change some day. However, if I am
right that common sense rests on both libertarian incompatibilist and compatibilist
presuppositions, then, to the extent that those two views are contrary to each other,
common sense incorporates a deep conflict.
In the conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant claimed to have shown that
the issues of whether God exists, whether human beings are free, and whether human
beings continue to exist after death are permanently beyond the power ot reason to settle
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either way. I do not dispute that he showed these things. I take his practical aim to have
been to piotect faith in positive answers to these issues from skepticism, yet it has long
struck me that the appropriate response to his demonstration that these claims are beyond
settling is a withholding from either the positive or negative assertion about them. In any
case, if our customary practices do rest crucially on such faith, then those practices of
assessing people as morally blameworthy or praiseworthy will not work well for those (if
any) who lack the faith.
Positive religious belief in the absence of unmistakable divine revelation depends
on having faith. Our institutions and practices for securing social cooperation used to
depend on religious claims (or at least many people believed in that dependence). For
example, many people have believed that there was a cosmic account keeper, a being that
was aware of everything that happened and that was powerful enough to see to it that any
infraction of the social rules would not pay. For people who hold such beliefs (and who
are rational), seeing to their compliance with social rules required little social effort. Such
people believe that no one can get away with or ultimately benefit from behavior that
harms others. If such religious believers respond to the reasons that they take themselves
to have, then they would never engage in forbidden behavior in front of God’s all-seeing
eye. While these beliefs are still widespread, they are no longer close enough to universal
acceptance to count as part of common sense. There are plenty of people who no longer
have the requisite beliefs, and to the extent that their cooperation is required in social
efforts, different measures will be called for.
There likely are several necessary conditions for the proper application of the
concept ‘morally responsible’. To discuss all of the candidate conditions that have been
proposed and defended would take me too far afield. Instead, I will concentrate on the
purported condition that most interests me: control.
Most common sense moral evaluators believe that individuals can do things on
their own, that they almost always have effective control over their own behavior. If
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practices ot social coordination and cooperation are based upon this belief, and if the
belie! should come to be doubted, then those practices may well be damaged. Claims
about God are claims about a person with certain extraordinary powers. I think our claims
that we are agents, beings who can just make things happen are also extraordinary, and in
a similar way. In both stories, there is a being in effective control of (and hence
responsible tor) what happens. If what counts as common sense is a matter of what most
people believe, then I take it that the common sense account of agency is not just that we
act independently of external influences, but also that we have mastery over those
external influences. Believing in their own free agency and their ability to make what
they want to happen, people depend on their ability to control themselves in dangerous or
disorienting or extremely tempting circumstances and depend on their ability to control
those circumstances. Sometimes we get into difficulties that perhaps could have been
avoided given a different image of what we are: highly interdependent beings of strictly
limited powers, embedded in a network of both natural and social causes. This is my non-
libertarian image of what human beings are.
F. Other Relevant Concepts
1 . Common Sense
As I have already indicated, I believe my views have implications for our
common sense moral evaluative practices. However, to give an adequate account of what
counts as common sense is beyond anything I do here. Instead, I will rely on the reader’s
intuitive understanding. Still, to give at least some rough guidance for this discussion, I
do need to make some remarks about common sense, at least the part of it which bears on
moral evaluation. I take it to be part of the common sense conception of things that there
are agents, persons who are, to some extent at least, independent sources of activities,
beings who do things in an originative way. This conception need not deny that persons
are subject to influences bearing on what they do, but it is inconsistent with any view that
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portrays the behavior of human beings as wholly the effects of ultimately impersonal and
uncontrolled causes (or of such causes plus uncontrolled eruptions of chance). In this
aspect, common sense is at odds with non-libertarian incompatibilism, but it is also at
odds with compatibilism (to the extent that that view makes room for thoroughgoing
determinism). However, many practitioners of common sense moral evaluative practices,
when pressed about ultimate control, will withdraw from what I see as implicit
commitment to libertarian incompatibilism to such seemingly more moderate claims as
that persons act with a degree of independence, but not in total independence of external
influences. This expresses what I take to be the compatibilist aspect of common sense.
Despite defending non-libertarian incompatibilism, I still consider myself to be
operating from an only slightly modified common sense framework. One thing that
leaves my treatment here within such a nearly common sense framework is my liberal use
of beliefs and desires in explaining what people do and how they come to do what they
do. Explanations in terms ot beliefs and desires strike me as the heart of common sense
accounts of our behavior (as opposed to explanation patterns that leave them out, such as
strict behaviorism). Beliefs and desires are common sense explanatory tools, yet I wind
up using them in ways that put me at odds with common sense, which holds that people
are frequently morally responsible for what they do. I hold that my beliefs and desires
arise through causes I do not ultimately control, but that those beliefs and desires, in turn,
control what I do. This puts what I do under the ultimate control of forces with respect to
which I am passive and strips me of the sort of agency which I believe common sense
attributes to human beings. I explore this matter further in the next chapter.
2. Common Sense and Responsible Action
I claim that it is part of common sense moral attributions to take responsible
human actions to originate from agents. “Jones did it." must be in some way the ending
point in explaining what happened if he is to be held morally responsible. It there is a
1
1
further explanation of Jones doing what he did in the form of another person (who
coeiced Jones, or shoved Jones, or tricked him with false information), then many
common sense practitioners will refrain from assigning moral responsibility to Jones, and
will hold instead that the moral responsibility rests with the inducing agent. However, if it
appears that Jones, while not induced to do what he did by any other person, was induced
by happenings that were not someone’s doing, then sometimes Jones will be held morally
responsible and sometimes not. It appears to depend on the sort of inducing factors at
work. Seizure disorders and brain tumors frequently are held to exculpate, while having
unusual beliefs and desires often is not.
When children misbehave, they often seek to escape punishment by saying,
“Jimmy made me do it. He started it!"’’ The disapproving parent typically responds to the
lirst half of this account, “No one can make you do anything. You did it all by yourself.”
This is an archetypically libertarian incompatibilist utterance. The second half of the
child's claim is also an incompatibilist claim. The one who begins a process is morally
responsible for what happens. Kant, in characterizing the libertarian position, wrote of
"the absolute spontaneity of an action, as the proper ground of its imputability." When I
decide freely to rise from a chair, Kant writes, "this resolution and act of mine do not
form part of the succession of purely natural effects, and are not a mere continuation of
them. In respect of its happening, natural causes exercise over it no determining influence
whatsoever. It does indeed follow on them [natural causes, temporally], but without
arising out of them [causally]; and accordingly, in respect of causality though not of time,
must be entitled an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances.'"’
“The buck stops here” said President Harry Truman. He might just as well have
said, “Things start out from here.” In the process of passing the buck, the buck is
responsibility. When you attempt to fix responsibility for something on A, he may deflect
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, trans. (New Yonk: St. Martin’s
Press, 1965), pp. A 448-452.
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it by identifying B as the truly responsible one instead. When you confront B, she may
deny ultimate responsibility by pointing to C, etc. Truman, by not passing the buck,
implicitly identified himselt as the truly responsible one, the causal origin of whatever
happened, at least within the political sphere of governmental doings.
I have come to be skeptical about the existence of beings who actively start causal
chains. Such beings may exist, and we may be among them, but I see, as yet, no compel-
ling reason or argument to believe that we are. Instead, I suspect we are causal
transmitters, things that act only as a result of being acted upon (or by chance). If we are
causal transmitters who never ultimately originate anything, then that leaves us no
different in kind from the rest of what I take to be nature. However, if we are genuinely
originating agents, libertarian incompatibilist uncaused causers, true creators forging the
tirst links of new causal chains, then it strikes me that we are beings of a quite
extraordinary sort. To understand how we could be things of that sort, I seem driven to
thinking of human beings as somehow above natural causal processes, as somehow
super-natural.
A metaphor for understanding myself that appeals to me is that of a lens. The
shape of a lens, the material of which it consists, and any material in which it is immersed
fully determine how light passing through it will be modified. Yet, if we focus on the lens
as foreground and leave the facts of its composition, shape, and environment in the
background (or out of our attention altogether), then how the light is affected seems to be
a property, even an action, of the lens. That is, the lens has a power to modify the energy
(light) that it encounters. Like a lens, I believe I do shape the energies that flow through
me, in a characteristic, even a unique way, but, I hold, that shaping is not ultimately up to
me. How I transform the influences that affect me reveals something about my properties,
about the way I am. However, unless I control having those properties, then how those
influences work themselves out through me is not my action. A glass lens, despite
affecting the light that falls on it, is passive. It seems to me that to be genuinely active, I
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would have to have some power to shape the energies that impinge on me differently than
I do. If I lack such a power, then I am not in control of how I shape those energies and am
therefore not responsible for how I shape them.
3. Determinism and Non-self determination
The classical arguments for non-libertarian incompatibilism have been hard
determinist ones, based, tor example, on Laplace’s conception of a determinist universe.
He wrote, “Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces
by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it -
an intelligence sufticiently vast to subject these data to analysis - it would embrace in the
same formula the movements of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the
lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain, and the future, as the past, would be
present to its eyes.’’ 7 Such a comprehensively deterministic outlook has attracted me in
the past. However, considerations of quantum physics have led me to strongly doubt that
Laplacean determinism is true. This is why I focus on non-self determination 8 rather than
causal determinism. If classical Laplacean determinism were true, then even though it
might require an infinitely powerful information processor, facts about the future could
be known in advance. What I have read by quantum theorists gives me two reasons for
questioning the claim that we live in a Laplacean universe. First, it seems that the concept
of ‘a complete specification of what is going on at an instant of time' does not apply to
physical systems in our universe. One major interpretation of quantum theory is that,
antecedent to our measurements of them, physical systems are not in determinate states
but rather are in a superposition of contrary states with varying probabilities of being
found to occur when a measurement or observation is made. Even after we have observed
7
Pierre Simon de Laplace, A Philosophical Essays on Probabilities , F.W. Trustcott and F.L.
Emory, trans., (New York: Dover, 1951), p. 4.
8
1 borrow this term from a discussion by Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 27-30.
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a system as carefully as we can, there seem to be principled limits to knowing what went
on. Second, the indeterminacies that appear in quantum accounts of physical systems
seem to imply that how some quantum transitions (such as certain radioactive decays)
occur is strictly a matter of chance 9
. To the extent that future states of the world depend
on when and how these superpositions collapse or these transitions occur, no amount of
understanding about causal laws and current conditions will equip even an infinitely
powerful calculator to predict those future states now. It seems that they depend on
events that have not yet happened and which do not have sufficient causal antecedents in
the present.
For all I firmly know, some of the events we regard as human doings happen as
they do by chance, as a result of uncaused quantum events. This might mean that the
quantum superposition of contrary probabilities could have collapsed differently than it
did. If so, then when I did something, it would be true that the event that was my doing
could have been different from what it was. Chance conditions, with respect to the
happening of which I (along with everything else) am passive, could have made it the
case that I did differently from what I in fact did. However, I do not see how the
operation of outbreaks of chance that I do not control could contribute to my having an
agentic power to do differently than I do. This last would require that I faced more than
one available alternative and controlled which one happened, without being caused by
anything I did not control to bring it about as I did. This is the incompatibilist picture of
the choice situation. To be in such a situation requires that the future not be determined to
a single one of those seeming alternatives, and if there are genuine quantum
indeterminacies, we may have that much. However, I see no compelling reason in
9 Don Howard, "Holism, Separability, and the Metaphysical Implications of the Bell
Experiments", in James T. Cushing and Ernan McMullin eds, Philosophical Consequences ot Quantum
Theory
,
(South Bend IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 224-247.
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quantum theoiy (01 anywhere else) to believe that any human being is ever actually in
such a situation that he or she controls which alternative happens.
It the quantum considerations that indicate we live in an indeterminist universe,
liddled with chance events, hold up, then that saves us from being determined in every
detail of what we do by events that happened long before we were born. But it does not
put us in charge of how we shall be or what we shall do.
4. Agents as Self-Movers
In what follows, I mark a difference by using the terms ‘act’ and ‘do’ and their
derivatives. Briefly, libertarian incompatibilist agents, who act, are self-movers, while
compatibilist or non-libertarian incompatibilist doers are moved by other things to do as
they do (or do it by chance). Libertarian incompatibilist agents, by acting, do things all by
themselves, independent of causes that they do not control, while compatibilist or non-
libertarian incompatibilist doers do not exercise such independent powers. That
difference, personal independent origination, is what, in my opinion, qualifies libertarian
incompatibilist agents properly to be held responsible for their actions, and its absence is
what disqualifies compatibilist or non-libertarian incompatibilist doers from properly
being held morally responsible for what they do.
If there are such libertarian incompatibilist self-moving beings, I argue that their
existence and operation is not consistent with their being wholly the products of natural
processes and with their activities occurring solely within the bounds of natural laws.
5. Naturalism
My foregoing remark raises the question of what counts as a naturalistic
framework. This is another large question, perhaps not so intractable as the question of
what counts as common sense, but again one to which I can here direct only a few
remarks. Randolph Clarke, writing as a libertarian incompatibilist, comments in a recent
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essay that it cannot be assessed whether someone’s view is compatible with naturalism
without an account of what naturalism requires 10 :
Daniel Dennett claims that naturalism precludes any libertarian variety of free
will
,
as do Bruce Waller 1 ^ and Thomas Nagel 1 '. Unfortunately, none of these authors
says much about what he takes naturalism to be. Here is my attempt to characterize
‘naturalism': the methodological assumption that all events happen solely as a result of
causes, chance, or a combination of the two. For any event E, either E is a link or an end
point on a causal chain. If it is the first link, it happens by chance. If it is not the first link,
then it is caused by the prior links. Naturalism, as I characterize it, rules out non-chance
initiations of causal sequences. As I understand libertarian incompatibilist actions, they
are non-chance initiations of causal sequences. As such, they are incompatible with my
version of naturalism.
6. Control
I claim that among the necessary conditions for something’s being morally
responsible is that it exercise a very strong sort of control over what it does. I interpret
‘control' as a causal notion. If one thing. A, controls another thing, B, then some relevant
state of B is caused by some relevant state of A. The thermostat being in a particular state
causes the furnace to ignite, its being in another state causes the furnace to turn off. This
relation between states constitutes the thermostat controlling the furnace. Similarly, to the
extent that a person controls some event, how it happens depends causally on some state
'"Randolph Clarke, “Freedom and Determinism”, Philosophical Books . Vol. 36. Number 1,
January 1995, p. 12.
I
I
Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting , (Cambridge MA:
M.I.T. Press, 1984).
12
Bruce N Waller, Freedom Without Responsibility , (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1990).
13 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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ot heis. Typically, we speak ol personal control over an event only when the state of the
putative controller is a propositional attitude, such as wanting the event to happen.
There are (at least) two sorts of control: proximate and ultimate. The thermostat’s
control over the furnace is proximate because its internal state (the position of a metal
strip) is itsell causally controlled by a further state, the temperature of the room where it
is. The thermostat would have ultimate control over the furnace only if its internal state
were independent ol any such external factor and yet not just a matter of chance; that is,
only it the thermostat were self-controlled rather than room temperature controlled. Aside
trom the conceptual puzzle of reflexive sell-causation, I note that such a device would be
unsuitable lor our purpose of linking the furnace’s operation to the temperature of the
room. We want thermostats to be completely under the control of their environments. It is
that causal linkage that makes them useful to us. Anything that weakened that linkage
would diminish their usefulness.
7. Moral and Non-moral Goodness
Consider a case in which a knife fails to cut a rope because the knife is dull.
Given our end, cutting, we would be moved to reject the knife as an intrinsically
defective item of its kind. It fails as a knife, although it might serve admirably as a letter
opener. In short, it is not a good knife. Whatever sort of goodness this is, it is not moral
goodness.
Now consider a case in which a person, Jones, fails to further our interest in
having a pleasant companion because Jones has such properties as a disposition to be
impatient with other people and to be intolerant of what he sees as their flaws. Given our
interests, we would be moved to reject Jones as an intrinsically defective item of its kind.
He fails at being a pleasant companion, although he might serve admirably as a drill
sergeant, or athletic coach, should we ever need one. He is a bad dinner companion. I
think that the sort of badness Jones exemplifies here is not moral badness.
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In both the case of Jones and the knife, the goodness or badness is not categorical,
but instead relative or hypothetical. Jones and the knife are bad in that they do not well
serve our purposes. Relative to other purposes we might have, they are good, that is, well
suited. Considei the soit ot compatibilist who believes that all evaluative properties either
are naturalistic properties or supervene on such properties. It seems to me that such a
compatibilist cannot make the strong distinction that separates the knife’s goodness or
Jones’ badness from genuine moral goodness or badness. Perhaps, for such
compatibilists, human moral badness would be a generalized unsuitability to anyone’s
purposes, a sort of multi-faceted disposition to cause harm. For me, genuine moral
badness would require not only a disposition to cause harm, but also an agent’s having a
special sort of control over causing that harm that I do not believe would be consistent
with thoroughgoing naturalism, especially in the form of comprehensive causal
determinism.
G. Practical Implications
My (incompatibilist) intuitions lead me to believe that the acceptance of non-
libertarian incompatibilism would imply major changes in what have been our common
sense practices. If someone comes to believe in non-self determination, then I believe that
would be likely to cause a diminishing of certain characteristic sorts of negative attitudes
toward those who we believe have caused certain sorts of outcomes we believe are
harmful. That particular sort of negative evaluative attitude is what I identify as moral
disapproval, indignation, or resentment In the final two chapters below I try to describe
how I imagine such changes would be like and to defend them against the contention that
they are psychologically impossible.
19
CHAPTER II
BELIEFS, DESIRES, AND SELF-CONTROL
A. An Account of Doings
I subscribe to a belief-desire causal account of rational human doing . It seems to
me that compatibilists, for the most part, subscribe to a belief-desire causal account of
rational human action . They hold that when people have desires to do things and beliefs
about which means are most likely to lead to their satisfaction, then that will cause them
to perform actions consisting in employing the means to seek satisfaction of the desire (or
else the agent will be revealed as irrational). When the time comes that I do something, I
take it that I am then moved by what is then the strongest among the desires to which I
am subject. Otherwise, if I am not so moved, then I suffer from an outbreak of conative
irrationality. If what I do is rationally comprehensible at all, it is the outcome of my
strongest belief-desire complex at the time of the doing.
When it comes to actions, I am an incompatibilist. I agree with thinkers such as
Professor Carl Ginet, who contends that actions cannot be caused, or at least cannot be
caused by things independent of the agent’s control 14 . However, I take it that what I call a
‘doing’ (in contrast with actions) can be the effect of causes independent of the one who
does whatever it is that gets done. I hold that when people have desires to do things and
beliefs about promising means, then that will cause them to do something: to employ the
means to seek satisfaction of the desire (or else the doer will stand revealed as irrational).
Doings, in this sense, are moved movings, the conveying of causal force from one time
and place to another. By contrast, I take it that actions would be unmoved movings, the
14
Carl Ginet, "Can the Will Be Caused?", Philosophical Review , Vol. 71, 1962.
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originations of new causal chains. The agents of such actions might be influenced by
ciicumstances that the agents do not control when they perform the actions, but those
influences can at most incline but never causally necessitate them to perform the actions.
While I take it that we do many sorts of thing, I doubt that any human being has ever had
the power to perform an action, in the sense of ‘action' I have indicated.
I do not claim that explanations in terms of beliefs and desires constitute the best
way of accounting for what we do, but merely that common sense explanations are just
about always of this sort. Also, I recognize that compatibilists who are comfortable with a
belief-desire causal account of (what they consider) actions would disagree with my view
that being caused to do something by a desire is morally excusing. For compatibilists
such as Hobbes, my having been caused to do what I did by my wanting to do it is
precisely what makes for my being morally accountable. As Hobbes puts it, “I say, what
necessary cause soever precede an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that does it
willingly may justly be punished.” 15
. Hobbes apparently subscribed to a belief-desire
causal account of what he called action (and what I would call ‘doing’). On his view, the
will was identical to the last desire present before the doing. “In deliberation, the last
appetite or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is
that we call the WILL.” 16 This suggests to me a psychology in which people are subjects
to a single desire at a time. It seems to me that I am typically subject to many desires at
once. My will (which, I agree with Hobbes in taking to be the effective desire that moves
me) is the last and the strongest. If what Hobbes means by ‘my desire' is what I would
call ‘the resultant of all my desires at a time', our psychologies would agree.
Suppose that we are moved movers. That is, suppose that our desires do cause us
to do what we do, in ways that we do not ultimately control. Specifically, suppose that we
15 Thomas Hobbes, “Of Liberty and Necessity”, in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and
Necessity , Vere Chappell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 24.
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , R. Tuck, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.
44-5.
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neithei conti ol having the desires we have nor having the specific propensities to be
moved by the various desires that we have at a given time, that is, the priorities among
our desires. As I have already indicated, I believe that ultimate control over what we do is
a necessary condition ot our being properly held morally responsible for doing it. If we
do not control the causes of our doing what we do, then I do not believe that we are
properly held morally accountable for doing what we do. If what I do is the result of
causes I do not control, then, while I do the things, I do not ultimately cause them to be
done or control their being done.
One counter-move to this way of taking things is to identify me with my desires,
so that when those desires cause something, that amounts to my causing them as well. I
have at least some sympathy with this move. I believe that, at bottom, I am a subject of
passive mental states and experiences. I take myself to be a subject of beliefs and desires,
and I believe, with respect to those states, that I come to have them passively, that is, by
processes that I do not control. Others (such as Thomas Reid 17 ) have held that human
beings wield active mental powers in addition to being subjects of passive mental states,
but I see no reason that moves me to agree. Despite my sympathy with the claims of a
thinker such as Michael Levin 18 that I am to be identified with the set of my beliefs and
desires, I think that his move to ground my being properly morally accountable for
having and for being moved by my desires fails. Even if we suppose that I am my desires
or my desire-dispositions, I still do not control the causes of what I do. That is, I do not
control having the characteristics that characterize me. If I am my desires, I coincide with
the cause of what I do (my desires). There is no spot to insert a wedge between my doing
something on my own and my being caused to do it by the state of my desires. However,
there is still a problem: while I (my desires) cause what I do, I do not control myself. That
17 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man , (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1969).
18
Michael E Levin, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem , (Oxtord: Clarendon Press, 1 979),
p. 236ff.
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is, it I am my desires, and if I do not control having those desires, if they arise due to
causes I do not control, then I do not control being who I am or being the way I am. My
being a bad peison because I have bad desires that lead to harm makes me a
natui alistically (non-moially) bad person. However it does not plausibly amount to my
being a morally blameworthy person because I lack control over my having the desires
that constitute me and cause what I do.
It I am not my desires, then what am I? I conceive of myself as a subject of
desires, but a passive being, along for the ride, carried forward by my having the desires I
do. My function, as such a conscious subject of experience, is, I speculate, to be some
sort of synthesizer or narrator of an ongoing account of what (it seems to me) is going on.
Perhaps just exercising that function would make me an agent if I were actively in control
of the synthesizing or the narrating. However, it does not seem to me that I control such
vital components of these processes as what it occurs to me to think about or which
desires I notice myself having, and the relative saliencies and priorities among the things
that do come up for conscious rumination.
When I say that I subscribe to a belief-desire causal method of explaining
people’s doings, I do not mean to say that all our doings are explainable. Rather, I claim
that, when they are explicable, claims about beliefs and desires are what do the
explaining. By contrast, suppose that someone claims that she did something actively and
denies that she was passively moved. She contends that her action was not caused by her
beliefs and desires, but at most influenced by them. Thus far, it seems to me that she has
given no explanation for her purported action. If she offers reasons for what she claims
was her action, then what else could they be but desires and beliefs she had? If these were
sufficient to cause her to do what she did, then it seems to me that she is passively moved
by them after all. If they were not sufficient, and she added something active and
independent of them, what was it and what is the explanation for her doing that? There
may be some satisfaction in responding to the question of why someone did something
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with She just chose to do it; that’s all.” However 1 think the response only appears to be
an answer to the question. It is not genuinely explanatory, as (I claim) citing the doer’s
televant beliefs and desires (and their causes) would be. It seems to me that to make the
agentic attribution ot choice is to offer a pseudo-explanation, but perhaps the point of
such attributions is not to explain what happened, but rather something else, to justify a
particular sort of retributive attitude, moral disapproval.
Beliet-desire compatibilists identify ‘action’ and ‘being moved by one’s belief-
desire complex’. I see them as competing, contrary types of intentionalistic explanation.
Claiming that someone was the agent of what happened does not really explain anything,
so far as I can see. Yet we gravitate strongly to such accounts, and we find relief from
some sort of puzzlement in them and think we understand. Yet an answer to the “Who
did this?” question is quite different from an answer to the “How (or why) did this come
to happen?” question. Belief-desire explanations in terms of ultimately passive movement
seem to me good material for answering the second sort of question. I would be surprised
if there were not a difference in kind between what satisfactorily answered the two sorts
of question, but perhaps the next argument I read will convince me otherwise.
The belief-desire causal account of rational human doings that I accept (for now
at least) is simple, even mechanistic. I find its simplicity, even what some might consider
its crudeness, an advantage. Others propose more complicated accounts that, rather than
leave us as passively moved beings, make room for action. Such accounts typically allow
desires to count as reasons that partially explain our actions, but leave the agent with
some sort of executive control over which desires get pursued and which get suppressed.
I think that most common sense moral evaluators hold that we have desires, but that it is
up to us to let ourselves be moved by them on particular occasions or not. This seems to
me to imply either incompatibilist powers or, on a compatibilist account, the threat of a
regress (where the action of “letting” itself requires a further desire to motivate it, and
that desire a further letting, and so on). Libertarian incompatibilist accounts depict human
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beings as choosing from among their desires, changing their relative strengths, or even
ci eating them on the spot. Compatibilist accounts give somewhat weaker stories of agents
endorsing or identifying with or desiring to desire certain of their desires in preference to
others, where the endorsing or identifying or meta-desiring are not presented as fully
independent actions. The most widely accepted of such compatibilist accounts is
Professor Harry Frankfurt’s 19
,
which I discuss in Chapter IV.
Even though I favor a simple, passive belief-desire account, I do not claim that the
belief-desire causal account applies to all cases of ‘doing’. Rather it applies only to our
rational doings. Sometimes it happens that I do not do what I most want to do even
though I have beliefs about what seem to me probably effective means to the satisfaction
ot what strikes me as my strongest desire. I consider all such cases to be outbreaks of
irrationality. Sometimes it has seemed to me that I most strongly wanted to do something,
but did not do it. For example, I have occasionally been blocked by fears that did not
make sense to me, but that paralyzed me nevertheless. Perhaps neurosis is an explanation
(if such a word is really at all explanatory). Perhaps I am moved by my strongest desire
after all, but have a mistaken belief about which of my desires that is. This last stratagem
saves the ‘desire’ part of the belief-desire causal account, and leaves me conatively
rational, but only at the expense of cognitive irrationality, of being subject to false beliefs
about what I most want. Whether the failure arises from neurosis or self-deception, it
seems to me that either way I am irrational. Certain compatibilist authors20
,
while
recognizing that there are cases like these, of incapacitating irrationality, hold that there
are other, positive cases in which I do not do what my strongest belief-desire complex
19
Harry G Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 68, no. 1, January 14, 1971, pp. 5-20.
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Analysis , 56, pp 63-73; Alfred Mele, “Underestimating Self Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and
Toad”, Analysis . 57, pp. 1 19-23; and Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents , (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
25
would otherwise move me to do. They hold these departures from being controlled by our
desiies to be not only rational but also what makes for our being morally praiseworthy.
They call these cases self-control.’ They see such self-control as what allows for our
doing what is right despite our having contrary desires to do wrong. This sort of
compatibilist sell-control, if allowed for, would imply complications to the simple belief-
desiie causal account that I feel suffices for rendering human doings comprehensible (to
the extent that they can be). In what follows, I will give my reasons for resisting such
complications.
B. Different Sorts of Control
The compatibilist authors I discuss here maintain that we have sufficient control
over our beliefs and desires to qualify as morally accountable for doing what they prompt
us to do. As I have emphasized, I believe that control is a necessary condition of my
properly being held morally accountable. For me to be in control in what I take to be the
relevant sense, it seems to me I must be in a special sort of causal relation to what I do.
The relation that we might call “self-control” differs in kind from the control that, say, a
thermostat exercises over a furnace. A thermostat causes its own temperature to remain
within a pre-set range. That sort of reflexiveness seems to me not enough for the morally
relevant sort of self-control. The thermostat in a room, by turning the furnace on and off,
controls the temperature in a room, but it also thereby controls its own temperature. What
distinguishes the sort of control a thermostat has from what a putatively responsible agent
would have? Much needs to be said, but for now I will just state my opinion that my
conception of the sort of agentic control which would be needed for moral accountability
falls under a transfer principle, the principle of the transfer of non-control. Roughly this
principle is that, if some event is the effect of causes I do not control, then I do not
control that event, even if that event is my doing something. I recognize that this is a very
strong principle and that it amounts to the incompatibilist claim that I, to be self-
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controlled, must be, at least to some extent, an unmoved mover. Professors Smith, Pettit,
Kennett, and Mele defend a weaker notion of ‘self-control’.
In the series of writings I have cited, these authors engage in a discussion of their
account of what self-control is, and how it may occur. All the authors agree that the
morally relevant sort of self-control would appear in cases in which we successfully try
not to do what we most want to do. The primary dispute among them is between, on the
one side. Smith, Pettit, and Kennett, who hold that self-control happens by a non-actional
disposition and Professor Mele, on the other side, who holds that we can exercise self
control actively. All these authors employ accounts that include both actions and non-
actional doings. My belief-desire causal account of doings leaves out actions. However,
since all these authors describe themselves as compatibilists, they cannot mean by
‘action what I mean; but I am somewhat unclear about what they do mean. Perhaps they
mean by ‘action’ what I mean by ‘doing’, or a subclass of such doings. Some of the
things I do happen independently of any conscious desire on my part about them (for
example, digesting food, twitching, outbursts of irrationality or akrasia). Other things I do
happen accompanied by (and caused by) an explicit, conscious desire on my part that
they happen as they do, and when I am rational, by a desire that I explicitly recognize to
be the strongest relevant desire. Perhaps compatibilist actions are doings of that sort. On
reflection, this strikes me as a special category of doings, and perhaps we would do well
to give it a special name. However I think that ‘action’ is a poor name to use because it
has incompatibilist associations that are likely to engender confusion. ‘Deliberate doing'
is also attractive, if by ‘deliberate’ we mean only mean ‘consciously thought about’ and
not ‘considered and chosen in a way we ultimately controlled from among options also
considered'. The latter notion, again, is freighted with incompatibilist associations.
Perhaps ‘consciously considered doing' or ‘intentional doing' are useful, if unwieldy
terms.
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I think this special category of doings, whatever we call it, is not a plausible
candidate tor what justifies moral evaluations about the doer. I say this because I doubt
that we contiol even the operation of those desires of which we are explicitly aware. 1
may come to leact negatively, to consciously dislike, my having a habitual susceptibility
to respond in a particular sort of way, and that distaste may cause the habit to weaken.
However, it seems to me that the moving force, my having the distaste, is something that
happens to me passively in ways I ultimately do not control. By my lights, this lack of
control rules out moral accountability. I think that my bad habits (and my good ones),
including my habits of being moved to give the weights I do to my various sorts of
desires, are naturalistic products of a process that is beyond my control. These
dispositions may constitute my being naturalistically bad, and they may justify defensive
and evasive maneuvers on the part of those who see themselves as likely to be harmed.
They would be moved to deploy such maneuvers (if they are rational) by any source of
naturalistic harm. It seems to me that my having such dispositions or habits does not set
the stage for my being genuinely blameworthy, but merely troublesome in a way that is
not essentially different from the trouble a storm might cause.
Professor Mele told me once that he does not really like “true self’ accounts.
Neither do I. These are accounts which (figuratively, I think) distinguish between and set
into opposition the empirical or actual self and something else, the ideal or potential self.
Nevertheless, perhaps as metaphors, they still may be useful in describing different
views. In that spirit, it seems to me that for Professors Smith, Kennett, and Pettit, my true
self is someone who fulfills the norms he accepts, who does what he thinks he has best
reason to do. My true self, on this picture, wants most strongly to do what I believe I
ought to do. On my simpler view, my true self is the one who has the desires and the
order of priority of desires that I actually have.
For Professors Smith, Kennett, and Pettit, self-control is doing what I ought to do
by wanting what 1 ought to want. I take it that the ‘ought here is a moral one. Since I
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accept the maxim that (moral) ‘ought" implies ‘can’, and since I doubt that any of us has
the power to do what we do not do, I doubt that there is anything that any of us morally
ought to do. There are other sorts of obligation in which ‘ought" does not imply ‘can’,
and I will discuss one of them in the final chapter, role obligation. Consequently I doubt
that theie aie any cases ot specifically morally relevant self-control in the sense used by
Professors Smith, Kenned, and Pettit. At most, I think, there are cases of conative meta-
rationality, my being moved by my strongest desire, and that being consistent with my
strongest meta-desire, my desire about what object level desire I most want to be moved
by. When I am conatively rational in this way, I have a sort of self-unity. I am not divided
against myself, but I do not see this as being a case of morally relevant self-control. Who
I am (in my opinion, the subject of a particular set of desires, with a particular order of
strengths) controls, to some extent, what happens in the world. However who I am does
not control who 1 am. Who I have been is part of the cause of who I am now, and that in
turn is part of the cause of who I shall be later. However, who I am now is constituted as
what it is by factors (causes and chance events, if any) that I do not now control. In short,
I take it that, even if I be identified as my desires, unless I have the powers of an
incompatibilist agent, I lack the sort of self-control that would make for my being
properly held morally responsible for what those desires move me to do.
I seem to myself to be the subject of many desires, of many different sorts.
Typically, if I have a desire to do one thing, I also have other desires to do other things
contrary to it. If I am conatively rational, then, given a set of mutually contrary desires, I
am moved by the strongest desire in that set. A desire may fail to transmit force across a
means-ends gap 21
,
but only, I claim, by that transmission being blocked by another,
contrary, desire being stronger and transmitting its force instead (or by external
circumstances preventing me from doing anything).
21
1 owe this notion of an end-means gap, and of desires transmitting force across it to Kennettt and
Smith, op cit., p.65.
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c. Compatibilist Self Control
If by ‘self-control' someone means what Hobbes meant by ‘freedom’, that is,
‘doing what you want', then I see no problem with there being such a phenomenon
(although I doubt that it is what makes for moral goodness or badness). However, there
are other sorts of purported compatibilist self-control about which I am skeptical.
Suppose that I have non-actional dispositions to undergo certain experiences that I
describe as “guilt feelings”, “remorse”, or “self-contempt.” Suppose that I do not actively
create these feelings or otherwise control them. They just come over me after I have I
done certain sorts of things. Suppose that I imagine with pleasure abolishing these
feelings, it only I knew a way. Further suppose that I know myself well enough to
reasonably well predict how I shall feel later if I do now what (those predictable reactions
aside) I want to do. To the extent that I care about my anticipated future pains, then that
will subtract strength from my desire to do the otherwise pleasant thing. My being subject
to such dispositions to feel such pains may strike others (and even me) as a good thing.
They may even try to help the process along by adding to my pains, to teach me the
lesson that yielding to temptation does not pay. However, I claim that having such non-
actional dispositions (that I do not control) does not constitute my having self-control and
I further claim that such tractability does not constitute my being a morally good person.
Instead, it constitutes my being a person who happens to be inhibited in useful ways.
Such are the non-actional dispositions that Professors Michael Smith and Phillip Pettit
call “self-control .”
22 These dispositions may well allow us to get things right, but not in
any way that we control. Having the right inhibitory dispositions makes me well
socialized but does not make me a good agent. As an agent, I am left quite out of the
picture.
22
Kennettt and Smith, op cit., p. 63.
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The compatibilist authors discuss a number of different examples of putative self-
control, but they seem to me to all have a roughly similar structure. For the sake of
simplicity, I propose to examine just one of those cases, from Professor Mele 23 . Ian is
currently watching TV, and, it so happens that Ian’s desire to watch TV is stronger than
any other desire of which he is the subject. However, he also has among his desires
another, weaker desire to do some work that he had planned.
In his response to Kennett and Smith24
,
Professor Mele claims that, even in a
deterministic world, we can exercise self-control not only by the non-actional and
diachronic means that Kennett and Smith describe, but also actionally and synchronously.
Ian wants to watch TV more than he wants to do anything else, but that does not exclude
his doing something else he wants to do to a lesser degree, because many different things
one might do can proceed without conflicting. As Ian is watching TV, it (non-actionally)
occurs to him to remember his therapist’s advice that he silently repeat to himself an
imperative such as “Get to work!’’ Even though he has a weaker desire to silently repeat
that phrase than he has to watch TV, Professor Mele notes that this does not prevent his
repeating the phrase because Ian can do both. When he does go ahead and repeat the
phrase to himself, Professor Mele takes him to perform an intentional action. This
puzzles me. That the idea of using the phrase occurs to Ian is non-actional. That his desire
to repeat the phrase to himself is stronger than any genuinely contrary desire (such as not
repeating any phrase to himself) is non-actional. However, when he does repeat the
phrase to himself, then suddenly we have an action (rather than a case of passively being
moved). I do not see where the actional aspect comes in, how it arises from these non-
actional materials, unless perhaps Ian has incompatibilist powers to just make himself do
something independently from the desires he finds himself with. My puzzlement lessens
23
Mele, Autonomous Agents , op cjt. p. 52-3.
24
Mele, Alfred, “Underestimating Self Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad”, open.
31
when I hypothesize that such considered yet passive movements are what Professor Mele
means by ‘actions’.
Suppose Ian does think about and then uses the technique his therapist had
mentioned to him. He issues the imperative to himself. Our compatibilist authors
Kennett, Smith, Pettit and Mele all agree in regarding such a maneuver as a self-control
technique by which Ian tries to diminish his desire to (continue to) watch TV. Suppose,
for the sake of this discussion, that if Ian employs the technique it will work. His desire to
watch TV will decrease to the point where his desire to work dominates it, and he will get
to work. For my part, I interpret Ian’s being moved to employ the technique (if he does
so) as not so much causing a change in his desire as expressing a change in desire that has
already occurred. II Ian takes effective steps to get himself to stop watching, it seems to
me that he already wants to stop watching TV more than he wants to continue (or that he
is conatively irrational). Why then does he need to issue the self-imperative? Why not
simply stop watching TV? Perhaps he issues the imperative because he has noticed in the
past a certain tendency on his part to a sort of behavioral momentum. We sometimes do
continue to do things after our desires have diminished, and say things like, “I’m eating
from habit” or “I’m just finishing up what’s on my plate” or notice ourselves eating for
social reasons even though we are not really hungry.
I am dubious about Professor Mele’s contention that Ian can perform actions, but
grant it for the sake of discussion. Take it that what Mele means by ‘action’ is what I
mean by ‘being passively moved by a desire about which I consciously think’. Anyway,
consider the following desire pairs, and assume that they are the only relevant ones Ian
has at a given time:
Compound desire 1 ): a) to continue to watch TV and b) to relax and
daydream while paying desultory attention to the content of the TV
program;
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Compound desire 2): a) to continue to watch TV and c) to issue a mental
command to himself by silently repeating the words “Ian, get to work!”
Suppose that Ian has all three desires, and that Ian’s strongest atomic desire is a). For
simplicity's sake, suppose that all three desires, a), b), and c) at least at the beginning,
have independent subjective motivational forces for Ian. I do not think that denying this
simplification would make any difference for the point I am making. Given this
independence supposition, in considering Ian’s overall motivational situation, I think we
can subtract a) out of the compound desires because it appears in both. Which compound
desire is stronger for Ian depends on the respective strengths of b) and c). My view is
that, it Ian wants c) more, he will be moved to do what compound desire 2) motivates.
However, I note that the object of c) is a means to an end contrary to a). Now I believe
that, if we are rational, then if we want a particular end we will also want the means that
we believe to be necessary to that end. Not only that, if we want an end, we will not want
means that we recognize to be contrary to it. Given that, it seems to me that if Ian wants
c) to the degree that it moves him to issue the silent imperative, then, if he believes his
doing so will lead to the frustration of a), then he does not want a) more than he wants
not-a). His strongest desire may now be to get to work (which requires that he stop
watching TV).
His employing the means c) may be Ian’s way of crossing a temporal gap or
desire lag, to get his doing in accord with his currently dominant desire (to get to work).
That is, it may be a way of getting his dominant desire (to get to work) to triumph over
some irrational resistance, the behavioral momentum that keeps him watching TV even
though that is no longer his strongest desire. By droning on with the repetitive silent
imperative, Ian spoils his own pleasure in relaxing while watching TV and then does
what (by my hypothesis) he more strongly wants, to get to work. On these interpretations,
we do not have a case of self-control as Professors Mele, Smith, Pettit, and Kennett
33
describe that purported phenomenon: trying to get oneself to not do what one most wants
to do. It seems to me that, it Ian really does want a) more than any other desire, then
(even if we all would approve his getting to work) his being moved by desire c) is not a
case of self-control at all, but rather a case of irrational self-defeatingness.
Suppose that Ian were to want to undergo a certain sort of therapy and did so. The
therapy is a soit of aversive conditioning. After undergoing the therapy, whenever he
finds himselt watching TV when he also has work to do, then he will experience
unpleasant effects such as to find himself compulsively chanting “Get to work!” to
himself, or even a physical symptom such as nausea. Now that they have become linked
by the therapy, Ian is not in a position to have the enjoyment of watching TV while work
is waiting without also experiencing the unpleasant effect that has been linked to it by the
therapy. If his aversion to (say) the nausea he knows will come with it dominates over his
desire to watch TV, he will be moved to do something else instead, such as getting to
work. This situation does not seem to me to be a case of self-control, at least not in the
sense that Ian does something other than what he most wants to do. Given the link to the
unpleasant consequence, he wants to watch TV less than he wants to get to work. Also, if
the conditioning has gone so far that the reaction of experiencing the aversive is
compulsive, it does not seem to be the right sort of thing to constitute (synchronous) self-
control. After successful therapy, let us assume that the aversive effects occur whenever
Ian watches TV, whatever his current desires are. Even if he should come to think he has
been a workaholic in the past and even if his current best judgment were that it would be
better to relax than work, he may still be driven to work by the effects of the
conditioning. This strikes me as no more synchronous self-control than would cutting off
my hand at one time to prevent my stealing at a later time.
In a conversation, I asked Professor Mele the following questions. If I want to do
(and do) one thing that I know will interfere with my doing a second thing, then how can
doing that second thing be my strongest desire, if I recognize the conflict? To employ the
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so-called self-control technique is to undercut the satisfaction of my purported strongest
desire. My willingness to employ the technique does not so much cause the temptation
not to be my strongest desire any longer as it provides evidence that the temptation has
alieady (somehow) weakened. It shows that I have a desire that what had been my
stiongest desire not ieturn to that status, and that this meta-desire is now my strongest
one.
Professor Mele admits that Ian seems stuck with wanting not to exercise the self-
control technique, but he says that the time lag is important. Ian is currently blocked from
getting to work. Unless something changes, he will not do the work because his stronger
desire to watch TV will prevent it. Even though his strongest current motivation is to
continue to watch TV, this does not preclude his taking steps to change his desires by a
self-control technique. I take this remark to indicate that Professor Mele is primarily
discussing diachronic self-control, someone’s doing something at one time that will
increase or decrease his or her likelihood of doing something at another time.
Imagine two Ians. The thought of using the self-control technique occurs
(passively) to both of them, but one is moved by that occurrence to employ it and the
other is not. How do we account for the difference (assuming there is a rational
explanation)? It seems to me that the situation is comprehensible (on my belief-desire
causal account of doing) if Iani wants to employ the technique more than he wants to do
any contrary thing, and lam does not. Now, Professor Mele is right that watching TV is
not directly contrary to employing the self-control technique of silently repeating to
himself the phrase “Stop watching TV and get to work!” Ian can do both. Yet, it seems
to me that there is some sort of opposition between them. The opposition is between Ian's
wanting to issue the silent self-imperative and his wanting to continue to have TV
watching as his highest (and hence operative) desire. Ian knows that employing the self-
control technique will likely lead to the frustration of his currently strongest desire. If Ian
willingly uses the technique, then, it seems to me, he wants more for his desire to watch
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TV to stop being his strongest desire than he wants it to continue to be. If Ian uses the
technique in a conatively rational way, then his meta-desire is that TV watching become
a weaker object-level desire; if he doesn’t use it, then he wants TV watching to continue
to be his strongest object-level desire. Moving to the meta-level preserves the (to me,
attractive) principle that I always do what I most want (if I am rational). Since, at that
level, each of our two Ians is moved by his stronger desire, there is no need (or room) for
genuine action on his part (as I interpret ‘action’). For Ian 2 to think of the self-control
technique and not employ it seems to me to amount to his endorsing his continuing to
want to watch TV, since he forgoes what may be an effective means to his ceasing to
have that desire as his strongest one. For many compatibilists (such as Frankfurt), it is
this endorsing that grounds moral accountability. However, since I do not see us as
controlling the endorsing in the right way, I disagree.
For Mele, Ian’s best considered judgment about what he should do is stop
watching TV. However, he most wants to watch TV. Yet he also wants to think of
himself as a rational and good person, that is, he wants there to be a match between his
best considered judgment about what to do and what he most wants to do. That is, he has
a meta-desire, and if that meta-desire is strong enough, then it will cause him to use
means that change the identity of his currently strongest desire in the way he wants that
change to occur. Otherwise, he will not.
Suppose that Professor Mele’s treatment of self-control works. Iani performs an
act of self-control (by silently repeating the imperative) and thereby causes himself to get
to work and to stop watching TV despite his having started with a stronger desire to
watch TV than to work. Suppose that Ian 2 either does not make an effort to use the self-
control technique or that he does and it does not work. How might we account for that
difference in any way that leaves Iani morally praiseworthy for getting to work and Ian 2
morally blameworthy for not doing his work? Were the way those things happened up to
either Ian? Did either control whether trying the self-control technique occurred to him,
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or, if it did, whether it was effective? I do not see how it would be up to either of our
Ians, unless each were an agent with incompatibilist powers.
In the service ol self-control, Mele tries to exploit conative referential opacity, the
alleged fact that I can want a state of affairs to happen under one description and not have
the same strength of desire for it under another description25
,
even though there is no
cognitive ieferential opacity. When Ian thinks about it, he sees that, under his current
circumstances, 'continuing to watch TV’ and ‘breaking my resolution to get to work’
pick out the same state of affairs. Yet it seems to him that he wants the former very much
and does not want the latter at all. His desire to use the self-control technique his therapist
has recommended to him may be stronger than his desire to not get to work yet weaker
than his desire to continue to watch TV. This might happen even though, under the
circumstances, ‘continuing to watch TV' and ‘not getting to work' pick out the same
event under two different descriptions.
My first reaction is to doubt that Ian controls the description under which he
conceives of what he is doing. I especially doubt that, given that the two different
descriptions occur to him, he can agentically attend to one and ignore the other. It may
happen that he thinks of the matter under one description rather than the other, but I take
that to be something that happens to Ian rather than an action he performs. Secondly, if
lan does use the self-control technique, then, I claim, he wants to do that more than he
wants to do the thing with which the technique interferes. In short, if Ian somehow
manages to conceive the issue in a way that renders it unattractive to him, then that does
not yield a case of his trying to do something other than what he most wants to do.
When I first read Professor Mele’s claims about the motivational differences
between different descriptions of the same situation, I found it plausible that this could
provide some opening for a successful compatibilist treatment of self-control. I most
25
Mele, Autonomous Agents , op cit., pp. 52-53.
want to do something under one description, but under another description want to do
that thing to a lesser degree than something that conflicts with it. However, on reflection,
while I admit that such differential, description-relative valuations of one and the same de
re situation do happen, I think that they are outbreaks of irrationality, cognitive
irrationality. As such it seems to me unpromising material for moral responsibility
giounding sell-contiol, and especially for actional exercise of self-control. It seems to me
that I can only desire a situation ditferently when it is described in two different ways by,
to some extent, forgetting for the moment that the two different descriptions describe a
single thing.
As I have already claimed, whether I happen to think about a particular
description of a situation is not up to me, as an action, to perform. Once a particular
description has occurred to me, neither is it up to me whether or not I am pleased by
contemplating the situation under that description. However, assume that it occurs to me
to think about a given situation under a number of different descriptions, all of which,
each in its own way truly applies to the situation. That is, each description lists properties
that the situation actually has. If I remain aware that all these different descriptions apply
to a single situation, then it seems to me irrational for me for the strength of my desire for
that (de re) situation to change as my attention passes among those different (de dicto)
descriptions.
Suppose that a new description occurs to me, one that brings into the foreground
of my attention a property of the situation that I had not previously thought about. For
example, suppose I have been describing a situation to myself as “something that, if I did
it, would yield me a significant benefit”, and that I very much want to do it. Now,
suppose that it occurs to me for the first time to describe to myself the situation as
“letting down a friend who has depended on me.” When I think of the situation using the
new description, I find myselt not wanting to do it at all. This would not count as a case
of my wanting to do the same thing to different degrees of strength due to describing it in
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two ditfeient ways. Since I remain aware that both descriptions truly apply to the
situation, I will come to want the situation to the same degree under either way of
desciibing it to myself. Other things being equal, if the prospect of a gain moves me more
strongly than the prospect of letting my friend down, I will do it, otherwise I will not.
The new description, "letting down my friend” occurring to me does not only
decrease my desire to do the thing considered under that description, but also my desire
to do it under the description "securing a significant benefit for myself.” I do not want it
more under one description than under the other unless I forget, for a moment, when I
think of it under one description that the other description applies to it as well. If that
happens, then I suffer from a cognitive lapse, a bit of irrationality. However, might there
not be a specifically conative opacity? That is, even though I know that letting down my
friend is the same state of affairs (given my opportunities) as my securing a significant
advantage for myselt, I may want the latter and scorn the former. I do not know whether
we are capable of (or susceptible to) both sorts of irrationality. However, in any case, I
see both sorts of irrationality as disqualifying us from being morally accountable. The
compatibilist authors I have been discussing apparently see something like what I have
called conative irrationality as what opens a way for our being self-controlling, morally
accountable beings. Let us return to Professor Mele’s example.
Ian wants to watch TV very much. In fact, he wants to watch TV now more than
he wants to do anything else now, or at least more than anything else that he thinks of
doing. Suppose he believes that for him to watch TV now would also be for him to shirk
some work that he wants to accomplish. Now further suppose that he does not want at all
to shirk the work. Something is wrong with Ian’s desires. Given his beliefs, his watching
TV is his shirking the work. The two descriptions, under the circumstances, pick out the
same state of affairs. It seems to me that it makes no sense to ask Ian, "Would you prefer
to watch TV or to not do your work?” Given the situation, this seems to amount to asking
Ian, “Would you prefer to do A or to do A?” If I asked the first quoted question above,
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and Ian replied, “I much prefer watching TV to shirking my work.”, he might be saying
something true, but he is also revealing his conative irrationality.
Now suppose that I asked Ian, “Do you prefer continuing to watch TV or not
employing an effective trick that would cause you to not watch TV?” If Ian recognizes
that the latter disjunct is a necessary means, under the circumstances, to his getting the
first disjunct to happen, something has gone wrong if he expresses a preference for the
first disjunct over the second. If, instead, I ask him, “Do you prefer watching TV or to
employ an etfective trick that would cause you to not watch TV?”, then I have posed a
question which he can answer either way and not reveal himself to be irrational.
However, he would be conatively irrational if he said, “I want more than anything else to
continue to watch TV and I also want to use a means that I believe will frustrate that
desire to sufficient degree of strength that I use it.”
Frequently, when I think of a situation under one description, the thought pleases
me, and when I think of the same situation under another description, the thought
displeases me. This does not reveal any irrationality on my part. Just about every real
world situation will have some properties I find good and others I find bad, and different
descriptions will bring different properties to the foreground of my attention. Suppose
someone offered to bet with me on the flip of a fair coin. If she described what she was
offering me as “a 50% chance to win some money”, that might excite in me pleasurable
images of gain. If she described it as “a 50% chance to lose some money”, that might
well cause me some painful fear of loss. However, if she then asked me which I
preferred, a 50% chance of winning some money or a 50% chance of losing some money,
I think I would lapse into conative irrationality if I said I preferred the former (unless I
fell into cognitive error by somehow forgetting that they were two descriptions of a single
proposal).
Social psychologists have performed experiments that have revealed our robust
and endemic disposition to rate scenarios as less desirable if they are described in terms
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of losses and more desirable if they are described in terms of gains26
. I suppose that, on
some occasions, such biases will result in our breaking out of self-defeating behavior
patterns. However, since they still trade on irrationality, I shrink from calling operations
that depend on them selt-control. I suppose I might consciously deliberate about how to
describe a situation to myself, and be moved to describe it in a way that emphasizes its
unattractive aspects in an effort to get myself to not want that situation to happen.
However, to employ such a maneuver, more attractive ways of describing it must not
come vividly to mind (something I do not believe I control). Further, it seems to me that
even if I could actively choose to describe the tempting prospective situation to myself in
an unattractive way, then that would express my desire to prevent its happening. That is,
il I were rational and actively chose that description, then the thing’s happening would
not be what I most want to have happen. If so, once again we do not have a case of self-
control as Mele and the other compatibilist theorists have defined it. This is not a case of
my preventing myself from doing what I most wanted to do. At most, we have a case of
my preventing a desire that is not currently my strongest from becoming so.
Imagine a change in the case of Ian. Instead of him silently chanting to himself,
“Get to work!”, someone else comes in the room and begins to chant, “Ian, get to work!”.
Suppose that Ian has desires about two different situations:
1) to watch TV in an otherwise silent room;
2) to watch TV while hearing the person chanting of “Ian, get to work!”
Assume that Ian has agentic control (whatever that takes), that he stands in a position to
perform an action that will bring about either 1) or 2), and that he acts so as to bring
about 2). Assume that, for Ian, it is more pleasant to watch TV in a quiet room than in a
room where someone is chanting an imperative at him. Then it seems to me that Ian
26 Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, , Inevitable Illusions , (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), pp.
52-57.
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wants what is tor him a less pleasant experience more than he wants what is for him a
moie pleasant one. This, by itself, is not puzzling. I may find an hour at the dentist less
pleasant than many other things I also have some desire to do during that hour, but
nevertheless want to go to the dentist most strongly. This is because I see getting dental
care, howevei unpleasant that may currently be, as a means to avoiding even more
unpleasant experiences later. Suppose Ian’s case is like that. He does find the chanting
annoying. That annoyingness is what poisons his pleasure in watching TV and gets him
to get to work. However, he sees being exposed to the annoying chanting as a necessary
means to avoiding something he believes he would find even more annoying, his
spending the whole day in front of the TV and facing the reproach of others and himself
about work undone. If that is what is going on, then I claim that Ian wants more to stop
watching TV than to continue, and that this is contrary to our original assumption, that
watching TV is Ian’s strongest desire. That is, this is not a case of self-control as the
compatibilist theorists have characterized ‘self-control’. Ian’s rationally wanting 2) more
than 1 ) only makes sense to me on the supposition that Ian wants something to happen,
his ceasing to watch TV (given that he believes hearing the chanting will bring that
about) more than he wants something contrary, such as 1 ), which will result in his
continuing to watch TV. I find that hard to square with watching TV being Ian’s strongest
desire.
Suppose that Ian had a timer that he could set but, once set, not change. Suppose
that he sets it to cut off power to the TV in 5 minutes, and then returns to watching TV.
Would his setting the timer be an exercise by Ian of self-control? Some might interpret it
that way, but I would consider it instead his employing a means to deal with his lacking
self-control. If he had self-control, as I understand that term, he would resolve to turn off
the TV in 5 minutes and then (somehow) do that on his own even in the face of his
strongest desire being to continue to watch TV. If Ian had the power to exercise that sort
of self-control, then he would fulfill what I take to be the common-sense notion of ‘self-
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control’. I believe that common sense moral evaluators suppose that the targets of then-
evaluations have a power to just choose to do something, on their own. An
mcompatibilist self-controller can just make himself do something. However, I see no
compatibilist way for someone to have this sort of self-control.
Some time ago, I wrote to Professor Mele and argued against his examples that
they all depended on having different desires for an end and for the means necessary to it.
I claimed that in such cases, to will the end is to will the means. In a note he wrote to me
in reply. Professor Mele described the case of Skinny Sam.
Perhaps "to will the end is to will the means." But it doesn't follow from
this that to desire an end is to desire the means just as strongly as one
desires the end. Nor, I think, need there be irrationality in the latter case.
Skinny Sam desires to have the physique of [pick your favorite body
builder]; his desire to undertake the grueling, sustained training that that
requires is considerably weaker.
Professor Mele holds that we can have different desires for an end and for the means we
think necessary to that end, and yet be conatively rational. He suggests that this
phenomenon provides an opening for our exercising self-control. Professor Mele treats
ends and means as quite separable. He writes about Skinny Sam as if his desire to look
like Charles Atlas were separable from his desire to engage in the grueling exercise
regimen that, Sam believes, is the sole means he has to his coming to look like Charles
Atlas. I see ends and means as forming wholes, especially in cases where there is a sole
means. Professor Mele claims that Skinny Sam wants muscles more than he wants to do
what he believes is the sole means to getting muscles. The only sense I can make of this
is that Sam imagines there being a way to get muscles by some other, easier means
(hormone shots, perhaps), and he wishes the world could be as he imagines it rather than
as he believes it to be. However, it seems to me, his actual desire about what he believes
are his actual end and means, must form a piece, or, if they do not, that Skinny Sam is
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irrational. However much he might want to come by a certain sort of physique by other
means, if he believes that the only means by which he can actually do so is by grueling
exercise, and it he does not want to do what he believes he must do to get muscles, then
that, I claim, amounts to his not wanting muscles. This is the nub of my disagreement
with Protessoi Mele. My idea is that, whatever desire Skinny Sam might have for
muscles, as an abstract idea considered independently of any particular means, is
diminished by his considerations of the means he believes actually available to the point
where if he does not want the means then he does not want the end, under those
circumstances. Instead he wishes there were other means, and on the supposition that the
wish be granted, then he would very much want the end, or rather that end-means
complex. Skinny Sam fervently wishes that he had other, less painful, means to getting
big muscles, but given the means before him, his desire to get big muscles and his desire
to do the exercise must equilibrate because, under the circumstances, they are two sides
of the same coin. If this equilibration between Skinny Sam’s desire for an end and his
desire to employ what he believes to be the necessary means to that end does not happen,
then that strikes me as an outbreak of irrationality (either conative, cognitive, or both) on
his part. As such, it does not seem to me appropriate material to constitute Skinny Sam’s
exercising self-control. I say this because I suppose that, whatever might ground our
being free and responsible self-controllers, it cannot be irrationality.
I see end-means complexes as forming units (on the assumption that the means is
a sole, necessary means). To desire one part of the end-means complex more than another
part necessarily linked to it is like wanting to raise my hand more than I want to raise my
finger. I might, without irrationality, want only to raise my hand, and not even think
about my finger (and hence have no desire about my finger). What I am ruling out as
irrational is to have two different positive desires about raising my hand and raising my
finger, in a circumstance where I am aware that to do the former implies doing the latter
(so long as my finger remains part of my hand). If I am right that they form part ot an
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inseparable whole, how can I lationally desire that whole to two different degrees of
strength? In the same way, I claim, it is irrelevant to observe that Skinny Sam likes the
idea of his having big muscles and that he dislikes the only means at hand, onerous
exercise. Since they are linked as effect and necessary cause, it is not his desire for each
in isolation that matters, but his desire for the whole that they form.
I am conatively irrational when I do not do what I, given all things that I consider,
most want to do. On some occasions, I may be fortunate to turn out to have been
conatively irrational. It may even save my life. Nevertheless, conative irrationality puts
me out of control, even proximate control, over what I do, to say nothing of ultimate
control. The compatibilist thinkers I have been examining allow for these sorts of
breakdowns, but they also seem to me to be claiming that there are cases of divergence
from conative rationality that are positive, that are not breakdowns but rather examples of
well-functioning. I do allow that it may be a good thing for me to be conatively irrational
on an occasion, or even that I have a settled disposition of not doing certain sorts of
things even when I very much want to do them. Having such a disposition may be part of
my (and others’) happiness and be part of what constitutes my being naturalistically
good. However, I deny that my having such dispositions constitutes my being self-
controlled or is any part of my being a morally good person. While it may be a good
thing for me to have such dispositions to conative irrationality, I am not morally
praiseworthy for having them. This is because I do not see how I could control my having
them in the right sort of way to count as responsible for what they cause me to do.
As I imagine what agents with libertarian incompatibilist powers would be like, I
suppose that they would be able to simply give themselves desires or to adjust the
strengths of existing desires by acts of will. Beings with only compatibilist powers cannot
do this. If such a being is to exercise self-control, it seems that it must do so in less direct
ways. For Professors Pettit, Smith, and Kennett, the indirect means is a non-actional
disposition. For example, Ian may have a (non-actional) disposition to think selt-critical
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thoughts oi to issue self directed imperatives to himself when he finds himself watching
TV rather than working. If such dispositions reduce his desire to watch TV to the point
where his desire to work dominates, then, on their treatment, Ian’s having the dispositions
is what constitutes his being self-controlled.
My reactions to this treatment ot freedom and self-control as a disposition to
believe and desire orthonomously is that it ties self-control too tightly to getting the thing
right, that it seems to me to leave no room for culpably doing wrong. Pettit and Smith try
to cope with this by recourse to imputing to agents a self-starting ability to get right
whatever they happen to get wrong 27
. I can make no sense of such an ability other than to
take it as an incompatibilist power, unless by “self-starting” Pettit and Smith mean that
the disposition is sell-starting, that is, that it automatically fires in the appropriate
circumstances. If that is what they mean, then, since such a self-starting disposition fires
independently of my control, it is irrelevant to my moral praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness (if, as I assume, that genuine moral blameworthiness requires that I
have controlled whatever it was that happened about which I am being evaluated).
My view, as I have said, is a simple one. It does not make room for my Skinny
Sam having differing desires about getting big muscles and about doing a lot of exercise.
However, I do not hold that simplicity is all-important. Sometimes other considerations
will move me to introduce complications into an account. I will do this if I believe that
introducing the complication helps to increase the explanatory power of the account,
especially if I see no blatant conceptual difficulties in the proposed complication.
However, I do not (yet) see how allowing for rationally differing desires for an end and
for the means necessary to it either helps or how it is free of conceptual difficulties.
Suppose, despite my misgivings, that we do in fact sometimes have different
desires, with different strengths, for ends and necessary means. If I employ a means
27
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contrary to the means to satisfying my currently strongest desire, what explains my doing
that rather than employing the means I think necessary to getting what I most want? It
seems that I must either want to employ that means more than I want to employ any
contrary means or that I must behave irrationally (or that I must explain the matter
differently than by the belief-desire causal account of doings). I explain the matter, for
myself, in the second way. It I want things that are necessarily connected to each other
differently, then I am either cognitively irrational (by not recognizing the connection) or
conatively irrational (by wanting the same thing differently just because I describe it to
myself in different terms).
If the more complicated account allowed for our being agents (which my simple
account does not), is that a sufficient advantage to motivate my moving to the more
complicated account? So far, for me, it is not. Aside from its greater simplicity, I believe
there is another reason for me to (be moved to) adopt a non-agentic account of human
doings. Rather than as a locus of control, an agent, on the belief-desire causal account of
doings, I appear in my own account as a controlled locus where passions converge and
work themselves out in a way that results in my doing something. An agent-focussed
account of a situation’s arising undercuts our motives for finding out what I suspect are
the real causes of the situation’s arising. Thus, it is not just a violation of intellectual
norms that motivates my questioning that point of view, but also practical motives.
Turning from the people who have desires that lead to outcomes that concern us to the
question of how they came to have those desires at least holds out some hope of finding
answers. Focussing on agents and implicitly or explicitly attributing their desire priorities
to them as if they were their free creations discourages any investigation of other causes.
Beyond its negative implications for responsible agency, does the notion of a
passive belief-desire account have something positive to contribute to our living together
socially? I think it might, as, it seems to me, did Albert Einstein:
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Schopenhauer s saying, ‘A man can do what he wants, but not want what
he wants,’ has been a very real inspiration to me since my youth; it has
been a continual consolation in the face of life’s hardships, my own and
others’, and an unfailing well-spring of tolerance. This realization
mercifully mitigates the easily paralyzing sense of responsibility and
prevents us from taking ourselves and other people all too seriously; it is
conducive to a view of life which, in particular, gives humor its due . 28
28
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CHAPTER III
CAN A ROBOT BE MORALLY RESPONSIBLE?
Daniel Dennett has described thought-experiments involving robots in his books
Elbow Room29 and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea30 (and elsewhere). Here is the Elbow Room
scenario. You are sending a robot explorer to a distant planet. We are talking about
something vastly more capable than the recent Mars explorer robot. Sojourner. Because
Mars is about 15 light-minutes distant from us, signals, in either direction, have a time lag
of at least 15 minutes. We on Earth could at best see what Sojurner’s video cameras
detected 15 minutes ago, and if danger loomed, the best we could have done would have
been to issue a command that would not have been executed until another 15 minutes had
passed. NASA’s control strategy for Sojourner was to plan out several hours of activity
and issue all the commands for that period from the ground in a burst. Sojourner moved
only a few inches at a time in an apparently perfectly static setting, and NASA’s strategy
worked well. The machine operated in such a way that it both remained undamaged and
sent us valuable new information about Mars.
If Sojourner had faced actively changing conditions, it would have needed some
built-in strategies for coping with those changes because it was too far away for our
directly controlling it from Earth like a puppet. Dennett’s imagined robot planetary
explorer is equipped to have a chance in a more interesting world than Mars, and at a
distance from any earth-based controller of at least several light-years. Since we do not
know what conditions it will encounter at its destination, we cannot explicitly program
the robot’s computer in advance as to what to do.
29
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Dennett writes
,
Once the lobot is tar away on its uninhabited planet, and we
can no longer intervene, it is on its own. What it does when confronted with problems is
up to it.” While I agree that what it does is not up to us, I would not say that it was up to
it. That way of putting it suggests to me that the robot is an agent, and I doubt that it is. I
would say, instead, that what the robot does is up to a combination of its own internal
properties and the set of external circumstances that bear on it, a set from which we are
excluded. Dennett’s interplanetary explorer robot is quite sophisticated, and generally
rises to its occasions, but as a finite being, it is not perfect. Sometimes it will be in a
position (in some sense):
to act upon some information it has received, but simply fail to... When it
fails, it will have been determined to fail, because, ex hypothesi
, it is
always determined... If one of your fellow human beings were to fail on
such an occasion we would be inclined to say he blew it; he had the
opportunity all right, and simply failed to capitalize on it. It might be
inappropriate for us to speak of each other in these terms, but is it not
obvious that our robot, in virtue of its deterministic predicament, is
inappropriately described in such terms? 32
Dennett does not answer his rhetorical question here. However, I think it is inappropriate
to say of either the robot or the human being that he or it “blew it” because to say that
implies that we had an agent in control, a being such that what happened was up to it
(which I doubt).
The scenario in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea 33 is similar, except that instead of
spatial isolation, the problem is temporal. Suppose that, for some reason, you want to
experience conditions in the 25
th
century. You arrange to be placed in cryogenic
suspension, a deep freeze coma, with the hope of being revived in 400 years. However,
31
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while you are in that coma, you will not be able to take care of your interests. Perhaps
your children or grandchildren would fulfill your wishes, but 400 years is quite a few
generations away. Again Dennett imagines a robot, this time a rather large one,
containing within it your cryogenic capsule (and yourself). The robot’s task would be to
preserve your capsule in good working order, come what may, and then help with your
revival at the time you had appointed. Since you cannot now predict in detail what will
happen over the centuries, you again cannot explicitly program the robot as to how it is to
secure your interests.
Here is how Dennett describes the survival robot34 :
a mobile facility to house your capsule, along with the requisite sensors and
early warning devices so that it can move out of harm’s way and seek out
new sources of energy and raw materials as it needs them.... You should try
to design this robot so that above all else it “chooses” actions designed to
further your interests... Don’t call these mere switching points in your
robot’s control system “choice” points if you think that this would imply
that the robot had free will or consciousness, for I don’t mean to smuggle
any such contraband into the thought experiment... Since you will be
comatose throughout, and thus cannot stay awake to guide and plan its
strategies, you will have to design the robot supersystem to generate its own
plans in response to changing circumstances over the centuries. It must
“know” how to “seek out” and “recognize” and then exploit energy sources,
how to move to safer territory, how to “anticipate” and then avoid
dangers... Let us suppose that, in addition to whatever people and other
animals are up and about during the centuries to come, there will be other
robots, many different robots ... competing with your robot for energy and
safety... If you have to plan for dealing with other robotic agents, acting on
behalf of other clients like yourself, you would be wise to design your robot
with enough sophistication to calculate the likely benefits and risks of
cooperating with other robots, or of forming alliances for mutual benefit...
As an autonomous agent, it will be capable of deriving its own subsidiary
goals... These secondary goals will respond to circumstances you cannot
predict in detail... Your robot may embark on actions antithetical to your
purposes, even suicidal, having been convinced by another robot, perhaps,
to subordinate its own life mission to some other... All the preferences it
will ever have will be the offspring of the preferences you initially endowed
it with, ... but that is no guarantee that actions taken in the light of the
Ibid
, pp.423-425.
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robot’s descendent preferences will continue to be responsive, directly, to
your best interests... It will have some internal representation of its
currently highest goals, its summum bonum
. but if it has fallen among
persuasive companions of the sort we have imagined, the iron grip of the
engineering that initially designed it will be jeopardized. It will still be an
artifact, still acting only as its engineering permits it to act, but following a
set of desiderata partly of its own devising.
There is a lot to quibble about here, such as the slide from putting intentionalistic
words in scare-quotes to apparently straightforward talk of goals, life missions,
autonomous agents, and actions. However, let us not dwell on that. Instead, let us grant
Dennett all that, and see where it gets us. Dennett claims that, if the survival machine is
not a source of original intentionality (because it gets its original stock of intentions from
us), then neither are we. He claims that you are yourself “just a survival machine
designed, originally, for the purposes of preserving your genes until they can replicate .”35
He then continues, “If this position does not appeal to you, consider jumping the other
way. Acknowledge that a fancy enough artifact—something along the lines of these
imagined robots—can exhibit real intentionality—It, like you, has taken on a certain
autonomy, has become a locus of self-control and self-determination, not by any miracle,
but just by confronting problems during its own ‘lifetime’ and more or less solving
them
—
problems presented to it by the world.” 3” His point seems to be that both we and
the robot start out with a stock of purposes that we do not create for ourselves, ex nihilo ,
but that this does not block our being full agents if we transform those originally given
purposes into our own. As I understand making purposes our own, I doubt that we really
can do that without being agents with incompatibilist powers, but Dennett disagrees.
Dennett is highly optimistic about our chances of making progress in the
development of artificial intelligence and artificial life. So am I. Nevertheless, I
35
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understand the reasons that lead others to be much less optimistic. Time will tell. The
reasoning in the passage just quoted amounts to a plea for premise 1 ) in the following
argument, which, while he never explicitly presents it, I attribute to Dennett:
1) There is no relevant difference, in the properties that make for moral
responsibility, between human beings and highly sophisticated robots.
2) Human beings are paradigms of a sort of being that is sometimes
genuinely morally responsible for something.
3) Therefore there is no barrier, in principle, to a robot qualifying as
morally responsible.
I recognize that premise 1) is controversial. There are weighty considerations to support
the claim that we are essentially different from other sorts of beings, both other sorts of
animals and any sort of machine, in a way that qualifies us for moral responsibility and
excludes them. Nevertheless, I suspect that these considerations are not weighty enough.
Provisionally at least, I join with Dennett in accepting this sort of naturalism. However, I
disagree with his conclusion. I reject premise 2. I would accept the following argument
instead:
1) There is no relevant difference, in the properties that make for moral
responsibility, between human beings and robots.
2’) Robots, however sophisticated, are paradigms of a sort of being that is
never genuinely morally responsible for anything.
3) Therefore, despite appearances to the contrary, human beings are never
genuinely morally responsible for anything.
For both Dennett and me, human and robot responsibility stand or fall together. He thinks
they both stand; I suspect that they both fall. Someone who denies that robots could ever
be morally responsible for anything and who holds that human beings sometimes are
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morally responsible must believe that there is a difference between the two sorts of being
that giounds their difteiences in moral accountability status. This, I take it, would amount
to a denial of premise 1 ), to a rejection of that sort of naturalism.
Dennett sees no reason to refrain from attributing personhood, a similar sort of
personhood to what we have, to the sort of robots he imagines may someday be built. In
the passages of Elbow Room and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea I have been citing Dennett
does not explicitly claim that the robots would have moral responsibility. However, he
does deal with that matter in an (I believe) as yet unpublished paper posted on his web
site: “Did HAL Commit Murder?”37
. He concludes that a being such as Arthur C. Clarke
described HAL to be (in his script to the film 2001: A Space Odyssey ) is in the running to
qualify as a morally responsible agent. Dennett cites at least two things that ground that
status. Lirst, Hal was “a higher-order intentional system, in other words, capable of
framing beliefs about its own beliefs, desires about its desires, beliefs about its fears
about its thoughts about its hopes, . . .” Secondly, HAL had “the world knowledge
required to be a moral agent—a modicum of understanding or empathy about the human
condition.” Lor the robots we have been discussing, if we countenance them as having
intentional states at all, I see no reason to deny them higher order intentional states. I'm
not sure why a stock of knowledge about human beings is a necessary condition of being
a moral agent (perhaps morality is solely about human beings’ interests), but, in any case,
Dennett’s robots can have it to whatever extent we can. (Or can they? They can never
know from the inside what it is like to be a human being; but then we can never know,
from the inside, what it is like to be them. Are we only morally responsible to our own
kinds, to those we can empathize with from ‘the inside? If so, then robots might turn out
to be capable of having moral obligations, but only to their own kind, to other robots, and
not to us).
37 http:www.tufts.edu/ddennetl/didhal.html
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In addition to having higher order intentionality and certain sorts of knowledge,
are there other things needed for qualifying as a morally responsible agent? Specifically,
is (as I believe) some sort of ultimate control required? Some compatibilists (such as
Martin Luther, Jonathan Edwards, and Robert Merrihew Adams) dispense altogether with
any sort of ‘could have done otherwise’ condition. Dennett, In Elbow Room (and
elsewhere), sometimes comes close to doing that, but he also gives a compatibilist
account of ‘could have done otherwise ’ 38 It is a description of an information processing
system
that is capable of finding improved strategies, if they are there to be found.
Suppose I find I have done something dreadful. Who cares whether, in
exactly the circumstances and state of mind I found myself, I could have
done something else? I didn’t do something else, and it’s too late to undo
what I did. But when I go on to interpret what I did, what do I learn about
myself? Ought I to practice the sort of maneuver I botched, in hopes of
making it more reliable, less vulnerable to perturbation, or would that be
wasted effort?... This time I made a fool of myself; if the situation had
been quite different, I certainly would have done otherwise; if the situation
had been virtually the same, I might have done otherwise and I might not.
The main thing is to see to it that I will jolly well do otherwise in similar
situations in the future.
I think this is a quite good account of one sort of ability to do otherwise: the ability to
learn from one’s poor performances and to improve in the future. However, I think that
talk about my “seeing to it’’ that I do otherwise in the future has troublesome agentic
implications. Many computer systems have the ability to improve their performance.
31 '
Some computer chess playing games get better by recording how well various gambits
work in the course of playing games against human and computer opponents. Many
neural network computer systems improve their performance by a sort of trial and error.
They undergo small random adjustments to the weighting among their nodes. Then their
38
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performance is either measured relative to some internally stored standard or by an
external (perhaps human) evaluator. Then the network undergoes further small
adjustments, and quality measurements in a repeated cycle until performance is good
enough. The trick is to preserve small improvements and for them to serve as the basis
for further variation and evaluation.
Some information processing systems (both human and computer-robotic) learn
quickly from their mistakes, making a given sort of error only once or twice, while others
persist in certain sorts of mistakes through many instances. Learning quickly to improve
is a sort of excellence and getting stuck in patterns of mistakes a kind of deficiency.
However, I deny that a system that improves quickly by learning is morally superior to
one that has a persistent habit of error unless the systems in question have agentic control
over whether they improve or not. If Dennett’s sort of ability to do otherwise (by
avoiding the repetition of errors) were adequate to grounding moral responsibility, then,
since both humans and robots can have it, both humans and robots would be in a position
to qualify as fully morally responsible for what they do. However, I do not think this sort
of ability to do differently is adequate to ground moral accountability.
A self-controlling being in Dennett’s sense is capable of changing for the better.
This strikes me as similar to John Martin Fischer’s account of ‘could have done
otherwise' in terms of reasons responsiveness .
40 One of Dennett’s robots has a current
stock of strategies, but it also is complex enough to be able to (be moved to) override
them. However, whether a given such being in fact improves or not depends on things it
does not control. It depends on things about the system, on its dispositions to learn and to
improve, but without incompatibilist powers the system does not control having the
dispositions it has. Some systems will improve readily and others will hardly improve at
all, but neither sort controls how well it can learn. One is better and the other worse, but
40
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this in not moral betterness. As information processing systems, individual robots (and
individual human beings) differ in their skills, but I do not believe any of them ultimately
control having the sorts and degrees of skills that they have. If so, then their having such
skills are not their action , but rather things that happen to them passively. To the extent
that what they do is causally dependent on their having the skills they do, then what they
do inherits the passiveness of the skills it depends on. I maintain that we are not
responsible for things that happen with respect to which we are passive, even if they
happen through us, through our properties and dispositions that we passively happen to
have.
As Dennett notes, once the robot begins to learn and change under the impact of
what it experiences after it passes outside our influence, it may come to have new
purposes, some of which may conflict with those we have given it. If it is moved more
strongly by these new desires than by its old ones, does it violate some moral
responsibility to us, its creators? It thwarts our desires to be sure, but I do not believe it
ever had a responsibility to do what we want, despite the fact that we have made it. I say
this not because I believe in the robot’s right to self-determination, but because I do not
believe it is an agent with responsibilities because it lacks the right sort of active control
over what it does.
Dennett’s robots are finite systems designed to rise to the occasions on which they
are presented with certain sorts of challenges; but finiteness implies imperfection. If one
system rises successfully to a sort of occasion that defeats another, we may be moved to
praise the first and criticize the second. As an incompatibilist, it seems to me that to
properly blame a system morally for getting something wrong, we must first attribute to it
an active capacity to have gotten it right, to have risen to the occasion that it did not, in
fact, rise to. It also seems to me that this power is only to be satisfactorily spelled out in
incompatibilist terms, that is, as control over a non-arbitrary choice between genuinely
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available alternatives. To be a morally culpable agent, I must have it in my power to do
better but instead do worse.
A robot security guard may, on average, perform better than a human security
guard. Yet, when the robot system does well, it does not deserve our gratitude, and when
if performs badly, it does not deserve our resentment. One way of claiming a morally
relevant difference between human beings and robots is to say that we, but not they, can
perform badly on purpose or due to laziness or culpable negligence. It does not seem to
make sense to describe a machine as deliberately malfunctioning or deliberately doing
less well than it might. My view is that, in the sense that moral accountability requires,
unless we have incompatibilist powers, it also does not make sense to describe us as
deliberately malfunctioning or as doing on purpose less well than we might. For me to do
that would require not only a power to not only have done differently if the causes
bearing on me had been different; it also requires an ability to have done differently even
if the causes bearing on me had not been different. If I had such a power, I would be a
true agent, not a thing passively moved by forces beyond my control like a robot or a
puppet. Dennett’s imagined robots are as complicated in their doings as we are in ours.
Yet, complexity does not constitute agency. I see both the robots and us as passively
moved to do what they do, as non-agents.
My putting it that way expresses a strong distinction I make between action and
passion. I heard Professor Dennett in April 1996 give an address at a New Hampshire
Humanities Council conference on the theme of "Brain, Mind, and Meaning. He closed
his remarks by saying that biological or sociobiological facts would not instruct us as to
the meaning of life. Instead, he said, the moral significance ot an event arises trom
somebody’s caring about it. Afterwards, I got a chance to ask him whether we decide in
some active way what matters to us, what we care about, or whethei we instead just
passively find ourselves caring about some things and indilterent to others. He replied
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that the active/passive distinction in terms of which I posed my question was itself part of
the problem.
Professor Dennett’s brief remark to me may have been just what I needed to hear
to find my way out of error. Perhaps he was pointing to an alternative account of the
concept ‘action’ from my incompatibilist one. On this account, a complicated enough set
of interacting algorithmic (mindless and passive) processes gives rise to a minded and
active process. The fact that I cannot see how that might happen is my problem, not a
flaw in this way of construing the concepts of ‘action’ and ‘agent’. Perhaps on this view,
whether a thing is active or passive is not a matter of metaphysical fact, but rather is a
contextual matter, depending on our perspective and our interests in categorizing the
thing, on the stance we take (or are moved to take) toward it. We are moved to take not
just the passive but also the active intentional stance to things, and it serves our purposes
to do so. What more needs to be said?
The more that I think needs to be said is that serving our purposes is one thing and
being morally good another. Here again, I make a distinction in kind (between moral and
non-moral goodness) where a compatibilist might see a difference within a type. The
goodness of, say, a knife, consists in its properties that suit it to our purposes (typically its
sharpness, resistance to rust and things like that). The goodness of a security guard
(whether a human or a robot) also consists in its properties that suit it to our purposes in
guarding something we want guarded (stays alert, knows how to distinguish authorized
from unauthorized visitors, etc). I would call the goodness in both cases non-moral. As an
incompatibilist, I take moral goodness to be a different matter. There being a morally
good thing might suit our purposes, but it might not. It also, I think, would require that an
agent exhibit a sort of control that 1 do not see how a fully naturalistic being could have.
Suppose I am wrong about all that, and that moral goodness is just a highly generalized
suitability to human beings’ purposes or a general conduciveness to human well-being.
Moral badness would then turn out to be a reliable disposition to diminish human well-
59
being. In neither case do we need hold that the being who was morally good or bad
controlled its being good or bad. What bothers me about this way of taking things is that
a person’s moral goodness or badness turns out to be a matter of luck. Those who
happened, independently of anything they ultimately controlled, to be bad in this so-
called moral way strike me as unfortunate rather than as blameworthy. Their dispositions
to cause harm are no more blameworthy than a runaway robot’s or a tornado's. I note that
Derek Pereboom makes a similar point that what we have taken to be moral badness may
actually be the sort of non-moral naturalistic badness that a destructive storm may have . 41
We typically think of machines as objects, rather than as subjects. As I will
examine further in Chapter V, P.F. Strawson has laid great emphasis on the moral
difference between taking something to be an object rather than a subject. However, as
Dennett describes them, I imagine his robots would qualify as much as subjects as we do.
They are the subjects of beliefs and desires, or at least the functional equivalents of these.
However, when it comes to moral responsibility, I think the active/passive or
agentic/non-agentic distinction is more important than the subjective/objective
distinction. Something might be a subject without being an agent. A non-agentic subject,
roughly, is a locus of passive experience, a point of view, while an agent is a source from
which actions flow, a locus of a particular sort of control, a causal origin. Dennett may
have deflected my question about whether we actively control what we care about, but,
though a compatibilist, he writes “I, as a person, consider myself to be a source of
meaning, an arbiter of what matters and why .”42 As an incompatibilist, I think our being
responsible requires being an ultimate source. Dennett cannot mean this when he speaks
of being a source. What is a less than ultimate source of meaning, a proximate source ot
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meaning or concern, and how can merely being a proximate source ground our being
morally responsible?
According to Dennett, the sort of freedom we can have, and which is worth
wanting, is the freedom of having an “open future.” This is the freedom that, presumably,
is relevant to our being morally responsible. What is it to have an open future? It is facing
“a future in which our deliberation is effective: a future in which if I decide to do A then 1
will do A, and if 1 decide to do B then I will do B, a future in which— since only one
future is possible— the only possible thing that can happen is the thing I decide in the
end to do.”41 ‘Deciding in the end’ may mean being the ultimate decision-maker in a way
that would make me an ultimate, incompatibilist source, an unmoved mover. Or ‘in the
end’ might just mean being the last person in the causal sequence leading up to an event,
the last one whose decision, if different, could have blocked an event from happening. On
this latter interpretation, there may have been a sufficient cause, outside the decider’s
control, for the last decision. Although I was last, I may have been a completely moved
mover. While I find nothing wrong with this way of construing the notion of being the
one who ‘decided in the end’, I do not see how having that position in the causal
sequence would make me morally responsible. In any case, if robots make decisions and
are subjects of beliefs and desires, they can surely occupy the final decision point before
an event. If that is what makes for morally responsibility, then they can have it.
Professor Dennett sees us as very fancy robots, designed by natural selection. I
see no good reason to dispute that way of conceiving what we are. However, I do dispute
with Dennett his compatibilist view that all it takes to be personally morally accountable
is to be a fancy enough robot. Perhaps his idea is that, while simple systems (an ant, or
even a tiger) do not qualify, that when a certain threshold ol increasing complexity is
passed, the systems become capable of doing moral right and wrong. My conti asting
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opinion is that no degree of complexity of non-agentic processes is sufficient for the
emergence of agency. Use ‘nature’, ‘nurture’ and ‘chance’ to stand for the naturalistic
processes that might produce an organism or a robot of arbitrarily high complexity. Since
I believe both that these processes are all the ones that operate and that there are passive
selves, these naturalistic processes must be sufficient to produce passive selves. However,
personal activity (as opposed to passively being moved) requires something more, in my
opinion, something dilteient in kind from what nature, nurture and chance can produce.
Personal responsibility for an action requires more than being the person who stands in a
paiticular position in the causal process leading up to some event. To merit my resenting
it, taking what it does personally, a thing that causes me harm would have to have been
able to avoid causing me that harm. Such an ability strikes me as not something nature,
nurture and chance could produce in either a robot or a human being. To be the agent of
my harm requires something more than harming me, or harming me while wanting to do
so, or even harming me while endorsing wanting to harm me. I think the something more
boils down to causally independent production of non-random behavior. This would be
the agent’s own doing, and that strikes me as what would make for personal moral
responsibility.
In conclusion, the power or freedom to lift oneself by one’s bootstraps is a power
or form of freedom that Dennett holds is not worth wanting. Since I believe we neither
have such powers nor any way to get them, and that it is pointless to want what you do
not believe you have any way to get, I agree that they are not worth wanting. However, I
take it that Dennett moves from their not being worth wanting to their being unimportant,
and this, I think, is a place where we disagree. Those unattainable powers of self-
movement and ultimate self-control are important if our common sense moral evaluative
practices imply that we have them. If we come to believe they are unattainable, then that
would dictate a reform of those practices. In his presentation at Dartmouth, Professor
Dennett allowed that some changes might be needed, some tightening of the concept of
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‘responsibility', but suggested by his tone that these changes would be minor
adjustments.
On page 158 of Elbow Room, Professor Dennett describes what he (and I) accept
to be the facts: that no one ever does anything in a way that is independent of interfering
factors that he or she does not control. Professor Dennett then says, “If we are to be found
responsible at all, it will have to be a modest, naturalized, slightly diminished
responsibility, for we are no angels.” He then goes on to discuss our justification for, in
the face of certain sorts of behavior that displeases us, “punishing” the beings that
produce the behavior. I put “punishing” in quotes because I think it a conceptual mistake
to speak of literally punishing a being without incompatibilist powers. By the word
“angels” I take Professor Dennett to mean beings who have supernatural powers, such as
contra-causal free will. Yet why settle for a diminished notion? Why continue to find
ourselves responsible at all? Professor Dennett says it is the best game, the only game, in
town, but I doubt that. I will try to sketch out and defend a different game in my final
chapter, below.
Perhaps it helps, in deploying our strategies for influencing each other’s doings, to
use the old language of personal moral responsibility, guilt, free choice, etc. However, I
think these advantages are gained at a cost in confusion that outweighs the advantage. It
might also help for our purposes in affecting each other to continue to use the old
religious language of sin, damnation, redemption and grace (in figurative ways if we did
not literally believe in supernatural beings). However, again, the danger of confusion, of
taking the figurative to be literal, strikes me as too great. If there is no divine lawgiver,
then no one can literally sin. If there are no agents who have the power of independent
control over their choices, then no one is ever literally responsible for having freely
chosen to do A (say, killing some noisy neighborhood children) rather than B
(complaining about them to their parents). It someone is moved to kill children who have
annoyed him, we will be moved to respond to his wildly unusual behavior by restraining
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him or even killing him if he cannot be otherwise moved to desist. However, I deny that
by responding that way we are punishing him or holding him morally responsible.
I have claimed that our common sense moral evaluative practices depict us as sole
authois ot our actions. In a way, this image of ourselves is a great strength. If someone
did something, and nothing made him do it, then it makes sense to me that he be held
responsible in a special way. However, if people's behavior is produced by many causes,
the strategy of making attributions of moral responsibility that suggest sole authorship
may not be the most effective strategy to use. This focus on individuals as if they were
independent causes, if it is false to the naturalistic facts, may lead us away from other
causes that we could more easily manipulate so as to bring about the behavior we want.
What point is there to investigating other causes if “He just did it, and nothing made him
do it." or for looking for psychological generalizations if we believe human minds
operate independently of natural causal regularities?
I agree that what I call “incompatibilist control" and what Dennett calls
“metaphysical freedom" is an odd thing to want.44 1 don’t believe we have incompatibilist
freedom, but whether I have it is not up to me. There’s nothing I can do about whether I
have it or not, nor is there any way I know of to settle whether I have it or not. That
leaves it an irrelevance from my point of view. However, I do think that part of the
customary meaning we attach to the terms of moral evaluation implies that we have
incompatibilist powers. To me, all that has the practical implication that, if I want to have
self-respect as a reasoning being, I will be moved to reframe my ways of describing and
my techniques for influencing my own and other people’s doings. I will avoid, except for
clearly figurative rhetorical flourishes, the use of traditional moral evaluative language. I
say this because I believe that this traditional language has historically been associated
with such beliefs as that we human beings are the independent sources of our behavior,
Ibid., p. 172.
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choosing between genuinely available alternative courses of actions in a way that nothing
we do not control causes us to choose. I claim that common-sense users of moral
evaluative language would largely agree that only people who can help doing what they
do or who can help being the way they are constitute appropriate targets for full-blooded
moral evaluation.
If we are not such beings (and I believe that Professor Dennett believes we are
not), why use language that even suggests that we are? Abandon literal use of ‘free’,
‘action’, ‘responsible’, ‘punish’, etc. to the libertarian incompatibilists and use different
terms instead. This would entail some short term loss of rhetorical effectiveness (as our
having moved away from use of the language of sin, damnation, God’s all-seeing eye,
etc., has engendered such loss), but I suspect we would be better off if we made the
change. If our habit of attributing independent agency to each other does not admit of
such change, then we will continue to operate as we have, however implausible it may be
that we are causally independent active beings. In that case, being free of the agentic
point of view (that is, being rid of it in our practice) is not a freedom worth wanting,
because we will turn out to be blocked by what are apparently insuperable psychological
forces from ever having it. However, I doubt that we are as inflexible as that, and will try
to say why in Chapter V, below.
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CHAPTER IV
ON FRANKFURT’S COUNTERFACTUAF INTERVENER EXAMPLE
A. Introductory Remarks
Professor Harry Frankfurt has presented what is clearly the most influential
thought experiment example case in the modern discussion of freedom and moral
responsibility: the counterfactual intervener45
. Compatibilists have drawn two lessons
from Frankfurt s example case46 . The first is that, even if causal determinism is true, we
might still turn out to be properly morally accountable for what we do. The second is that,
even if we could not have done otherwise than we did, we might still turn out to be
properly morally accountable for what we do. In other words, they take Frankfurt’s
example to support the claim that compatibilism is a sound position and that the principle
of alternative possibilities is false. However, it seems to me that these conclusions are too
broad. As I see it, the most that this sort of example supports is that, under certain sorts of
unusual circumstance, people might turn out to be morally responsible for doing things
even though there were independent conditions sufficient for their doing what they did.
Such examples do bring to light a problem with one way of formulating the ‘could have
done otherwise’ condition that the principle of alternative possibilities is designed to
capture. However, there is another way of putting that condition that seems to me
immune to the examples but which leaves compatibilism subject to a strong challenge. As
an aside, allow me to note that I am going to use the phrase ‘alternative possibilities’
rather than follow Professor Frankfurt’s use of ‘alternate possibilities’. In standard usage,
as I understand it, ‘alternate’ is a verb and ‘alternative’ is an adjective (or noun).
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Compatibilism, as I understand it, is the position that the truth of causal
determinism is no threat to our having the sort of freedom or self-control that would
allow us to properly count as morally responsible for what we do. Putting it briefly,
causal determinism and personal moral responsibility are compatible. I take causal
determinism to be the view that, for everything that happens, there is a set of conditions
sufficient to bring it about that it happen as it does.
B. The Case Described
Suppose that Black wants Jones to vote for Brown, rather than Green. He has
monitoring equipment that gives him the power read Jones’ mind. By this (admittedly
science fiction) means, Black can detect any incipient tendencies on Jones part toward
voting for Green (or doing anything else but vote for Brown). Black also has the means to
pre-empt such tendencies and cause Jones to decide to vote for Brown. However, Black
never has to intervene because Jones never shows any tendency to do anything but vote
for Brown, which he does. Suppose that, under the circumstances, if an agent fully
capable of moral responsibility were to freely vote for Brown, he would do something
morally wrong (say, because there is strong evidence that Brown will oppress the
innocent).
Professor Frankfurt’s intuition is that Jones is morally responsible for voting for
Brown despite the presence of the counterfactual intervener. Black, by standing by, limits
Jones such that there is only one available thing Jones can do: vote for Brown. If we
assume (as I do not) that Jones would be morally responsible for voting for Brown if
Black had not been standing by, then adding Black does not seem to alter Jones’ moral
status. The plausibility of this intuition rests on the fact that Frankfurt so structures the
example that Black has no causal impact on what Jones does. Black is causally screened
off from Jones. Jones does the same thing whether or not Black is present. As far as
anything to do with Black is concerned, Jones does what he does independently, on his
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own. The supposition is that Jones, rather than Black, actually controls what Jones does,
and this is what (many believe) grounds our accepting Frankfurt’s intuition that Jones is
morally responsible even though Black leaves him with no alternative possible things he
might do.
In a footnote47
.
Professor Frankfurt suggests that his counterexample would work
just as well if we substituted impersonal natural forces for Black. If there were a
particular set of natural conditions that would have caused Jones to do something if he
had not, independently, done it on his own, the example would be completely parallel to
the case of involving Black. The particular set of natural conditions would make no
difference to what Jones did, and it would consequently not affect whatever moral
responsibility Jones might have for doing it. The set of impersonal natural conditions
would be sufficient for Jones’ doing as he did, but would not be necessary because there
would be a separate circumstance sufficient for his doing it (Jones’ doing it
independently, on his own). Yet suppose that the impersonal sufficient condition for
Jones’s doing as he did (the analogue of the counterfactual intervener) were not some
particular fact but rather a vast network of such facts, constituting an entire causally
deterministic world insofar as it bears on Jones. My image is of a deity tossing an
invisible maze over Jones’ (and every other morally responsible person’s) life, one that
leaves each of us but a single path from birth to death. Neither Jones nor anyone else can
see the maze, but if he bumped into a wall, it would cause him to move in the direction
the maze allows. We next suppose that the maze does not constrain Jones because he
never bumps into its walls by trying to go in a direction the maze does not permit. By an
overwhelmingly improbable series of lucky breaks, Jones happens to turn whenever he
would have hit a wall if he were to go straight. Jones traverses his path on his own,
independently of the maze that would confine anyone else who took different turns, but
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this independence is only relative to the maze, and not relative to whatever conditions (if
any) that cause his making the turns he does.
Might a distinction between primary causation and secondary causation make
room lor moral responsibility in the absence of ultimate control? Aquinas gave God the
power to create things ex nihilo
, but he made room in his system for secondary causes,
created agents that helped God to bring about specific finite effects. Presumably, God had
ultimate control and we creatures had a lesser sort of control, yet still enough control of
the right sort to provide the ground for our being properly held morally responsible48
.
If such a distinction between primary and secondary causes works, that might
open a viable way to not just a supernaturalistic compatibilism but a naturalistic
compatibilism as well. If God’s control and our control can be made out to be compatible
with each other, then so might impersonal natural causes and our control turn out to also
be compatible with each other. Something like this may be at work in Professor
Frankfurt’s remark that his counterfactual intervener might be replaced by an entire world
of causes.
However, I do not think this move works. Consider some purported sin or morally
culpable wrong-doing, for example my stealing some money. Grant, for the sake of
discussion, that God (or nature) is the primary cause of this event and that I (or the state
of my will) is the secondary cause. I help to bring about, or fulfill, that for which God (or
nature) has set the stage. Rather than focus on the taking of the money, which God (or
nature) and I, co-cause, I instead call attention to my part of it, my helping to complete, in
a secondary or proximate way, what God (or nature) has brought it about that I/We do in
His/its primary, ultimate way. That is, rather than on the puiported act of stealing, I focus
on my cooperating with the circumstances in which I find myself. Whether those
circumstances were placed there by God’s action or just non-agentically came to be there
48Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloeica . John A. Oesterle, trans. under title Treatise on The
Virtues (South Bend IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), la, Ilae Q. 49, art 2, ad 3, p. 6.
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due to non-intending natural causes, I presume I did not control there being as they were.
If my cooperating with the primary cause is to ground my being morally responsible, then
that cooperating must be my action, something that I agentically control. If my
cooperating occurs passively, then, at most, it grounds my naturalistic badness, but not
my moral badness. Now, if my cooperating is an action, then it is either caused or
uncaused. If it is fully uncaused, then that seems to me to amount to its happening
randomly, and I shrink from believing that a random event can ground my moral
accountability. If I cause the cooperating but am not caused to do so, then I am an
unmoved mover, a being with libertarian incompatibilist powers. If my cooperation is
caused both by God (or by nature) as the primary cause and by me as the secondary
cause, then I fear a regress. We can again distinguish my, secondary, contribution to my
own cooperation from God’s (or nature’s) primary causal contribution and ask again
whether I have ultimate control over that secondary contribution or not. If I do have
ultimate control, then I am an agent with incompatibilist powers. If I do not, then again I
at best make a secondary contribution along with some primary cause that I do not
control.
If I were a primary cause of my cooperating or not with what God (or nature) has
prepared, then that is inconsistent with God’s being the cause of everything that happens
or with natural causes being sufficient for whatever happens. I take 'natural causes being
sufficient for whatever happens’ to just be a way of stating the thesis of comprehensive
naturalistic causal determinism. My exercising even a secondary causal power conflicts
with comprehensive causal determinism, unless I, myself, am a naturalistic cause. If I
cause things in a non-naturalistic way, then I have incompatibilist powers. If I cause
things in a completely naturalistic way (by being myself a naturalistic cause), then, again,
I focus on my causing things as I do. Whether we call it 'being a secondary cause or
‘proximately causing’, my doing that is either my action, something controlled in an
agentic way, or it is not. If it is not my action, not something I do in a controlled way,
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then it does not ground my responsibility. If I do control or cause my causing things to
happen as they do, then that second order causation is itself either primary (or ultimate)
or secondary (or proximate). If I only have proximate control over how I exercise
proximate control, then this seems to me too weak to ground my moral responsibility. If I
exercise ultimate control over how I exercise proximate control, then it seems to me that I
have incompatibilist powers, powers independent of the natural (or supernatural) causes
bearing on me.
When Jones votes for Brown without Black having to do anything, what (if
anything) does cause his voting as he does? If there are causes, do they leave Jones in
control of what he does in the way that it takes for him to turn out to be morally
responsible? That question is left untouched by Frankfurt’s example. Until that question
is settled, Frankfurt’s example establishes only a hypothetical point about Jones’
responsibility. If he is responsible without Black, he is just as responsible with him. Since
Black abolishes any chance Jones had to do otherwise, that hypothetical point is enough
to severely challenge the principle that alternative possibilities are necessary to moral
accountability, but it is not enough to establish that moral responsibility is compatible
with determinism.
A libertarian incompatibilist is someone who holds that, when Jones does
something in a way that leaves him morally responsible for doing it, all else remaining
the same, he could have done differently than he did. I take libertarian incompatibilism to
attribute non-naturalistic contra-causal powers to human beings. On this view, the world
is not causally sufficient for a responsible agent’s doing as he does. A compatibilist of
Frankfurt’s type apparently holds that, when Jones does something for which he is
morally responsible, that the external world being as it was is not causally necessary to
his doing it. Even though external circumstances may have been causally sufficient to
move Jones to do what he did, they were not necessary because there was an independent
sufficient condition for his doing what he did: his doing it on his own. Both libertarian
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incompatibilists and compatibilists hold that the external world does not make Jones do
what he does, but rather that he (at least sometimes) does things on his own, in
independence of that world. As a non-libertarian incompatibilist, I suppose that there is a
straightforward causal connection between the world and Jones' doings. The causes (and
uncontrolled chance eruptions, if any) that bear on him are neither insufficient (as
libertarian incompatibilists hold) nor unnecessary or epiphenomenal (as I take it
Frankfurt-style compatibilists hold). To the extent that these conditions are beyond my
control, it does not seem to me that I am responsible for what they cause me to do.
I grant that it is logically possible for Jones to have done what he did in complete
causal independence of the rest of the world. Nevertheless, it strikes me as much less
plausible than it did in the case of the personal intervener. Black, even with his vast
powers, was but a single influence. I see the rest of the world as amounting to the sum
total of all the influences bearing on Jones. Nevertheless, however remote may be the
logical possibility of Jones doing what he does independently of the whole world, it is
enough to threaten the categorical requirement of alternative possibilities as necessary for
moral responsibility. Even if we live in a deterministic world, one that leaves us with no
available alternatives whatsoever, we could turn out to be morally responsible for what
we did. We would be responsible if we did things independently of what that world
would cause us to do had we not done them on our own.
What we are imagining is a world that is both causally deterministic and that
leaves room for human beings such as Jones to do things independently of causes. Isn't
that an inconsistency? If the world is truly comprehensively deterministic, if there is a
sufficient cause for every event, then must there not be a cause for any given doing, such
as Jones’ voting for Brown? As I see it, there must be a cause for Jones’ doing as he does,
but that cause need not be some condition independent of Jones or outside his control.
The world might be deterministic and yet there still might be separate, independent causal
chains, some outside of our control and others within it. Thus, there could be two
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independent sets of circumstances, each sufficient for Jones’ voting as he does, and as
long as one of those sets of circumstances remained under Jones’ control, he is plausibly
responsible.
Consider the structurally similar case to Frankfurt’s that John Locke discusses; of
a man locked in a room who stays there voluntarily. The locked door (about which our
man is ignorant) prevents him from leaving, but even if the door were not locked, he still
would not leave. His desire to remain in the room is a cause of his staying there that is
independent of the locked door41'. It might seem that there are significant differences
between the two cases. In Frankfurt’s case, the intervener is counterfactual. Black never
actually does anything, but it seems that the state of the lock is actually prevents Locke’s
man from leaving. While plausible, I think this impression of a significant difference
between the two cases is a mistaken one. In Frankfurt’s case, even though the intervener
does not interfere with what Jones does, Black is represented as actually existing. It is his
doing something that is counterfactual. It seems to me that, in this regard, the lock is as
counterfactual a factor as Black is. It is a counterfactual preventer. It does not actually
prevent the man from leaving (because he makes no attempt to do so), but it would
prevent him in the counterfactual situation where he does try to leave. A second
difference between Frankfurt’s and Locke’s cases (and this I think a real one) is that, in
the counterfactual situation where Jones starts to vote for Green but is then prevented,
Jones does not detect Black’s intervention. We may assume that Black not only has
effective control over Jones’ voting, but also over his trying to vote. If Locke’s man were
to try to leave, he would detect his being prevented from doing so by the locked door.
In Locke’s example, the fact, unknown to the man, that the door is locked is
irrelevant to his moral goodness or badness with respect to his remaining in the room.
Suppose that, while in the room, he fails to prevent someone’s harm, a harm that, had he
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not been in the room, we hold that he could and should have prevented. Our intuitive
reaction is to hold him blameworthy for the harm. The locked door makes it the case that
he could not do otherwise but remain in the room and, therefore, could not have
prevented the harm. We seem to be holding the man responsible for not doing something
that he could not have done. However, the door’s being locked does not make it the case
that he cannot try to leave, only that he cannot succeed. If ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (as, I take
it, in the moral context it does), then we are wrong to think the man blameworthy for not
preventing the harm. Instead, if he is blameworthy at all, it is for not even trying to get
into a position where he could prevent it. To decide whether to morally condemn the man
for not trying, I would want to know what caused his not trying (assuming that there was
a cause), and whether he could have controlled those influences and brought it about that
instead he did try. Similarly, in Frankfurt’s case, whether Jones is responsible does not
depend on the presence or absence of the counterfactual intervener, but rather on the
causal background of what actually happens. Was he caused to do what he did (by things
other than the intervener)? If he was caused, did he have any control over the operation of
those causes? Could he have made the actual influences that operated operate differently
so that they would not have moved him as they did, to vote for Brown? If not, then it
seems to me that he does not control what he does, and, for that reason, is not responsible
for doing it.
In short, Black leaves Jones as responsible as he would be if Black did not exist,
but why suppose he was responsible to begin with?
C. How Are Events Best Described?
Thus far, I have been granting Professor Frankfurt’s contention that Black leaves
Jones with but a single available thing to do. Frankfurt claims that the counterfactual
intervener, if he had actually intervened, would have caused Jones to do precisely the
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same doing that he (actually) does" 11
. Whether or not I fully accept that contention
depends on how we individuate doings (which I am assuming throughout are events). 1
am not sure precisely how Professor Frankfurt distinguishes different particular doings or
how he sorts different particular doings into types. As I see things, in these examples, I
do not think we are discussing particular events, but rather event types. The particular
event that would be Jones’ voting without Black doing anything seems to me a different
particular event from what would be Jones’ voting under Black's influence if he had
intervened. I say that because, for particular events at least, I agree with Professor Van
Inwagen’s suggestion that we individuate events by their causes 51
. If this be accepted,
then the doing Jones performs on his own turns out to be a different doing from the one
he would have performed if the counterfactual intervener had been an actual intervener,
even though both doings are tokens of the same type, ‘a voting for Brown by Jones’. I
think that different particular causes produce different particular events as their effects.
Even if we confine the discussion to event types, I think that we can plausibly
individuate types by causes. On this view, while in both cases we have a voting, we have
a different type of voting when Jones votes under the influence of something Black does
and when he does not vote under such influence. It seems to me that it is only with some
coarser typing of events that it is true to say that Black leaves Jones with but a single type
of thing to do. It seems to me that, if the principle that moral responsibility requires
alternative possibilities were to apply at all, it must be a requirement that Jones have
alternative types of things available that he might do. Suppose someone effectively
coerces me into harming you. I hit you with my left hand. It seems to me irrelevant to the
issue of whether I am blameworthy that the coercer left it open to me to strike you instead
with my right hand. There may be indefinitely many doings that would have fulfilled the
50
Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, op, cit., p. 837.
s|
Peter Van Inwagen, “Ability and Responsibility", reprinted in John Martin Fischer, ed. Moral
Responsibility
,
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1986) p. 160.
75
coercer s desires, but they all fell under the type ‘harming you’. If he genuinely left me
no alternative outside that general type, then despite my having many alternatives within
it, it would not be plausible to hold me responsible on the basis that I had those
alternatives. Think again of Locke’s man in the room. One event one is his staying in the
room because his desire to stay prevents his leaving. Another event is his staying in the
room because the locked door prevents him from leaving. On the occasion we are
considering, the first event happens, but not the second. However, the second would
happen if the first did not. Though they are both cases of staying in the room, it seems to
me that they are different types of event. In this sort of overdetermination case, it does
seem plausible to say that one sufficient condition (the desire) was the real cause and that
another sufficient condition (the locked door) was a stand-by cause, something that
would have been a real cause if the first condition had not filled that role. In other sorts of
overdetermination cases, where both sets of conditions actually bear on the matter, there
may be no plausible candidate for the role of “the real cause”, and no answer to the
question of which type of event happened (if not both). For example, several assassins
might simultaneously (yet separately) launch different sorts of attacks on a king, each of
which, by itself, would be fatal. In this sort of case, we seem to have multiple sufficient
conditions for an event (the king’s death) without any of them being the cause.
As I have said, it strikes me that we may describe the events that are our doing in
wider and narrower ways. Assume that the proper objects of moral blame or praise are
not particular doings, but coarsely typed sorts of doings. Described widely, under the
coarse type ‘voting for Brown’, the counterfactual intervener Black eliminates any
alternative that Jones otherwise may have. Described more narrowly, Jones may arguably
have alternatives. Consider these different ways of narrowly specifying types of doings:
on the one hand ‘Jones voting for Brown on his own' or ‘Jones voting for Brown by
normal causal processes’ versus, on the other hand, ‘Jones voting for Brown due to
Black’s intervening’. Again, we are distinguishing sub-types, under the more general type
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Jones voting for Brown', by mentioning causes. It seems to me that, relative to these
narrower descriptions, Jones arguably has alternatives even given the counterfactual
intervener’s standing by. Jones cannot help but vote for Brown, but can fail to vote for
him on his own or fail to vote for him by a normal, non-coercive causal process.
In the locked room case, I mentioned my opinion that the morally relevant way of
describing what the man does is not ‘remaining in the room’, but rather ‘not trying to
leave the room’. In Frankfurt’s example, I think it equally plausible to hold that it is not
‘voting for Brown’ but ‘voting for Brown independently of anything Black does’ for
which Jones is arguably responsible. If Jones has an alternative between voting for
Brown on his own and voting for Brown under Black’s influence, then the counterfactual
intervener does not rule out alternatives, and the example fails to show that alternatives
are not necessary to Jones’ being morally responsible. However, questions about how to
type events are controversial, and for the sake of discussion here, I propose to proceed on
the assumption most favorable to Frankfurt’s example. That is, I assume that the morally
relevant way of typing events is such that Black does rule out Jones’ alternatives. On that
supposition, Jones lacks alternatives but still seems morally responsible.
What is a cause? I think a cause is a contingent sufficient condition for the
happening of an event, the effect. A cause is also necessary to the effect’s happening in
the sense that the effect would not happen if the cause had not happened. On this
characterization of ‘cause’. Black does not cause Jones to vote for Brown, even if he
actually intervenes (since Jones stood ready to vote for Brown on his own). The locked
door does not cause Locke’s man to stay in the room (since he would have stayed even if
the door had not been locked). In both cases a sufficient condition fails to be a cause of
an event because it is not necessary to the event’s happening. The locked door is
sufficient but not necessary because there is an independent sufticient condition, the
man’s desire to remain in the room. Black's actual intervention is sufticient but not
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necessary to Jones’ voting for Brown because there is an independent sufficient
condition, Jones' independent desire to vote for Brown.
Suppose that Jones acted freely relative to ah of the causes that bore on him, in
the following sense. If any of those causes were subtracted and replaced with a neutral,
null, or average place-holder condition, Jones would still have done what he did. If Jones’
doing were that robust, then I take it he would have unconditional freedom with respect
to that doing, and it would be compellingly plausible to hold him morally responsible.
However, such unrestricted freedom relative to ah the causes bearing on Jones would,
also in my opinion, amount to incompatibilist freedom. Under such suppositions, even
though the causes bearing on him were sufficient for his doing what he did, they would
not be the cause of what Jones did. Something would be left over, some agentic
contribution, something his own that was independent of those causes that constituted an
independent condition sufficient for Jones’ doing as he did.
If we assume that, in the absence of the external conditions bearing on Jones, he
would be himself the sufficient cause for his doing what he does, then it seems to me that
he would have some power to be the agent cause of his doing. Such a power would not
quite be an incompatibilist one because it is compatible with causal determination, or at
least something quite like causal determination. That is, Jones’s exercising his own
independent power is compatible with there always being an independent sufficient
condition for all Jones’s doings so long as Jones’s agent causing always happens to
coincide with what the rest of the world would move him to do if it were not for his doing
it on his own. However, that sort of unvarying harmony between causally unconnected
ways that Jones’s doing might be produced seems to me highly unlikely to just happen by
coincidence, without something or someone causing the coordination.
The idea that natural causes might operate and be sufficient for our doings but not
necessitate them because a harmonious corresponding free action avoids the necessitation
is highly reminiscent of Leibniz' views. By his doctrine of a pre-established harmony,
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Leibniz allowed for both a deterministic science of matter and a free and independent
arena ot personal agency. Leibniz held that, when it comes to mental substances, the
conditions that determine matter incline, but do not necessitate the actions of persons52
.
Even it ‘inclination’ happens so regularly and invariably that it appears to materialist
naturalists that human action is caused, according to Leibniz’ views, our actions are still
free.
However, Leibniz had God to appeal to as an agent who kept natural cause and
agentic free will in harmony, and who kept the windowless (causally independent)
monads in synchronization, but Professor Frankfurt does not invoke such a coordinating
agent. As a defender of a naturalistic compatibilism, he cannot. Instead, he apparently
depends on the mere possibility that a person freely does what, by coincidence,
independent circumstances were going to cause him to do anyway. I admit that possibility
as a logical matter. However, I consider it overwhelmingly unlikely that I and everyone
else that compatibilists want to hold morally responsible would always freely do on our
own what causes external to their wills were going to move us to do. I suppose that,
instead of Leibniz’s God, there might be some impersonal fact about the nature of things
that somehow assures that there is a pervasive harmony between the things that people do
on their own and what they would be caused to do if they did not do them on their own.
This would produce a harmony that was not pre-established by anyone’s action.
However, I can think of no reason to believe that this bare logical possibility of some
unknown naturalistic harmonizing factor is realized. If Professor Frankfurt’s example,
taken as describing not just the single case of Jones and Black, but all putatively
responsible actions, puts him in Leibniz’s camp, I suppose he is in good company.
However, Leibniz’s metaphysics of pervasive overdetermination is hardly the stuff of
common sense.
52 G.W Leibniz, “On The Ultimate Origination of Things", in Roger Arlew, and Daniel Garber,
G.W Leibniz Philosophical Essays , (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1989), p. 150.
79
Pervasive causal overdetermination via independent causal processes is logically
possible, but I shiink somewhat from calling such a world causally deterministic. I might
do all the same things I do if the forces that actually bear on me were different, but in that
case there would not be a causal connection between me and that world of forces. Instead
there would be either a correlation, some sort of non-causal connection, or a set of
coincidences that just happen. The forces that bear on me would be counterfactually
causal. They would move me to do things if I did not move myself in independence of
them. Such robust coincidences, unless they were set up by some pre-ordaining god,
strike me as astronomically unlikely to just happen (even granting the bare logically
possibility that they could).
I had thought that it was one of the chief advantages of compatibilism that it
promised to separate the plain, commonsensical, intuitively obvious (to some) facts about
people being individually morally responsible for what they do from abstruse, obscure,
and dubious metaphysical claims. A defense of compatibilism that depends on our living
in a world of massive overdetermination seems to forfeit that supposed advantage of
neutrality with respect to dubious metaphysical claims. Frankfurt’s example depends on
overdetermination. It seems to me that a more plausible way of presenting compatibilism
would be to hold that there are some sorts of natural causal process by which people are
moved to do things that do not interfere with people being morally responsible. However,
if there are such causes compatible with responsibility, and if they operate in Jones’s
case, then he already lacks alternatives before the counterfactual intervener comes onto
the scene. All that remains is for compatibilists to spell out these naturalistic causes of
doings and either explain how they do not interfere with our exercising control over what
we do or explain how our belief that responsibility requires control is misguided.
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This last approach is taken by what I call hard compatibilists such as Jonathan
Edwards 5 ' or Martin Luther54 (and in our own day Robert Merrihew Adams55 ). These
thinkers abandon any connection between doing things on one’s own and being morally
responsible for doing them. For hard compatibilists, my being susceptible (in ways that I
do not control) to being moved by external causes to do harm is what constitutes my
being a morally blameworthy person. For these hard compatibilists, there is no need for
overdetermination. They may make exceptions for my being caused in certain ways to do
things (such as coercion or fraud at another’s hands), but in general they see no
impediment to my being caused to do something and my being responsible for doing it.
Here we face a fundamental clash of intuitions, between hard compatibilism and my
view, non-libertarian incompatibilism. Frankfurt’s soft compatibilist approach seems to
me to paper over this clash. His example supports the thesis that I may be subject to a
sufficient condition (that I do not control) for my doing something and yet be responsible.
However, this support rests on there being a separate, overdetermining sufficient
condition that I do control. The fundamental difference between the hard compatibilists
and me is that they hold I may be responsible for doing what I am caused to do by forces
beyond my control while I deny that. In a Frankfurt-style overdetermination case, I am
not caused to do what I do by forces beyond my control (even though such forces exist
and even though they are sufficient to move me). Frankfurt’s example does not support
compatibilism if by ‘compatibilism’ we mean the view that I may be caused to do
something and yet nevertheless be responsible for doing it. The counterfactual intervener
does not cause Jones to do anything, and even an actual intervener does not cause anyone
53 Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will. (Indianapolis IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).
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to do something it he or she already stood ready due to some independent sufficient
condition.
Suppose that Black causes Jones to do something contrary to the will he
previously had. Then, Jones is unfree in compatibilist terms (at least for Frankfurt’s sort
of compatibilism). Unless Jones has control over being moved by the sort of influences
Black brings to bear on him, most of us would agree that Jones is not morally
responsible, even if what he does causes harm. This reaction indicates that most of us
reject hard compatibilism. If (as in Frankfurt’s example) Jones is subject to conditions
sufficient to move him to do something that accords with the desire about what to do that
he had already formed, then those sufficient conditions leave him free (and, other things
being equal, morally responsible) in compatibilist terms. If Jones is subject to a cause
sufficient to move him to want to do (and to do) something about which he had no
antecedent desire either way, then he meets the Hobbesean sort of compatibilist criterion
for freedom: he does what he wants to do56 . Yet it seems plausible to me that Jones’
responsibility in this last case should turn on what he would want if he were not subject
to being caused to desire as he does. If Jones would independently want to do what he
did, he did it freely. If he would not want to do it, he did it unfreely. Finally, if he would
have had no desire about doing it if he were not subject to the causes, it seems to me that
Jones would not qualify as free by a more sophisticated compatibilist standard than
Hobbes’, such as the meta-desire account that Frankfurt himself has defended"
7
. Instead,
Jones would do what he did wantonly.
In fact, I think that ultimately we are all wantons in Frankfurt’s sense. We are not
infinitely reflective and thoughtful about what we do and about the motives that move us
to do them. We, each of us, stop reflecting at some point. Where we stop differs
M
’ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , op. cit. p. 146.
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depending on our particular dispositions and on the exigencies of the moment. We then
proceed on what strikes us as justifying reasons for which we do not seek further
justifications. These are as-if categorical motives, the things relative to which the rest of
our practical reasoning are hypothetical. Because a motive goes unquestioned on one
occasion does not imply that it will go unquestioned in another, but each of us has a
character, a set ot habits of being moved with characteristic strength by given types of
motivating circumstances. Relative to my ends, various people’s characteristic ways of
finding situations important will be good or bad; but I claim that this is not a moral but a
naturalistic, instrumental sort of goodness and badness. I say this because I doubt that
anyone sufficiently controls his or her character to be responsible for having it.
D. What Does the Example Tend to Establish?
Professor Frankfurt’s counterfactual intervener example does have significant
implications for incompatibilists. It seems to me to imply that the principle of alternative
possibilities is false. If I am morally responsible for doing something, adding a second set
of conditions that assures that I would do what I do even if I did not do it on my own
abolishes my ability to have done otherwise but leaves me morally responsible. If this is
correct, then the widely accepted incompatibilist claim that, to be morally responsible for
doing something, I must have had an opportunity not to have done it, turns out false. That
is, “I couldn’t help it”, even if truly spoken, may not excuse me from proper moral blame
for doing something.
Libertarian incompatibilists are people who hold that, when people do things in a
way that leaves them morally responsible for doing them, all else remaining the same,
they could have done differently than they did. I take libertarian incompatibilism to
attribute contra-causal powers to human beings. The world is not causally sufficient to
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my doing as I do 8 . A soft compatibilist of Frankfurt’s type apparently holds that, when 1
do something for which I am morally responsible, nothing in the external world was
causally necessary to my doing it. Even though external circumstances were sufficient to
move me to do what I did, they could have been different, and 1 would still have done the
same thing (or, at least, the same sort of thing). Both libertarian incompatibilists and soft
compatibilists hold that (at least sometimes) the external world does not make me do
what I do, but rather that I do things on my own, in independence of that world. As a non-
libertarian incompatibilist, I join with hard compatibilists such as Jonathan Edwards in
supposing that there is a straightforward causal connection between the world and my
doings. The causes that bear on me are neither insufficient (as libertarian incompatibilists
hold) nor epiphenomenal (as I take it Frankfurt-style compatibilists hold).
For both soft compatibilists and libertarian incompatibilists, whether people are
morally responsible or not seems to rest on modal claims, about what would have
happened if actuality had been different than it was or if someone had tried to do other
than he or she did. I think that these modal claims are beyond settling. Thus I do not see
them as providing a sound basis for taking such positive, real world steps as blaming or
praising someone morally, or imposing punishment on them. By contrast, a non-
libertarian incompatibilist (or a hard compatibilist) need not settle any controversial
modal claims.
When things happen that we take to help us or harm us, that moves us to react. I
think it is perfectly proper to react to and to evaluate what people actually do. However, I
do not think we will be moved to have moral evaluative reactions if we keep in mind that
such attitudes require assumptions about counterfactual matters that are irresolvably
disputable. Both soft compatibilists and libertarian incompatibilists seek to ground
responsible human agency on some type of causal independence of a person from the
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surrounding world. Non-libertarian incompatibilism strikes me as the most naturalistic of
the competing views, allowing for a straightforward causal connection between the world
and person’s doings. However, this advantage comes at the expense of withholding from
believing people to be agents, as ordinarily conceived, as people who ultimately control
what they do and who consequently merit moral praise and blame for doing it.
Does Frankfurt’s counterfactual intervener case require us to settle disputable
matters about counterfactuals? It might seem that it does not. The counterfactual
intervener, Black, never does anything to causally affect what Jones does. We know
precisely what Jones would do if Black does nothing, because that is the actual case.
However, it seems to me that our holding Jones morally responsible depends not only on
beliefs about what he would do if Black were absent, but also what he would do if the
other causal factors that actually did bear on him were absent. That latter counterfactual
matter is what I consider irresolvably in dispute. The hard compatibilist approach would
be to simply identify moral blameworthiness with a disposition to be moved by
naturalistic causal processes to do harmful things. The fact that Jones is susceptible to
being moved by those causes is what makes him properly blameworthy, with no need of
his acting independently of any of those causes. Questions about counterfactual
situations, about what Jones would do if this or that causal circumstance were absent is
not relevant to this sort of compatibilist account of moral responsibility. Here we suppose
that the conditions that bear on Jones are actual causes. I understand causation by
following David Lewis’ treatment"
1
'. Professor Lewis gives a counterfactual dependence
account of causality. If C causes E, then, if C were absent or removed, then E would also
be absent, removed, or fail to happen. If the causes that move Jones were absent, he
would not do the harmful thing on his own, but (for hard compatibilist) that does not
exculpate. This, as I understand him, was Jonathan Edwards’ view. It is an attractive form
59 David Lewis, “Causation”, in his Philosophical Papers, Volume H, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp. 159-213.
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of compatibilism, one that does not require we settle disputable claims about
counterfactuals, but I note that it leaves people out of control of what they do. So does
non-libertarian incompatibilism. Our doing harmful or helpful things is a matter of luck,
of what causal influences we happen to be exposed to and moved by. Hard compatibilists
hold that we are sometimes morally responsible as a result of such matters of luck, while
non-libertarian incompatibilists deny that our moral status can properly be a matter of
luck.
Frankfurt's example shows that my being morally responsible for something is
compatible with there being a set of conditions sufficient for that thing’s happening that I
do not control. But it does not show that my moral responsibility for something is
compatible with my being caused to do it. What seems to be my bedrock intuition is this:
if some set of events that Jones does not control actually causes him to do something,
then he is not responsible for doing it. Now, ‘control’, I think, basically cashes out in
causal terms. We would control something’s happening in the way relevant to our being
morally responsible by causing it to happen when we want it to happen and causing it not
to happen when we want it not to happen. I realize that this portrays us as agent causes of
things, events, states of affairs. Now, I do not believe we are, in fact, agent causes or
agent causers. Thus my incompatibilism is non-libertarian. I suspect that whenever any
real-world people do anything, that conditions ultimately beyond their control have
caused them to do what they do. This renders us all always non-responsible, by my lights.
I recognize that this is an extreme conclusion, but I think it follows from the strong
notion of ‘ultimate control’ which I consider a necessary condition for moral
accountability. I agree with critics who find agent causes and the powers of ultimate
controllers mysterious. All I think I need for my views is that ‘ultimate control’ be a
logically coherent notion. I think it extremely unlikely that we are beings who exercise
that sort of control, but that it is logically possible that we do.
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E. Conclusions
Frankfurt s example is significant in a (to me) surprising way. It shows that the
way that I, along with other incompatibilists, have always put things, that moral
responsibility requires control over a choice between genuinely available alternatives, is
false. His example is a counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities, in its
straightforward, unrestricted form. However, the overthrow of that principle need not
move us to embrace compatibilism. Instead, I am moved to maintain incompatibilism by
adopting a more encompassing principle. Rather than saying Jones is responsible for
voting for Brown only if he had available alternatives to so voting, I would say that he is
responsible for voting for Brown only if no conditions he did not control caused him to
vote as he did. Jones’ having control over a choice between genuinely open options,
available alternatives would be sufficient for his not being caused to do what he does by
conditions beyond his control, but is not necessary to it. What Frankfurt’s example
teaches me is that Jones might escape from being caused to do something by forces
beyond his control (and thereby achieve responsibility) without having genuine options.
In colloquial terms, Jones is morally responsible for doing something if nothing makes
him do it. There may be a condition sufficient for his doing something that leaves him
with no alternative, but which does not cause him to do what he does
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CHAPTER V
CAN WE GET ALONG WITHOUT MORAL REACTIVE ATTITUDES?
A. Introductory Remarks
It strikes me that almost everyone takes human beings to be independently
operating agents. Nevertheless, I do not think this agentic way of taking things is
inescapable. There are many phenomena that we used to conceive of as the actions of
agents (such as attributing weather conditions to the actions of deities) that most of us
now interpret as arising from impersonal natural causes. A difference about how far
human beings can go in this withdrawal from agentic explanations is, I think, the issue
that divides my views from those of P.F. Strawson, Susan Wolf, and Daniel Dennett. In
his very influential article “Freedom and Resentment”60, P.F. Strawson claims that, as a
psychological matter, we can only take a few steps, and then only briefly, toward what he
calls an objective way of conceiving things. I will defer to Professor Strawson’s use of
the term ‘objective’ here, although I think the term ‘non-agentic’ would be better in some
ways. Some eliminative materialists (such as Stephen Stich 61 ) may hope for a fully
objective conception of human existence. However, I would agree with P.F. Strawson
that a personal, subjective way of conceiving of human beings and their doings is
psychologically inescapable for us. It seems to me non-eliminable part of our common
sense about things that we are the subjects of such states as beliefs and desires. However,
I doubt that we are inescapably driven to attributions of active subjectivity (agency) in
our ways of conceiving, describing, and explaining what people do.
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What does it come to when compatibilists such as P.F. Strawson speak about
taking an objective versus a subjective/participant attitude? Does being objective about
what people do amount to considering it only from a third-person point of view and beins
subjective amount considering it from a third person point of view while also attributing
to it its own first-person perspective? I do not think it is that simple. Rather, I think the
important dividing line is between a non-agentic and an agentic interpretation of what
some being does. Naturalistic objectivity, as I conceive it, has room for beings who
passively, yet in a first-person way, take in the world from a particular spatio-temporal
point, and are moved to respond to it. What naturalistic objectivity does not have room
for active subjects, first person subjects of actions, agents.
Professor Strawson holds (and I agree with him) that there is a widespread
tendency to respond to those beings that we conceive of as the agents of actions in certain
characteristic ways. Chief among these are our moral reactive attitudes, such as gratitude
and resentment. Professor Strawson holds that these attitudes toward human beings are
inescapable. I do not go quite that far. If we take something to be an agent’s free act, then
we will (typically) be grateful or resentful if the outcome is helpful or hurtful to interests
we care about. Taking an objective viewpoint amounts to accepting an account that does
not essentially mention agents or their actions as the independent sources of outcomes
that concern us. If we interpret things in that objective or non-agentic way, then there is
no target for praise or blame, gratitude or resentment.
B. Psychology or Philosophy?
If this is the difference between us, it strikes me that Professor Strawson and I
may not differ on any specifically philosophical issue. Instead, we may differ on a
question about human psychology: are the attitudes that most people, most of the time,
have toward certain sorts of events so fixed that they are unchangeable even if we were to
come up with reasons that would seem to motivate altering them? Such reasons would be
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aiguments and evidence to the ettect that we are not independent self-determining beings.
Are we inexorably determined to believe that we are free agents?
I take Strawson to claim that our customary moral reactive attitudes would
serenely survive some downfall of the metaphysical beliefs that have, until now,
accompanied them. My opposing claim is that, for many people at least, they would not.
Professor Strawson and I are disagreeing about matters of fact, about how flexible people
are, psychologically, and how they would respond to certain imagined changes. There are
no a priori arguments that I know of that would settle the dispute. If there is some fact of
the matter such that we either achieve proper moral accountability or do not, then this
psychological dispute seems to me a diversion, an irrelevance. What is true and what we
are psychologically capable of believing might well diverge, and if they did, our inability
to believe something would be no evidence that it was false.
C. Agency and resentment
In “The Importance of Free Will”62
,
Professor Susan Wolf claims that, if we took
the objective view toward ourselves and each other, we would “reduce the quality of our
involvement or participation in all human relationships.”63 . The objective attitude, as she
describes it, is the one we currently take (or rationally ought to take) toward most
animals, machines, and very young children.
Imagine for a moment what a world would be like in which we
all regarded each other solely with the objective attitude. We would still
imprison murderers and thieves, presumably, and we would still sing
praises for acts of courage and charity. We would applaud and criticize,
say ‘thank you’ and ‘for shame' according to whether our neighbors’
behavior was or was not to our liking. But these actions and words would
have a different, shallower meaning than they have for us now. Our
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praises would not be expressions of admiration or esteem; our criticisms
would not be expressions of indignation or resentment. Rather, they
would be bits ot positive and negative reinforcement meted out in the
hopes of altering the character of others in the way best suited to our
needs.
In this paragraph. Professor Wolf is presenting a circumstance and its consequences in a
way I take it she intends to arouse repulsion in her readers. She means to underscore the
great loss that she sees entailed by taking the objective attitude and giving up the
contrary, subjective or agentic attitude towards what human beings do. I think that we are
subjects, the subjects of such mental attitudes as beliefs, desires, sensations, and emotions
(all of which I consider to be passive states). However, I doubt that we are ever the
subjects of active mental states (such as trying or choosing to do something in the way
that only an agent could do). I also believe that we are participants in many sorts of
events. We do things, but I think that, in participating as we do, we are not agents.
Instead, I see no compelling reason that convinces me that our participation is more than
our passively being moved by causes.
I do not find myself repelled by what Professor Wolf describes. Instead, I am
moved to imagine a parallel set of comments that might have been made at an earlier
point in our intellectual history, the reaction that some may have had to Enlightenment
thinking or to the Darwinian naturalism of the late 19
,h
Century. Proponents of those
earlier forays into naturalism might well have been charged with proffering a shallow and
impoverished image of human beings and their doings, something that lowered us trom
near-angels to near-beasts. Professor Wolf presents our falling into a non-agentic attitude
toward ourselves as a loss, something cold, dreary, bleak, and barren, a drastic reduction
in our sense of the meaning and value of our lives"
4
.
However, suppose that we began to
suspect that the claims that we are free and responsible agents rested on errors and
illusions. I think that, while we might be deeply disappointed that the world was not as
64
Ibid., p. 1 06.
91
we had thought, we might tind compensations in our being merely natural beings.
Similarly, if I thought myself a proper target for (and subject of) moral reactive attitudes
and then became convinced that my belief had been false, I might well think my status as
a being had diminished. However, on the hypothesis that my belief had been false, I
would never have had the lofty status to begin with, and therefore could not really have
lost it.
D. The Case of the Addict
Professor Wolf discusses two cases, the addict and the robot. As I understand the
term ‘addict’, it connotes people who cannot control their desires. That presupposes that
ordinary, non-addicted people can control their desires. However, given my belief-desire
causal account of our doings, I doubt that anyone can control his or her desires by the
exercise of agentic powers. Sometimes one of my desires may not be fulfilled, but that
does not happen by my preventing it. Either some other desire that moves me more
strongly prevents the first desire, or some other condition thwarts it. I may have an
unconflicted desire to fly be my strongest desire, and yet not fly due to my lack of wings.
However, put my view on the matter aside for now for the sake of discussion and
return to Professor Wolfs treatment. By her lights, addicts, even addicts in a causally
determined world, are responsible for their drug-taking actions in proportion to their
degree of approval of their being addicts65 . In this approach, she adopts Professor
Frankfurt’s treatment of higher-order desires as what makes for responsibility for object-
level desires (and the doings that follow from them). However, Professor Wolf adds a
detail here that I find interesting. She follows Frankfurt66 (and parts company with hard
compatibilists such as Jonathan Edwards) in holding morally blameless the unwilling
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addict, the person with an impotent meta-desire to refrain from taking the drug. The detail
she adds appears in her following remark about the unwilling addict: “He shows that he
takes the drug only because he is addicted and that he would not take it if he could help
it. As a compatibilist. Professor Wolf is assuming that causal determinism is (or at least
may be) true. On that assumption, as I understand it, not only is it the case that the addict
cannot help but take his drug, but neither can he help but have the attitude toward his
taking it that he does. Despite that assumption of determinism. Professor Wolf grounds
her belief that people are responsible for doing something on a belief about what they
would do if they could help it. Given the assumption of determinism, I take it that the
world where people can help doing what they do is quite remote from the actual world. It
seems to me that a world in which I can help doing what I do is a world in which I have
incompatibilist powers. On Wolf’s view, what grounds my moral responsibility is what I
would do if I had a power that, on compatibilist assumptions, I do not have.
How might we come by grounds for belief about such a counterfactual question?
How much weight is it proper to give to what people say about what they would do if
they had incompatibilist powers that (compatibilists are assuming) they do not have? We
do come up with answers to such questions quite readily (at least as long as we do not
think too deeply about them). However, the answers we give to such questions cannot, it
seems to me, arise from experience, since no one ever experiences having such powers
(unless libertarian incompatibilism is true). Rather, I believe, the answers we give arise
from our imaginations. I think the human capacity to imagine sequences of events that do
not happen is very important, but I think its importance does not lie in its faithfully
creating a simulacrum of actuality. My impression is that, when I imagine in advance
what I will do with respect to types of situations that then actually come up, I frequently
do not react as I had imagined I would. Sometimes our imaginations work in a self-
serving way, and we think we would not do things that we later tind ourselves doing. At
other times, we sell ourselves short, and think we will not rise effectively to challenges
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that we, in tact, manage to handle well. How people describe their imaginings of what
they would do in counterfactual situations may plausibly ground our reacting to them
with disgust or admiration, but 1 do not see these as suitable grounds for specifically
moral reactive attitudes toward them. To begin with, our imaginings may well be
inaccurate, and, even it they are not, I doubt that they occur in ways we control. For me,
being beyond our control puts them outside the range of what could ground moral
evaluation of us. Professor Wolf takes a contrary view: “The addict’s own attitude toward
taking the drug gives us a reason (perhaps the reason) by which to establish ours — that is,
it gives us the means by which to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible
for taking the drug.”
67
Yet, as I have already noted, the addict’s attitude toward taking the
drug depends crucially on what he believes he would do if he were not addicted, that is,
upon his imagination about what he would do in a counterfactual situation.
Suppose we should somehow overcome this problem of supporting dubious
claims about what we imagine we would do in a remote counterfactual situation. Even so,
I believe that approving would only render people responsible for doing what they
approve of doing if their approvals are their own actions, doings that they control. If
addicts who approve of their being addicts are passively moved, and just find themselves
so approving, then that may be an impediment to their changing, but I do not see it as
something for which they are properly to be held responsible. If addicts’ approvals are
passions, and if the approvals cause the drug-taking activities to continue, then those
activities (being the effects of a passion) are not under the control of the addicts in a way
that would (I believe) make for their being morally responsible for their drug-taking.
Professor Wolf notes that, when an addict expresses his attitude toward his drug taking,
our holding him responsible if he expresses a favorable attitude “rests on our belief that
the addict, qua attitude taker, js a free and responsible being. If we believed that the
67
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addict s approval oi disapproval ol his actions were itself determined by influence of the
drug, we would not regard his attitude as giving us a reason by which to establish ours .”68
Yet why limit our concern to his attitude being determined by the drug? If the attitude
were determined by his early childhood experiences, or by advertising, or by anything
whatever that was beyond his control, wouldn’t that undermine just as much the link
between his having the favorable attitude and his being responsible for producing the
behavior that the attitude favors? If my attitude of approving of something results from
some active choice on my part, then I think I am responsible for what follows from my
having that attitude. However, if, as I believe, my attitudes are ultimately passive
reactions, likings or dislikings that, in the end, I just find myself with, then they are not
the sort of things that would ground my responsibility.
E. The Case of the Robot
Professor Wolf’s second example is the case of the robot. The sort of robot she
describes is not given a program in advance, but instead has its program constantly
updated by its programmer as new situations arise. It is a remotely controlled puppet,
much like the Mars explorer, Sojourner. However, it is much less sophisticated than
Dennett’s robots, discussed above in Chapter III. Those robots can learn and can develop
strategies for coping with unforeseen environments independently of explicit
programming. Nevertheless, the robot Wolf conceives of is a thinking being. It has
beliefs and desires and makes decisions and judgments, The programmer’s instructions
control what Professor Wolf calls the robot’s “choices” and “actions.” Still, Professor
Wolf holds that it is proper to regard the robot solely with the objective attitude because,
although “his decisions and judgments may be preceded by thoughts which look or sound
like reasons, he cannot be said to reason to these conclusions in the way we do. He is not
68
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in ultimate conti ol ot his values, his personality, his actions .”
69
Here it seems to me that
Professor Wolf begs what is, for me, the question. She assumes that, however we reason
to conclusions, our process is responsibility-grounding because she takes it for granted
that we are prime examples of responsible beings. For her this apparently implies that we
ultimately control our values, our personalities, and (therefore) our actions. Instead of
making these assumptions, I question how Professor Wolf knows that the process by
which we come to exhibit our behavior is relevantly different from the way the robot
arrives at what it does. That is, what reason does she have to believe we are in ultimate
control of our values, our personalities, and the actions that flow from our having those
values and those personalities? Still, I am pleased that, as a compatibilist, she explicitly
mentions ultimate control as what proper liability to moral reactive attitudes requires.
Professor Wolf then mounts an argument that I find very curious, to the effect that
any being that takes any attitude at all cannot be something to which a completely
objective attitude is properly taken. For example, to ask whether the robot should or
should not take a wholly objective attitude toward itself is to imply that it is not a being to
which a wholly objective attitude is proper. What confuses me is that Wolf clearly has
described her robots as beings toward which a wholly objective attitude is proper. They
have attitudes (that their programmers give them), but they do not actively take attitudes.
“In taking any attitude toward ourselves, including the attitude that we are not free or
responsible beings, we would be asserting ourselves as free and responsible beings. Any
attitude we take, then, would involve a false step.... Thus, it seems that the only way we
could live in accordance with the facts would be by ceasing to have any attitudes at all .”
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I think it is a mistake to rely solely on an image of an agent actively taking an attitude
and disregarding (what I claim to be) the fact that we at least sometimes (and, I suspect,
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always) passively come to have attitudes without actively taking them. If their
programmers have equipped the robots with beliefs at all, then they have attitudes. I see
no bar to their being given either the (to me) true belief that they are not free or
responsible beings or a contrary false belief that they are. If a robot had a true belief
about its nature, why would it not “live’' in accord with the facts? In summary, I do not
see that Professor Wolt has shown a principled way of distinguishing us from the robots
she describes, a way that would leave us morally responsible and them not.
F. Pessimist or Optimist?
Professor Wolf discusses pessimists and optimists about determinism. A pessimist
is someone who views the idea that determinism might be true with dismay because
determinism would interfere with our moral evaluative practices. Professor Wolf is an
optimist because, as a compatibilist, she does not think the truth of determinism would
interfere with our moral evaluative practices. I am a pessimist about determinism being
compatible with our customary moral evaluative practices. However, I think in a more
important way 1 am an optimist because I am not dismayed at the prospect of the
disruption of our customary moral evaluative practices. Professor Wolf takes it that the
proper upshot of accepting determinism would be to cease to take any attitudes
whatsoever. She labels that a pessimist position and she rejects it as psychologically
impossible. 71
I agree that to be a human being implies having some attitudes. I think it is
psychologically impossible for us to be human and to have no attitudes at all (except
when we are asleep or, perhaps, in a torpid daze). Yet I do think it is psychologically
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As a counter-example to her claim of psychological impossibility, as I understand it, I cite
not just my impressions about my own viewpoint, but also Thomas Nagel’s views as expressed in The
View from Nowhere , . op. cit . The whole book is about Professor Nagel’s taking the objective attitude
toward human doings. As consolation to Professor Wolf, at least Professor Nagel is somber and rather
depressed about having the experience she says he cannot have, seeing it, as she does, as a loss of the
meaningfulness of our lives and our doings.
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possible that we never actively take any attitudes at all and also that we might come to
believe that about ourselves. This would happen if we came to believe that what we had
previously considered to have been our actions were instead passive doings, behavior that
we had been moved by sufficient causes to exhibit. We would not actively cease to take
any attitudes whatsoever (by actively refraining from taking them), but we might be
moved no longer to be the passive subjects of some of our attitudes, specifically those
attitudes that depict us as agents.
Consider the question of “what it would be purely rational for us to do if we came
to believe that the thesis of determinism was true and that this implied that, as a matter of
metaphysical fact, that we were not free and responsible beings .”72 As I interpret
Professor Wolf’s question, she seems to be asking: What action ought we to take if we
became convinced that the sort of determinism were true that would move an
intellectually consistent rational being to take the objective attitude toward everything
(including itself and its own doings)? Professor Wolf is right that, if we ask a question
like that, then that supposes that the one asked is an agent, someone in a position to take
action in response to such a development. Both Professor Wolf and I agree in believing
that, if the relevant sort of determinism were true, then no one would ever actively
perform any action at all. In that case, the question of what action to perform given that
action-obliterating implication is a pointless one. Imagine that there were beings who
never had been agents, but who had conceived of themselves as such. If they stopped
conceiving of themselves that way, it would be logically odd to then ask them what
action they would perform in response to that change in outlook. However, it would not
be logically odd to ask them what, given their new conception of things, they would do,
where ‘doing’ is not conceived of as action, but rather as a passive reaction.
72
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How would a purely rational yet ultimately passive being be moved by the
discoveiy that, contrary to what it had formerly believed, it was not an agent? Not being a
purely rational being, I suppose I could not say. I imagine that a purely rational Stoic
would respond with emotional equanimity. A purely rational Kantian would reject the
purported “discovery” and argue that the irresolvability of such metaphysical claims left
room tor faith in responsible agency. A rational romantic (if that is not a contradiction in
terms) might embrace the same faith by rationally abandoning reason. In short, I can
imagine a variety of reactions to a situation that Professor Wolf claims is psychologically
impossible. I doubt that there is a single standard of “pure rationality” that makes one of
these reactions proper and the others mistaken, but the mere fact that someone has any
such a reaction seems to me to falsify the psychological impossibility claim.
Daniel Dennett makes a similar point to Wolfs, and I think it misses the mark for
the same reason. His view is not so much that disbelief in free agency is impossible as
that it is futile or self-stultifying. In his book on free will \ Professor Dennett
approvingly mentions Professor Wolfs reasoning in “The Importance of Free Will.” He
subscribes to her argument, which he takes to be to the effect that “those who have
written books and articles denying the reality of free will are in an embarrassing position:
they are left advising (pretending to advise?, seeming to advise?) the reader that advising
is pointless.” Much earlier, in 1645, Bishop John Bramhall made the same point when he
argued that “All counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments are superfluous and foolish if
there be no liberty.”74 The gibes of Bramhall, Dennett and Wolf would bite if (as they
seem to suppose) it were only agents who could be the proper targets of advice. This
would be so if every case of following advice were an action. However, I see no reason to
grant this supposition. It would be pointless to try to advise beings who we did not
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believe were agents about what actions we thought they should perform. Non-agents do
not and cannot perform actions. Yet there might well be a point to give beings whom we
did not think of as agents information about what we believed it would be best for them
to do. Such information might be a partial cause of their doing what they subsequently
did. I see no principled barrier to conceiving of such information giving as ‘advising’. All
that is required to be a proper target for advice in this sense is a capacity to be subject to
passions, motives that passively move one. In the broad sense in which 1 am taking
‘advising’, a threat or a warning is a sort of advice. It is communicating to my audience
that I will be moved to do something they will find unpleasant, detrimental to one or
more of their ends, if they do not do something of the sort I want them to do. I believe
that I can threaten an animal (and that an animal can in turn threaten me to get me to do
something it wants, such as stay away from its offspring). As long as all these
informational transactions are doings (caused causings of events) rather than actions
(controlled originations of new causal chains), they are perfectly consistent with even the
most comprehensive causal determinism.
Suppose there were robots of the deterministic sort that Professor Wolf imagines.
Stipulate, as she (and I) hold, that the robots are not free or morally responsible beings.
However, suppose that, instead of being explicitly programmed, they are, like the robots
discussed in chapter III, caused to have beliefs by their circumstances. If such robots
come to have beliefs about themselves, what are they likely to believe? Relative to those
affected by various interests, including the interests constituted by the desires of the
robots themselves, what would it be best that the robots believe about their own natures?
How plastic might their beliefs be? What would the robots believe if they wanted to be in
accord with the facts and were as fully apprised of those facts as they are capable of
being? These are practical and technical questions about how these unfree, determined
beings would be moved to behave, perhaps speculative questions about the likely
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trajectories of their attitudes. These are not questions about what the robots, as agents,
ought to do.
Someone might object that these are not, properly speaking, philosophical
questions, but questions about empirical matters, about how future technological
developments will unfold. Once we have machines capable of (passive) attitudes toward
themselves, we may be suiprised at what then happens. Nevertheless, Professor Wolf
seems to me to make assumptions about such questions when she describes certain
prospects as dreadful rather than as incoherent conceptual muddles. I think we are
involved in muddles if we think that the question is: what action ought to be performed
by beings who are incapable of performing actions? Except among those who are
themselves confused, that question excites neither dreadful nor hopeful imaginings,
because of its open inconsistency.
What appalls Professor Wolf is the idea of a world in which human beings no
longer conceive of themselves as free and responsible agents. She goes so far as to
imagine such beings as having reason to commit suicide 75 . I doubt that what excites that
reaction in Professor Wolf is the idea of a being incapable of agency performing an
action.
In the incompatibilist, agentic sense of ‘do’, in which doings are actions, I think it
is true that we can do nothing about anything. That is, I doubt that we ever ultimately do
anything at all in a sense that would amount to our initiating a new causal chain in a way
that we ultimately control. I doubt that we ever have ultimate control over doing
something rather than being moved to do it by causes (unless our doing is a pure eruption
of chance). However, I believe that, in a different, compatibilist sense of ‘do’, we
frequently do things. We are moved by causes to do things in this latter sense, and this
leaves us relatively and proximally active. What happens is sometimes under my
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proximal control. That is, its happening as it does is caused by my having the properties 1
have. What makes this control merely proximate rather than ultimate is my not
controlling having those properties. For example, being exposed to certain sorts of
arguments and examples may move someone to have an objective or non-agentic attitude
toward her own and other people’s doings, where before she had moral reactive attitudes
that implied we were incompatibilist agents.
Suppose for the sake of discussion that Professors Strawson, Wolf, and Dennett
are wrong and that a non-agentic attitude towards human doings is neither incoherent nor
psychologically impossible. Even so, what could motivate anyone to come to view the
world non-agentically, especially if viewing our doings agentically is at the heart of our
customary moral evaluative practices? It is sometimes difficult to gauge one’s own
motives, but I think that what moves me is a suspicion that our customary moral
evaluative practices are not optimal. I suspect that we might have even better practices,
and I will try to say more about that in the next chapter. However, if this envisioned
change were for the better, it does not seem to me that the relevant standard of goodness
could be a moral one. I think one thing that Strawson, Wolf, Dennett, and I all agree
about is that there is a close connection between taking things personally (agentically)
and morally assessing the persons we believe have affected our interests. If this is so,
then the moral way of conceiving events is the very thing under question. We cannot use
moral evaluative standards to evaluate the comparative worth of agentic and non-agentic
attitudes without begging that question.
It strikes Professor Wolf that, if determinism were true, then this would imply
that, to be intellectually consistent and to live in accord with the facts, we would come to
view ourselves objectively (or, as I prefer to put it, non-agentically). In turn, she takes
this to imply a “realization that you cannot, and/or rationally ought not, matter to the
people or to the world that matters to you - indeed to the people or to the world that
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matter independently of you - might give you reason to commit suicide .”76 However, it
seems to me that, even if I were something like a deterministic robot, a being with no
ultimate control over anything, I might well still be moved by desires that amounted to
other beings’ situations mattering to me. Also, I might well have properties that affected
the welfare of those whose harm I wanted to avoid. Thus, even though ultimately passive,
I would matter to the people or the world that matters to me. The only thing that it seems
to me a non-agentic conception of human doings rules out is my mattering as an agent . It
may cause me dismay or anxiety to reflect that I have no ultimate control over the level
of well-being of those I care about, but it would strike me as excessive if someone were
to react to that reflection by killing him- or herself.
Professor Wolf describes intellectual self-consistency as living in accord with the
facts as one takes them to be. This rational integrity is one of her values. I think I am also
moved by it. Given my non-libertarian incompatibilist outlook, I make no principled
distinction between desires and values. I suppose that values are central, stable,
preferences, core parts of my self-image, but, for all that, desires nevertheless. If I believe
something, I find it troubling if I notice myself behaving in ways contrary to that belief. It
dismays me to think of myself as turning away from what it seems to me that I have
reason to believe because I wish that things were otherwise. I believe I sometimes fall
short of that value. It causes in me a sort of self-loathing. Professor Wolf recognizes this
danger of self-deception, of believing in free agency because one wants it to be true
instead of because of argument and evidence, but claims that one need not fear
inadvertently falling into it. She gives several reasons, which to me do not seem
sufficient. She holds that we are psychologically incapable of viewing things non-
agentically. She further holds that we would be much worse off if, somehow, we did
come to view things that way. We would not be in the world most worth living in. On
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these bases, Professor Wolf concludes that, if the sort of determinism were true that ruled
out our being free and responsible beings, it would not be rational to live in accordance
with that fact . 77
Consider what I take to be the central question at issue: what would happen to our
customary reactive attitudes if what has been our pervasive belief in free agency
weakened? I think that taking an objective attitude does diminish the seriousness and the
intensity of the residues of the customary reactive attitudes that we are left with and that
this is a good thing. I believe that there are naturalistic analogues of the non-naturalistic
reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment. Professor Wolf argues (rightly, I believe)
that such genuinely morally reactive attitudes would be barred to us if we took only
objective, non-agentic attitudes towards ourselves. I believe that the naturalistic
analogues that we are not barred from by the truth of determinism (or non-self
determination) satisfy enough of our desires or interests to allow us to have lives worth
living. However, suppose that I am wrong in that estimation about the practical
consequences. Suppose that I turn out to have been an overly optimistic pessimist about
human freedom and that loss of belief in that freedom is as bad as thinkers such as P.F.
Strawson and Susan Wolf say it would be. Then, even if we were robots, living machines
programmed by a blind and impersonal process of natural selection that neither we nor
anyone else controls, we should likely find ourselves moved by our practical interests to
believe that we are not machines, or not just machines, not completely the effects of
causes we do not control. Instead we will be moved to believe that we are beings
(perhaps immaterial and supernatural beings) with the power to ultimately shape what
happens by controlling natural process, as it were, from outside them. All that happening
might be for the best. If living in accord with the (supposed) facts were to engender some
cataclysmic disaster, then it is better for us to live under the sway of saving illusions.
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Self-deception then would be no disaster, but the value of intellectual integrity would be
subordinated to other interests.
G. Conclusions
In her concluding remarks, Professor Wolf states that, even if the strings were
pulled by the hands of God, “we don’t want to be puppets. We don’t want to be, or be no
better than, objects of someone else’s manipulation .”78 As a frank and blank expression of
her desires, I can say nothing against it. I know of at least some religious believers who
have come to think of themselves as tools or machines operated by an all powerful God,
devoid of any genuine agentic will of their own, and who have come to accept and even
revel in that way of conceiving themselves . 79 However, that view of a divine puppeteer
leaves at least one agent still in the picture. It seems to me that conceiving of myself as a
puppet that is moved by ultimately impersonal circumstances is quite a different matter
from my being manipulated by another being with its own beliefs and desires. Also, it is
quite a different matter to be manipulated contrary to my desires than to be induced to
desire to do something, do it, and be pleased about having done it. However, all these
cases share a common feature. In none of them would I be an agent in control, the free
and independent originator of what I do. Yet, aside from that common factor, my
reactions to them differ sharply. I usually strongly dislike being manipulated by another
person to do something that I otherwise would not want to do. However, there have been
cases in which someone has stimulated me to want to do something or has given me an
extra motive to do something that I already want to do but was, somehow, blocked from
doing. For example, I have sometimes procrastinated, and having a firm deadline set by
78
Ibid., p. 117.
79
For example, the late 19th century Hindu mystic Sri Ramakrishna frequently said things like, “I
am a machine and God is the mover” or “It seems to me that men and other living beings are made of
leather and that it is God Himself who, dwelling inside those leather cases, moves the hands, the feet, the
heads.” (from [The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna , Swami Nikhilananda, trans., (New York: Ramaknshna-
Vivehananda Center, 1952), pp. 939-40.
105
someone has helped, even if I did not like such pressure at the time. If I were an agent
fully in control of myself, such interventions would be unnecessary, and even insulting to
my dignity. However, as much as I might like to be a self-starter, an unmoved mover, the
sole author of what I do, I doubt that I am or can be such a being. Given my own
experience of how I come to do things, I am happy to have been exposed to both the
interventions of other persons as well as the impersonally engendered incentives that
have gotten me to do what I doubt I would have done on my own.
Put aside puppet masters or helpful interveners who are persons. Suppose that I
found out that I was so exquisitely enmeshed in my environment and so well attuned to it
that I was moved by its conditions to respond quickly and skillfully to it in ways that
served what seem to me the interests of those I cared about. That strikes me as not a bad
thing at all. I doubt that I would prefer to be less responsive to my surroundings and to
the dangers and opportunities they present even if that would, somehow, make me less
their puppet.
What do we lose if we are moved from assessments of moral responsibility to
non-moral assessments? I think the primary loss might well be psychological. If you
believe I did something harmful to you all by myself, that nothing made me do it, then, if
you are like most people, you will resent it. Resentment is an inherently personal attitude
in at least two senses. A personal agent is the only proper object of the attitude. When we
have the attitude of resentment towards people, we take their behavior personally, as
either an action directly aimed at our harm or as an action committed in reckless
disregard of the harm that would probably befall us. Although the overall situation is
negative, for most people, there is something deeply exciting and even, in a way,
pleasurable in believing that you have identified the source of your problem and that the
source deserves certain types of aggressive negative treatment that we are normally
inhibited from dealing out to each other.
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It I am an intellectually consistent non-libertarian incompatibilist, then I do not
get to take things personally in these ways. However, I think that resentment, with its
focus on the supposed free agents who have caused us trouble, interferes with noting the
larger causal contexts within which the supposed agents are set. Free personal agents are
conceived of as the authors of their acts, even as the sole authors, as beings who act
independently of the influences bearing on them . 80 There are other sorts of assessment
(for example, the assessment of role responsibility that I shall discuss in the next chapter)
that strike me as allowing for a better understanding of what leads to the sort of behavior
that concerns us and a better way of responding to it than moral praise or blame. If we
have other ways to forestall similar future behavior than the strategy of moral
condemnation, they may have advantages that outweigh the admitted loss of certain sorts
of emotional satisfactions that come with moral resentment or indignation.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ROLE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Introduction
W.D. Hudson ends his survey of contemporary ethical theory 81 by considering
determinism. He concludes that it cannot be ruled out, and that if evidence were to grow
for a deterministic account of our doings, “The possibility is to be reckoned with that the
language of action will drop out of use.... We might still conceive of moral discourse as a
kind of propaganda and regard ‘moral’ expressions as useful in certain contexts.... but
this would not be moral language as we know it. The assumption that the point of such
discourse in to furnish free agents with reasons for action is essential to moral discourse
as we know it.... I go so far as to say that the demise [of moral discourse] would make
whatever came afterward not recognizable as what we mean by human life. The end of
morality would be the end of man .” 82 This all sounds, and is meant to sound, very bad.
Suppose that some argument or evidence were to move us to believe that there are
no incompatibilist agents, and, that Hudson is right that this meant the end of literal moral
discourse. Suppose further that Strawson and Wolf were wrong about our being safe from
such change because it is impossible psychologically. Then what? How would a non-
libertarian incompatibilist post-moral society differ from what we have now? First of all,
I do not believe we will ever have a society composed entirely of people who do not
make moral evaluations. Instead, what I imagine is the mode shifting. Currently, almost
all people are habitual moral judgers, both of others and themselves. I do not think any
view ever goes completely away. Only the proportions shift. Instead ot the current mode,
81 W.D Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy . (Garden City NY: Anchor Books Doubleday, 1970).
82
Ibid
, pp. 363-365.
assessing individuals as morally good or bad, I imagine the new mode becoming to assess
people as well or ill suited to the demands of various roles.
If significant numbers of people ever came to accept non-libertarian
incompatibilism, we would have reached a condition of despair, but would it be a type of
despair that should be the occasion of painful emotions, of mourning and woe? Would it
be pointless for life to go on? I don’t think so. Sometimes despairing of something that
does not serve our needs well sets the stage for being moved to something that works
better.
I believe that part of the point of moral discourse has been to distinguish human
beings, as rational, morally responsible agents, from the rest of what there is, the mere
things. As Hudson notes, determinism threatens that distinction. If a deterministic
programme of explaining our behavior were to succeed, we would be shown to be among
the mere things after all. I for one find some comfort in thinking that I may be a wholly
natural phenomenon. Even if I am a thing, I am a marvelous and complicated thing,
capable of representing bits of the external world by means of internal models that
simplify that unutterable complexity and of being caused, by emotional reactions to those
modelings, to behave in ways that sometimes alter my surroundings, and myself in turn.
What is the point of our morally evaluating each other? Deontologists such as
Kant hold that moral considerations are intrinsically significant and would object to
looking for any sort of extrinsic justification for our moral evaluative practices.
Consequentialists do look to non-moral consequences as giving moral evaluative
practices their point, their justifying purpose. Typically, the point is to maximize some
non-moral good such as human happiness or flourishing or to minimize some non-moral
bad such as physical or emotional pain. The only exception I know if to this pattern is a
hybrid view that Professor Fred Feldman has defended, a type of consequentialism in
which a moral good, justice itself (people getting what they deserve), is the target of
109
maximization83
. My treatment in this chapter will be something that, at first glance, looks
quite like a consequentialist meta-ethics based in non-moral goods such as human
flourishing or harm reduction. However, my treatment differs from utilitarianism in one
major way: it is not a meta-ethical treatment at all. It does not look to find a basis or
justification for moral evaluations (since I find myself not wanting to make those sorts of
evaluations), but instead is a treatment of other, non-moral sorts of evaluative practices.
Would the spread of a belief that no one qualifies as morally accountable for
anything cause a decrease in human well being? If no one deserves blame, then, does
anything go? Would withholding from moral evaluations remove an important bulwark
against “man’s inhumanity to man”? Would it mean a Hobbesan war of all against all? I
do not think so, for two sorts of reasons. First, I question how effective a bulwark against
harm our traditional moral evaluative practices have been. Second, I think we may better
serve our needs by recourse to a different sort of accountability and responsibility: strict
liability role responsibility84 .
Whatever the merits of my view as an intellectual position, isn’t there a danger of
harm resulting from misunderstanding it? Might not a person who uses others to gratify
his own desires in ways that they experience as harm not reflect thus: Galbreath says that
I can’t help but do as I do and therefore I’m not even going to try to restrain these
impulses? My reply is to admit this danger, even though I see it as a misunderstanding. In
the moment, I do hold that I cannot do otherwise (at least not in any way I control).
However, I can become different in the future. I do not control that process of change in
an agentic way, but sometimes my desires to be different from the ways I have been lead
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to the sorts of changes that I want. On the assumption that I am subject to contrary
desiies, to do what others feel harmed by and also to refrain, the latter desire may become
stronger than the former, and then I shall stop harming. It is a matter of luck when I
change for the better, but it sometimes happens.
I think it is salutary to take the focus off the individuals who, by their own
reckoning, are benefiting from the pattern and to instead focus on their environment, and
especially on those who feel harmed. Other people will very likely desire that I not do
what is harmful to them, and their desires may be unconfllicted by anything contrary.
They will likely have a more robust motive, a desire that the pattern change, than the one
benefiting from it. Is this “blaming the victim”? I do not think so. It is a call to the
victims to defend themselves and a looking at a larger process than the individual
changing all by his or her agentic self.
What would this imagined world where literal moral discourse had withered away
be like? I think it probable that it would be very much like the world we live in now. We
would do what we do under the influence of a structure of incentives, both naturally
occurring and socially contrived. Some people would flourish and live happy lives that
they found personally meaningful. Others would get into all sorts of difficulties, live
miserable lives, beset with feelings of futility and insignificance, and severely blight the
lives of those around them. It strikes me that what moves us to support the costs of
having social institutions is our belief that they tend to increase the relative proportion of
fulfilled over miserable outcomes. Non-morally based evaluative practices would, I
believe, well serve that end.
B. Role Responsibility Distinguished from Moral Responsibility
As I use it, ‘role responsibility’ is a technical term. I distinguish role
responsibility from moral responsibility in taking the former (but not the latter) to be a
wholly a matter of naturalistic properties. Compatibilists, as I understand them, also hold
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that all our properties are naturalistic. However, what distinguishes my view from theirs
is that (most) compatibilists continue to hold that we are agents, beings who have
sufficient control over what we do to properly be held morally responsible for doing it,
and I do not. I characterize social roles relative to people’s desires. If I have a given
desire, then I will count as good those properties that seem likely to lead to that desire’s
fulfillment. If many people share a persistent desire, then that may give rise to a social
role, a special niche, for people who specialize in fulfilling that desire. If they do a good
job of meeting our needs, we shall be moved to meet their needs in turn. To qualify to
occupy a role is to have the relevant properties. My intuitive idea is of something like a
job description. However, I widely extend ‘role’ to apply not just to formally designated
social functions but to just about all our interactions. Not just ‘plumber’, or ‘security
guard’, are examples of social roles, but so are ‘parent’, ‘friend’, or ‘neighbor’.
Roles are not necessarily stable things, nor are they prima facie optimal. Failing to
fulfill my role responsibilities will lose me my incumbency in that role if someone else
stands ready to do it more nearly adequately. Otherwise, I may continue to perform it,
even though badly. In some cases, my going outside the bounds of my role
responsibilities may transform the specifications and engender a new role in place of the
old, especially if my departure helps to better accomplish the purposes, the desires, for
which we subscribed to the original role in the first place. If enough people fail to fulfill
the specifications of a given role, and do it persistently enough, the role will cease to be
part of our way of being a society, and the desires on which it was erected will either go
frustrated, change, or we will despair of them.
On my understanding of the concept of ‘moral responsibility’, I must be an agent
to qualify. I need not be an agent to be properly assessed with either fulfilling or failing to
fulfill my role responsibility. For example, consider a seeing-eye dog. Its (role)
responsibilities include not biting people and not leading its human companion into
dangerous traffic situations. If it fails at these responsibilities, it is liable to lose its role.
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This is a case ol strict liability. That is, we need not show that the dog had any particular
mental states or to have had control over its poor performance in order to be properly
deprived of its role. It I do not run fast enough at the tryouts, then, however much I may
want it, I do not get to be on the track team. If I fall asleep, I lose my job as a security
guard. If I do not do what I say I will do, I lose my reputation as a reliable person, even if
I sincerely believed my statements about what I would do. Even if my performances
happen as they do outside of my control, or of control by what I want to do or of what I
believe I will do, yet I bear the consequences of failing to fulfill my roles as I had hoped I
would.
To evaluate people morally, it seems to me that I must have information about
their inner states, their wills, or (at least) their motives. As many have noted, this is a
difficult sort of information to get, especially if we allow that people may sometimes be
self-deceived. However, whether people meet their role responsibilities or not is, at least
sometimes, a publicly ascertainable matter. It need not depend on inscrutable inner states.
A wrong note or a false step is at least sometimes there for all to hear or see. However,
the beliefs and desires that, I believe, cause us to do what we do are inner states that are
sometimes inscrutable, even to their subjects (given that we may be self-deceived). Thus,
the contrast between moral and role responsibility in this regard is not as sharp as I would
like. Even inferring backward from the publicly ascertainable aspects of a doing to the
beliefs and desires that we posit as lying behind it causally is problematic. If event-types
are individuated by their causes (and vice-versa), then, by characterizing a doing in a
particular way, I may bias my account of what its causes were. Despite that difficulty, I
hope that something remains of my point, that whether we fulfill our role responsibilities
is more nearly a matter of public ascertainability than whether we fulfill our moral
responsibilities. At least, in the former case, we do not have to establish the presence or
absence of ultimate control.
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Moral responsibility assessment is parallel to but quite different from role
responsibility assessment. In the place of agentic evil, we have an ultimately passive
disposition to cause harm, to frustrate people’s desires. Instead of apology for wrong
action, we have expressions of regret for having been causally (but, ultimately, passively)
involved in another’s harm. Instead of punishment we have disqualification from a role.
Instead of feelings of resentment we have the feelings of pain at our desires being
frustrated. Instead of gratitude, we have a sort of happiness at having the good fortune to
find someone who is moved to meet our needs. A joke I tell, perhaps too frequently,
when people express gratitude to me is to say, “I couldn’t help it.” Typically, we use such
an utterance to evade blame, but it works just as well for the sort of gratitude that we
could only have to a moral agent that helped us.
What I see as a natural analogue of the moral-reactive emotion of shame is a
feeling of displeasure or even disgust at being revealed to ourselves to be as we do not
want to see ourselves be. This unpleasant discordance between the way it seems to me I
am and the way I want to be may cause debilitating ill-effects at times, and be a net loss,
a net harm. However, at other times it may cause me to move in the direction of being as
I want myself to be, and in those cases amount to a net benefit for me and for others who
also want me to stop being one way and be another.
It strikes me that we human beings are quite prone to harbor resentments. We
become disturbed about things that happen and almost reflexively cast about for someone
to blame for our difficulties. We so frequently take things personally that I have come to
suspect that our basic hypothesis about how situations arise is by something like agent
causation. Our first thought when disturbed is, "Who did this, and why are they out to do
us wrong?” Instead of this habit, I think our interests would be better served, in many
cases, by responding to disturbing events by looking for impersonal causes. I think this
holds even when persons figure prominently in those events. When people are moved by
impersonal causes whose working they do not control and ultimately cannot resist, then
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the events they figure in are impersonally caused despite the fact that persons are
involved. Reflecting on these claims (somewhat) quenches my reflexive tendency toward
resentment. It also quenches my tendencies toward a particular sort of positive emotion:
gratitude. However it leaves untouched the happiness and admiration I often feel at what
others are moved to do (as well as the disgust and disappointment I feel at other times).
What is lost with gratitude is the same as what is lost in the case of resentment, a special
characteristic way of taking things personally. I may be deluded, but far from seeing such
a change as a catastrophe, as making life not worth continuing, I think the gain outweighs
the loss.
To me, the primary characteristic that distinguishes role responsibility from moral
responsibility is compatibility with lack of control. Suppose that I am disqualified from
the track team due to muscular weakness and lack of coordination. Even if those
disqualifications happened due to factors outside my control, it is still proper that my
desire to be on the team go frustrated. By contrast, it strikes me as a conceptual
impropriety to say that I deserve moral criticism or punishment because of my having
qualities that lead to harm due to bad luck.
The role responsibility analogue of holding people negatively morally responsible
by punishing them is to come to believe that they are unsuited to some of their roles and
to be moved by that belief to no longer support their being in those roles. Irrationality
excludes me from being held morally responsible for what I do, but often will ground my
being held role responsible, that is, for being excluded from a role. Losing my
incumbency in particular roles may affect my life disastrously. It may be a very bad thing
for me, naturalistically, but it is not punishment unless I deserve to lose the role. Even it
those who remove me from the role are mistaken in their judgment that I am unfit to hold
it, they do not treat me unjustly. They do nothing morally wrong by making the mistake
they do, even if that mistake is caused by animosity. They could only do me an injustice
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if they were agents capable of morally right and wrong actions, and I do not believe that
to be the case.
One difference that I think it would make if we were to stop seeing role
disqualification as punishment is that it might diminish resentment on the part of those
disqualified and vindictiveness on the part of those doing the disqualification. Today
many citizens are not inclined to pay taxes to improve prison conditions or to look into
allegations of mistreatment of prisoners. They sometimes explain those attitudes by
saying that prison is supposed to be uncomfortable, degrading and dangerous because
prisoners deserve such conditions. On my role responsibility way of conceiving social
practices, disqualifying individuals from the role of being unsupervised and unconfined is
a sometimes necessary measure of collective self-defense and harm minimization.
However, the people confined are harmed as a means to the benefit of others. If anything,
it seems to me that we should make them as comfortable as we can, to find the least
restrictive ways to contain their harmful dispositions. If we find better structures of
incentives that lead to less destructive behavior, then we shall have enhanced everyone’s
interests.
Assessments of role responsibility give us accountability (I do not get to continue
in a role if I perform it poorly) without moral blame (because I do not control whether I
perform well or poorly). However, sometimes, even if I perform very poorly, I will not
lose a role. Some role incumbents are literally non-replaceable. For example, no one else
can fulfill the role of parent with respect to my children. If I am bad at it, my children are
burdened with having an inadequate father. Sometimes other people, friends or
stepparents, fulfill their roles well, and the damage to the child is mitigated. However, for
many children, there is no real assuaging of the loss of the adequate role-performance
that they wanted from a particular person, their parent. Many children in such situations
seem to spontaneously hit upon the hypothesis that there was something wrong with them
that led their parent to abandon them, either physically or emotionally. I heard an adult
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child of such a father say, “He could be a really great father when he chose to. He was
funny. He would play with me and talk to me and I felt important. But most of the time
he wasn’t that way.’’ Rather than seeing such parents as morally blameworthy, I see them
as unqualified or incompetent, as not having the right stuff. Part of having the right stuff
to competently fill a role often consists in having the right sorts of desires. When he had
such desires, he was “a great father”, but why assume he had a choice about which
desires he had? Rather than moral wrongdoing, I conceive of such situations as
unfortunate tragedies, not as anything that anyone chose to realize from among a set of
genuinely available alternative possibilities.
When I take personal (role) responsibility, I am moved to accept a particular way
of describing what I did. I am moved to an attitude of acceptance toward the
consequences that follow. “I wanted to do well at the track team try-outs, but my times
were just not good enough. As sad and as upset as it makes me, I just have to face the fact
that I will not be on the team.”
Libertarian incompatibilist self-control is different from non-libertarian
incompatibilist self-supervision. Whether or not we have ultimate control over anything,
we still may be moved to accord to people the role of ‘boss’ or ‘executive supervisor'
with respect to this or that enteiprise or effort. Typically, when children are young, their
parents play that role with respect to them, and maturity is a matter of coming to play that
role with respect to oneself, or one’s life. I may not be auto-nomos, that is, I may not
ultimately provide the principles that govern what happens to me or through me, but I
may be auto-archos, the one who occupies the role of archon, or ruler, with respect to my
own life. Unfortunately, the word “autarchy" is already taken, and my dictionary defines
it as “absolute rule”, which is not the concept I am after. There is nothing absolute about
the sort of self-supervision I am discussing. If I perform that role badly enough, and
especially if what I do causes what others take to be their harm, it will be taken away
from me and I shall be placed under the close supervision of others. With respect to this
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sort of self-control, it is not so much something I have as an internal principle or
property, but rather something that others accord to me or leave to me. Self-supervision is
not libertarian freedom, which, I take it, would give us a power of genuine self-control.
Self-supervision is not acting independently of sufficient external conditions. Instead, it is
doing what we do independently of unwanted interference from other people.
C. Non-Libertarian Incompatibilism and Judgmentalism
Non-libertarian incompatibilism may be more similar to what I have called “hard
compatibilism” than to any other competing view. Strict liability role responsibility
assessment may amount to something very close to hard compatibilist moral
accountability assessment. According to both, a certain sort of responsibility is
compatible with lack of control. The difference between hard compatibilists and non-
libertarian incompatibilists is about whether that responsibility without control is moral
responsibility or not. However, most compatibilists are not hard. They hold that control is
necessary for proper accountability, and try to describe a sort of control different from
incompatibilist ultimate control.
Hard compatibilists are typically viewed as being extremely judgmental. Martin
Luther, a hard compatibilist, held that our being morally responsible is compatible with
comprehensive determinism (the ultimate causation of everything that happens by God) 88 .
Jonathan Edwards held that our being morally responsible was compatible with
irrationality and irresistible compulsion86 . Robert Merrihew Adams holds racists and
other harm causers morally responsible even if they are oblivious about what they do
87
.
By contrast, as a non-libertarian incompatibilist, I claim to occupy the least judgmental
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position of all. How can anyone go further than to completely refrain from moral
judgment ? Yet when it comes to non-moral sorts of judgment, I may be as unyielding as
the hard compatibilists are about moral judgment. I may be extremely judgmental,
especially if I feel endangered by particular people occupying the roles they do and
performing them as they do. If someone seems to me to be on the verge of causing me
harm, I will be moved to defend what I take to be my interests. The case of the oblivious
harm-causers, those who are unaware of causing harm, or who argue that what they do is
actually to bring about the good of others, is especially troubling. However, I do not see
them as morally troubling. Rather it is a practical difficulty. It is hard to offer incentives
in a straightforward way to people who are unaware of what they are doing, or who
describe what strikes me as causing harm as instead “being helpful.”
If people have not done anything for which they are morally blameworthy, then it
is conceptually improper to punish them. I take this to be a trivially true claim, to follow
from the definitions of ‘morally blameworthy’ and ‘punish’. However, people who
confuse or blend moral responsibility with role responsibility may reach a different,
mistaken claim: that it is improper to deprive people of their roles if they have not done
anything for which they are to blame morally. If I cannot help but run slowly, then I do
not morally deserve to be dropped from the track team, and if I cannot help being
addicted to alcohol, then I do not morally deserve to be punished by loss of my livelihood
from school bus driving. Yet it is quite proper, I think, for me to lose both those roles
because I no longer qualify for them. Similarly, it some obscure causes move me to want
to severely injure another, and if that desire effectively moves me to inflict the harm, I
may properly lose my role of ‘unconfined and unsupervised member of society . That is,
I may be incarcerated or, at least, closely monitored. As I conceive things, this is not
punishment, but instead rather like the quarantine of a person with a contagious infection.
In my imagined future, courts would not arrive at verdicts of guilt or innocence (which
are categories of moral judgment). Rather they would be procedurally structured social
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mechanisms for admitting or excluding us from social roles. To be excluded from a role 1
want to occupy is a harm. My being allowed to occupy a role may also be a source of
harm. The function of courts would be to weigh the severity of harms and their
probabilities of occurring and to issue rulings about whether or not people should occupy
(or continue to occupy) specific roles. Moral condemnation, punishment, or retribution
would have nothing to do with it.
Somewhat paradoxically, in our contemporary society, some have raised moral
non-judgmentalism to the highest, even the sole, moral value. In a recent book88
,
Alan
Wolfe notes an overwhelming consensus among Americans today in favor of moral non-
judgmentalism and against any attempt by the community to “legislate morality.” The
only thing morally blameworthy is casting blame. Since I hold that no one qualifies for
moral condemnation (or commendation, for that matter) I should escape the opprobrium
of moral non-judgmentalists. However, I take no special pride in that because I do not
think myself morally superior to those who blame. Moreover, what may seem my
extreme moral tolerance and permissiveness toward what others think of as moral evil
leaves virtually unlimited room for non-moral judgmentalism, role responsibility
judgmentalism. If I am oppressed and endangered by someone I consider a powerful
tyrant, I doubt that my thinking him evil would sharpen my efforts to evade damage at his
hands. I imagine my fear would give me enough motivation. If I came to believe that the
tyrant was insane, and if I believed insanity was morally excusing, that would not weaken
my efforts to resist him. It would abolish whatever reason I had to condemn him morally,
but I imagine it would, in anything, sharpen my efforts to evade or depose him.
I suspect that the current opposition to moral judgmentalism arises, at least in
part, from a recognition that we live in a pluralistic society where conscience does not
speak with a single voice in every breast, or speak at all to many. Where there are
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pervasive and intractable disagreements about moral matters or even about what they are,
many sensitive people find themselves asking, “Who am I to judge?”
I think non-judgmentalism in secular moral disputes is quite similar to the notion
of religious toleration, of the agreement to tolerate fundamental disagreement that Locke
argued for in his Letter on Toleration 89 and that found expression in the Establishment
clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. We learned, through the
bitterest sorts of experiences, that we could not enforce religious orthodoxy at an
acceptable cost. Yet, if moral reasons are overriding (as many hold), then how can we
tolerate disagreement? I see a number of ways. We can raise toleration or non-
judgmentalism itself to the position of highest value. We can become relativists or
subjectivists or non-cognitivists about values and, thus, deny that there are fundamental
moral disagreements by saying that there are no objective matters of moral fact. Another
way, the way I find myself favoring, is to avoid moral judgments altogether, and to recast
what had seemed to be disputes about moral matters into non-moral disputes about
differing strategies for securing (non-moral) goods or for avoiding (naturalistic) harms.
If we must work together and live together in the absence of agreement about
moral values, it seems to me our best chance is through giving each other non-moral
incentives. The only other strategies that occur to me are the imposition of some sort of
moral orthodoxy on those who do not adopt it willingly or some sort of segregation of
people with fundamental moral disagreements into separate sub-communities. Even for
those who dispense with specifically moral evaluations, there may still be disagreements.
Whether a scheme of non-moral incentives works as intended depends on how many
people have quirky dispositions to be moved. Even threats of death would not dissuade
those who see such death as a desirable martyrdom. However, my hope is that we will
find more widespread agreement on non-moral incentives than we have on moral values.
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D. Social Conflict as Prisoners’ Dilemmas
I view prisoners' dilemmas as non-moral conflicts. They are situations where my
securing my own interests causes a reduction of the aggregate satisfaction of the interests
of all affected. It seems that non-humans can find themselves in such situations. Beside
the robot conflicts mentioned in Chapter III above, it is arguable that other primates90
,
bats 91
,
and even some fish92 sometimes engage in patterns of behavior that look quite a bit
like prisoners’ dilemmas. It seems to me that the task of a good society, a society through
which the members would have the best chance of reaping the benefits of social life,
would be one that, to the maximum extent possible, abolished or mitigated situations
where non-cooperation, crime, or parasitism paid. Rather than somehow mystify people
into acting against their own self-interests, I imagine the goal of a (non-morally) good
society would be to set things up so that such conflicts of interest are reduced to a
minimum.
Whether such incentive-based social efforts to influence each others’ behavior
succeed or not depends, I think, on people’s beliefs about probabilities. Both Jones and
Smith might have similar desires to do something that would benefit them at a more than
overbalancing cost to others. Both might know about role responsibility strict liability
sanctions in their community that are designed to cancel out the advantage they are drawn
to seek, and yet one may be moved to do the harmful thing and the other not. Jones thinks
the probability of the social sanction occurring is low and Smith thinks it high, or Jones is
more prone to take the risk than Smith. If Jones believes that he is fortune s favorite or
that he is on a divinely inspired mission, he may be confident of success in the face of
90
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whut appeal to eveiyone else as extieme lisks ol failure. How to devise social procedures
to cope with such extreme beliefs so as to minimize damage is a severe problem. Neither
moral exhortations nor the sort of practical incentive offering approach that I favor seems
likely to work against invincible ignorance about probabilities or a belief in one’s
specialness that says, “Paying the price can’t happen to me.” I suppose that the more
certain and swift were the socially contrived consequences, the greater the proportion of
cases where people would be convinced, moved to not do what they otherwise would. To
really effectively discourage the sorts of behavior we want not to have happen might
require a totalitarian surveillance of everyone, coupled with swift and draconian
imposition of disincentives. Perhaps, if we do not want such social arrangements (and I
do not), we will simply bear the greater proportion of parasitic, predatory, and harmful
behavior that results. If that is how we are moved, so be it; but it then seems to me odd to
blame those who we could have deterred under a stronger regime because we found it
inconvenient to live under such a regime.
Sometimes proponents of moral evaluation claim that moral reasons are
overriding, that is, that in any conflict with non-moral reasons, moral reasons “trump.”
That moral reasons should prevail is definitional for some thinkers. This internal claim of
supremacy makes moral evaluative practices self-sealing, immune to certain sorts of
practical criticism. Any consideration that enforcing a practice in general, or in a
particular case, does more (naturalistic) harm than (naturalistic) good is ruled out as
irrelevant, if a moral matter is at stake. This selt-sealing quality of the moral evaluative
strategy protects it, but at our expense if it prevents our moving to other ways that would
serve our ends better.
E. Comparing Moral and Non-Moral Strategies ot Social Control
I think that if we conceived of ourselves as living in a world where moral
evaluative categories did not apply, not only would it not be the case that anything goes,
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but we might well have a lesser frequency of the sorts of harmful events that concern us.
It we take things personally, we will believe that those whose interests conflict with our
own have freely chosen to direct harm at us or those we care about. I believe that such
beliefs lie at the root of some of the most bitter, intractable and destructive enmities. To
the extent that I am a consistent non-libertarian incompatibilist, I do not hold people
morally responsible for being the way they are or for behaving as they do, even when
their behavior affects me most sharply. This is because 1 do not believe that any one of us
has the right sort of control over being as we are or of doing what we do to qualify for
moral accountability.
However, reflecting that I am in no position to blame and they are in no position
to be blamed need not imply that I any less vigorously or effectively defend my interests.
The difference is that I will defend them with a different emotional tone. I grant that in
some cases moral resentment, the belief that one has been unjustly and deliberately
injured by an evil adversary, so inflames us that it gives us greater energy with which to
more effectively defend our interests. Taking things personally marshals our resources in
a way that taking things objectively, as arising out of ultimately impersonal and
uncontrolled circumstances, does not. However, I believe that taking things objectively or
non-agentically also activates our resources, but in different ways. When threatened by
floods, diseases, economic calamities, or social disruptions, our not taking these events as
personal affronts or as due to the machinations of evil elements of the community (or of
evil outsiders) does not imply that we just supinely put up with them. We look for causes,
defenses, warning signs, and ways to improve things. Taking people to be free agents,
especially libertarian free agents, beings who do things independently of causes,
interferes with looking for the causes of what they do because, for such beings, there are
ultimately no such causes.
Among the dangers I fear from taking things from a moral point of view is that ot
getting carried away and inflicting more harm than is necessary lor moving the situation
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and the parties involved so as to avoid our being harmed. If each side of a conflict
believes the other side to be evil and ill-willed, it is difficult to realistically gauge the
comparative harms that have been done and then to come to any settlement short of total
deteat ot one side by the other or ot mutual exhaustion. Perhaps the non-agentic point of
view threatens us with a corresponding danger: rather than too much passion, a lack of
passion, of perhaps seeing what would be the likely best course to a desired outcome, but
not being moved strongly enough to follow it. I think that which of these two approaches
one finds more congenial depends on how repelled one is by their respective dangers.
The danger I see with taking things morally is that moral reasons override reasons of self-
interest. If a person is willing to die for something, it seems likely to me that he or she is
also even more likely to be willing to kill for it. Being prone to disregard one’s own self
interest, to forego prudential rationality, even if it be a sort of madness, may happen to
advance the mad person’s purposes. Yet habitually relying on irrational or non-rational
coping strategies strikes me as quite dangerous, especially in a world where the means of
destruction are so much more powerful than they, historically, have been. When we had
less effective tools for hurting each other, we could afford to feel more extreme
emotional reactions to perceived harms because whatever damage might result would be
relatively limited. Powerful weapons of individual and of mass destruction may have
rendered habits that were once tolerable and even beneficial into unsupportable ones.
F. Conclusions
My claim is that a move away from agentic and toward strict-liability rules need
not imply some cataclysmic catastrophe. I think it would be a real change of tone and
involve a fairly radically different way of thinking about ourselves and what we do, and
would have real consequences for our practices. Yet much of what we already do would
continue unchanged at the behavioral level of description. We would merely think about
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it ditfei ently. I imagine it would also change the patterns of emotions we are subject to
when confronted by unpleasant events.
I do not contend that we face a choice between our prior practices and some new
ones. I doubt that we ever choose among alternatives. Yet they are alternatives in the
sense that one sort ot cause will lead us to settle on one set of practices as our operating
strategy and other causes will lead us to different strategies. My hope is not that we will
(actively) choose to do something else than make moral evaluations of each other, but
that we will be (passively) moved to do something else. I think we would be better off for
having undergone such a change.
If we came to believe that non-libertarian incompatibilism is true and that no one
is ever morally responsible for anything, then why bother? There is no credit for doing
well, and no blame for doing poorly. If those were the only motives for doing anything,
then the question would have real bite. However, plenty of things move us other than
considerations of moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness. Also, the “Why bother?”
question seems to imply that whether we bother about something or not is our action. The
question seems to ask for a different motive for the action of bothering if moral blame
and praise should turn out to not apply to us. However, if bothering about something or,
rather, being bothered about something should turn out to be a passion, something that
happens to us, rather than something that we do, as agents, then the “Why bother?"
question seems to me misplaced. For any given thing, person, or situation, either it will
move me or not. Whether I bother does not seem to me to be up to me.
Even though I do not believe that we are agents with respect to the desires that
move us, I still find myself hoping that an appreciation of what I believe to be the facts
will move us to give up hopes that are contrary to those facts. I think that then we would
thereby attain something like the peace of mind that Stoics such as Epictetus
recommended we achieve by restraining our desires. Epictetus held that we were, or at
least sometimes could be, in agentic control over our desires. He wrote, "Some things are
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up to us and some are not up to us. Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires,
aversions - in short, whatever is our own doing.” Among the things not up to us, not our
doings, he listed “our bodies, our possessions, our reputations, and our public offices.”9*
My view, I believe, is like Stoicism, but just more thoroughgoing. I agree with Epictetus
that we do not control events in the outside world, but differ with him by denying that we
control our inner lives as well. Still, I think the practical effect of my more extensive
belief in non-control may turn out to be similar to the Stoics’ goal. Suppose that 1 do not
have the agentic power to make myself respond with emotional calm to believing I lack
control over what happens. Nevertheless, if I am rational, if I behave consistently with
my beliefs, I will get to that calmness or ataraxia anyway, and not just about external
events, but about my emotional reactions to those events as well. Given the belief that
some desire cannot be satisfied, equanimity (in this case, not feeling frustrated desire)
will follow automatically if we are sufficiently rational. Whether I am cognitively
rational in that way, behaving in accord with my beliefs, is a bit of good fortune when it
happens, rather than something I control, but there is room for hope.
I think moral evaluation based strategies for getting people to do what we want
them to do give us a severely distorted causal account of people's behavior. Moral
evaluations point to the purported agents as the ultimate source of their actions. This
deflects us from looking at other, impersonal causes that may be at work; causes that, if
we found them out, might well yield even more effective ways of influencing each other
and preventing the harms we fear. That there are more effective ways of influencing each
other than by attributing moral responsibility is an empirical claim. Maybe there are no
more effective ways of affecting each other than the moral evaluative way. However, we
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Epictetus, Handbook . Nicholas White, trans., (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1983). p. 1 1 . However,
1 note that Epictetus also writes, “An uneducated person accuses others when he is doing badly; a partly
educated person accuses himself; an educated person accuses neither someone else nor himself. (Ibid- P-
13). The only sense I can make out of this position, which seems to match my own, is that Epictetus does
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will not even be in a position to look tor them unless we at least provisionally put the
moral agentic way of taking things into doubt.
Our customary moral evaluative practices identify the problem as the individual
who acts in the way that leads to harm. I see it as an advantage of non-libertarian
incompatibilism that, by not conceiving of individuals as the ultimate sources of what
they do, it opens up our attempts to understand how problems arise to a consideration of a
larger context than the focal individual, the purported source of the problem, the evil one.
II we find out what causes people to behave in ways that dismay us, then, by affecting
those causes, we have a means to avoid being harmed. To treat people in such ways is to
manipulate them. It would be an insult to the dignity of a free, responsible, self-
controlling being to attempt such manipulation. However, if we are beings who lack
those properties, then I see no insult at all in our mutually influencing each other in such
ways.
If I see a river that frequently floods as an ultimately impersonal product of forces
it does not control, I may react by damming it, or building a levee, or by moving
whatever of my property I can away from it. If others see the river as an agent, as
deliberately causing them harm, then they will take what the river does personally and
resent it. However, I do not see much advantage for them in being moved to take things
in this way. Supposing that the steps I have just listed exhaust the effective responses,
what good does it do people to take things personally? They may build a dam and think
they are punishing or imprisoning the river, but that seems to me extraneous. What they
do that is really effective (I claim) is the same as what I do: build a dam or move away or
fashion a dwelling like a houseboat that will not be damaged by a flood. With respect to
effectiveness in dealing with such an external problem, taking things personally strikes
me as epiphenomenal. Where it seems more likely to help is in our internal, emotional
economy, but even there I have my doubts. It is undoubtedly comforting to think that we
have identified the source of our difficulties. There are also some emotional rewards to
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being indignant or resentful. However, if these emotional reactions rest on a false theory,
a talse causal account of how the situations that disturb us arose, I fear they lead us into
difficulties that more than overbalance these emotional comforts. In any case, I do not
believe that whether I take its behavior personally or not affects what the river does.
Most ot us will agree that taking things personally does not affect the river.
However, the case is obviously different when it comes to things that are persons, such as
human beings. Even if we are not agents, our believing that we are (and others so
believing) does affect us and affects what happens. Some Roman Emperors were
encouraged to believe they had the powers of gods, and even though I do not believe they
had such powers, beliefs that they did have them affected what the Emperors did. I
conceive of the free, yet rationally controlled initiation of a new chain of causes as a
godlike action. That sort of ultimate control over something would seem to me a spot,
however tiny, of omnipotence. Given that power, I am the sole author of the outcomes
that ensue through its exercise. It strikes me as quite plausible that I would be morally
responsible for those outcomes. However, (while admitting I may be wrong) I do not
believe I have such power. If moral evaluative practices rest on irrational (or at least
extra-rational) presuppositions, things ultimately beyond understanding or explanation,
then when we use them we are cut off from whatever correctives careful thought and
investigation might afford us.
I began with a consideration of (what I claimed) were certain aspects of the
common sense concepts of moral evaluation. However, I have wound up with a highly
non-commonsensical claim: that those concepts have no literal application.
Non-libertarian incompatibilism is a deflationary view. It deflates what I consider
our pretensions to be in control of the events that concern us. It deflates the strong
emotions that attributions of literal moral accountability release in many of us. I think
such changes would be good for us, and perhaps that is what leads me to accept the ideas
I do. I would hope that my reasoning was not so loaded and biased by my estimate ot
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what would be practically good for us as to lead me into factual errors, but I do not know
whether that hope is vain or not.
I think it more probable that adherence to the habit of agentic attribution cuts us
off from something useful than that it is a neutral or benign disposition. How could
something so entrenched in virtually every human cultural setting not be beneficial? If it
were a practical detriment, would it not have been selected out long ago? Doesn’t its
ubiquity establish that it must be a beneficial disposition? Yes, it does establish that, I
think, but only within a limited range of circumstances, those under which the disposition
developed and became entrenched. When we did not yet have access to anything but the
crudest naturalistic rules of thumb, when we had no hope of a science that tracks
complicated causal correlations, the agentic way of taking things was the best game in
town, by far. I take it that such has been the human condition everywhere and throughout
history (and pre-history) until quite recently. However, under changed circumstances,
where our powers to carefully gather information and to skillfully analyze it in a
systematic way have increased, what has been common sense may be outstripped, and
eventually largely replaced, by a different, more advantageous way of taking things.
The benefit I imagine resulting from giving up the conception of people as
ultimate actors is a diminishing of vindictiveness and perhaps a diminishing of some of
the harm we do to each other out of the belief that the people harmed morally deserve to
be punished because of their having personally originated situations that displease or
appall us. My imagined substitute is not the Christian ideal of forgiveness, since, on my
view, no one ever is in a position to need forgiveness. Now, if the fire of righteous
indignation, the energy that comes with the firm conviction of one’s own rightness and
the other’s willful, agentic evil, is a necessary condition for any workable social life, then
we are unfortunate. For all I know, we may be unfortunate in just that way. On the other
hand, we may be fortunate enough to have the capacity to come to behave in different
ways if the circumstances make it sufficiently to our advantage to do so. Past strategies,
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which may have served us well in a world where relatively undeveloped technologies set
limits on the damage we could do to each other, may now be too dangerous, given our
recently augmented powers of destruction. 1 hope that we will be wise enough to be
moved to behave differently in response to these changes. A generalized withholding
from moral evaluations may be a part of such a response.
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